Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruz
Data de Publicação: 2014
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Mises
Texto Completo: https://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/601
Resumo: This article is a brief revisionist study about the history of Antitrust Law, in which we try to demonstrate that, in opposition to what the academic mainstream affirms, the antitrust statutes have not been edited to enforce free competition and/or to maximize the consumer welfare, but to protect inefficient firms who could not survive in a genuine free market, where competition was intense and produced extremely beneficial outcomes for the consumers: constant innovation, increase of production, better products/services and lower prices.
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spelling Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic RevisionAntitruste:: Uma Necessária Revisão HistóricaAntitrusteMonopólioConcorrênciaSherman ActAntitrustMonopolyCompetitionSherman ActThis article is a brief revisionist study about the history of Antitrust Law, in which we try to demonstrate that, in opposition to what the academic mainstream affirms, the antitrust statutes have not been edited to enforce free competition and/or to maximize the consumer welfare, but to protect inefficient firms who could not survive in a genuine free market, where competition was intense and produced extremely beneficial outcomes for the consumers: constant innovation, increase of production, better products/services and lower prices.Este artigo é um breve estudo revisionista da história do direito antitruste, no qual tentamos demonstrar que, ao contrário do que afirma o mainstream acadêmico, as leis antitruste não foram editadas para garantir a livre concorrência e/ou maximizar o bem-estar do consumidor, mas para proteger empresários ineficientes que não conseguiam se manter num ambiente de livre mercado genuíno, em que a competição era intensa e produzia resultados extremamente benéficos para os consumidores: inovação constante, aumento da produção, melhoria dos produtos/serviços e redução dos preços.Instituto Mises Brasil2014-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/60110.30800/mises.2014.v2.601MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2014); 223-250MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2014); 223-250MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; v. 2 n. 1 (2014); 223-2502594-91872318-0811reponame:Misesinstname:Instituto Mises Brasilinstacron:IMBporhttps://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/601/307Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruzinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2019-06-08T02:31:53Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/601Revistahttps://revistamises.org.br/misesjournalPRIhttps://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/oairevista@mises.org.br2594-91872318-0811opendoar:2019-06-08T02:31:53Mises - Instituto Mises Brasilfalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
Antitruste:: Uma Necessária Revisão Histórica
title Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
spellingShingle Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruz
Antitruste
Monopólio
Concorrência
Sherman Act
Antitrust
Monopoly
Competition
Sherman Act
title_short Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
title_full Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
title_fullStr Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
title_full_unstemmed Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
title_sort Antitrust:: A Necessary Historic Revision
author Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruz
author_facet Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruz
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ramos, André Luiz Santa Cruz
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Antitruste
Monopólio
Concorrência
Sherman Act
Antitrust
Monopoly
Competition
Sherman Act
topic Antitruste
Monopólio
Concorrência
Sherman Act
Antitrust
Monopoly
Competition
Sherman Act
description This article is a brief revisionist study about the history of Antitrust Law, in which we try to demonstrate that, in opposition to what the academic mainstream affirms, the antitrust statutes have not been edited to enforce free competition and/or to maximize the consumer welfare, but to protect inefficient firms who could not survive in a genuine free market, where competition was intense and produced extremely beneficial outcomes for the consumers: constant innovation, increase of production, better products/services and lower prices.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/601
10.30800/mises.2014.v2.601
url https://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/601
identifier_str_mv 10.30800/mises.2014.v2.601
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistamises.org.br/misesjournal/article/view/601/307
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto Mises Brasil
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto Mises Brasil
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; Vol. 2 No. 1 (2014); 223-250
MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; Vol. 2 Núm. 1 (2014); 223-250
MISES: Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Law and Economics; v. 2 n. 1 (2014); 223-250
2594-9187
2318-0811
reponame:Mises
instname:Instituto Mises Brasil
instacron:IMB
instname_str Instituto Mises Brasil
instacron_str IMB
institution IMB
reponame_str Mises
collection Mises
repository.name.fl_str_mv Mises - Instituto Mises Brasil
repository.mail.fl_str_mv revista@mises.org.br
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