Securities-based earnings management in nanks: validation of a two-stage model

• Autor(a) principal: Dantas, José Alves
• Data de Publicação: 2013
• Outros Autores: Medeiros, Otávio Ribeiro de, Galdi, Fernando Caio, Costa, Fábio Moraes da
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Revista Contabilidade & Finanças (Online)
• Texto Completo: https://www.revistas.usp.br/rcf/article/view/58649
• topic: Alisamento de resultados; TVM; Discricionário; Bancos; Manipulação; Earnings management; Securities; Discretionary; Banks; Manipulation

Studies investigating earnings management in banks have been particularly concerned with the use of Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) and mainly use two-stage models to identify discretionary management actions. Another type of record that has received attention from researchers in identifying discretionary management actions is the classification and measurement of the fair value of securities. In this case, however, one-stage models have prevailed. The present study aims to develop and validate a two-stage model for the identification of discretionary management actions using gains obtained from securities. Our model incorporates macroeconomic indicators and specific attributes of the securities portfolios to the traditional parameters used in models previously utilized in the literature. To validate the proposed model, the results are compared with the results from the estimation of a one-stage model - a methodology widely used in the literature. Tests conducted with the two models reveal evidence of income smoothing using securities and the classification of available-for-sale securities among the actions taken by management. The consistency of the results across the two models validates the proposed model, thereby contributing to the development of research on the topic that is not only concerned with determining whether earnings management is practiced but also whether it can be associated with other variables. We also find that securities-based earnings management is more significant in smaller-sized banks and in banks controlled by private capital.