Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2013 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/1822/24131 |
Resumo: | This paper investigates the effects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles. It transmits relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it acts as a price discrimination device. We look at the firms' optimal advertising and pricing decisions in two settings, namely mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination strategies. In the case of targeted advertising, we show that firms advertise more in its weak market than in its strong market. The analysis highlights that targeted advertising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition. We show that average prices with mass advertising/non-discrimination can be below those with targeted advertising/price discrimination (regardless of the market segment). We also fi nd that, when advertising costs are not too high, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry pro fits at the expense of consumer and overall welfare. Finally, we show that overall welfare and consumer surplus falls when firms use targeted advertising instead of mass advertising. |
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Competitive targeted advertising with price discriminationThis paper investigates the effects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles. It transmits relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it acts as a price discrimination device. We look at the firms' optimal advertising and pricing decisions in two settings, namely mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination strategies. In the case of targeted advertising, we show that firms advertise more in its weak market than in its strong market. The analysis highlights that targeted advertising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition. We show that average prices with mass advertising/non-discrimination can be below those with targeted advertising/price discrimination (regardless of the market segment). We also fi nd that, when advertising costs are not too high, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry pro fits at the expense of consumer and overall welfare. Finally, we show that overall welfare and consumer surplus falls when firms use targeted advertising instead of mass advertising.COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)Universidade do MinhoEsteves, Rosa BrancaResende, Joana20132013-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/1822/24131enghttp://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2013/NIPE_WP_07_2013.pdfinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2023-07-21T12:41:08ZPortal AgregadorONG |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
title |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
spellingShingle |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination Esteves, Rosa Branca |
title_short |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
title_full |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
title_fullStr |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
title_full_unstemmed |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
title_sort |
Competitive targeted advertising with price discrimination |
author |
Esteves, Rosa Branca |
author_facet |
Esteves, Rosa Branca Resende, Joana |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Resende, Joana |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Esteves, Rosa Branca Resende, Joana |
description |
This paper investigates the effects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles. It transmits relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it acts as a price discrimination device. We look at the firms' optimal advertising and pricing decisions in two settings, namely mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination strategies. In the case of targeted advertising, we show that firms advertise more in its weak market than in its strong market. The analysis highlights that targeted advertising might constitute a tool to dampen price competition. We show that average prices with mass advertising/non-discrimination can be below those with targeted advertising/price discrimination (regardless of the market segment). We also fi nd that, when advertising costs are not too high, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry pro fits at the expense of consumer and overall welfare. Finally, we show that overall welfare and consumer surplus falls when firms use targeted advertising instead of mass advertising. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2013 2013-01-01T00:00:00Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/24131 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/1822/24131 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www3.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe/docs/2013/NIPE_WP_07_2013.pdf |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
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Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação |
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RCAAP |
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RCAAP |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) |
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