Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pires, Cesaltina
Data de Publicação: 2000
Outros Autores: Sarkar, Soumodip
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260
Resumo: This paper presents a model of delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists operating in a linear city with two types of consumers and having incomplete information. At each location, the higher cost firm offers a uniform price equal to its delivered marginal cost while the lower cost firm offers a nonlinear tariff. For nearby locations, the lower cost firm may charge monopoly nonlinear prices, but as the distance increases the quantity consumed by the low valuation consumer becomes less inefficient than under monopoly. In the market region closest to the competitor’s market we get an efficient outcome. If firms choose locations, before choosing tariff schedules, they will locate at the median of their equilibrium sales distribution.
id RCAP_9b44d690ec61b3f4fc2435111a4b7dc5
oai_identifier_str oai:dspace.uevora.pt:10174/2260
network_acronym_str RCAP
network_name_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository_id_str 7160
spelling Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolistsNonlinear pricingDelivered pricingThis paper presents a model of delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists operating in a linear city with two types of consumers and having incomplete information. At each location, the higher cost firm offers a uniform price equal to its delivered marginal cost while the lower cost firm offers a nonlinear tariff. For nearby locations, the lower cost firm may charge monopoly nonlinear prices, but as the distance increases the quantity consumed by the low valuation consumer becomes less inefficient than under monopoly. In the market region closest to the competitor’s market we get an efficient outcome. If firms choose locations, before choosing tariff schedules, they will locate at the median of their equilibrium sales distribution.Elsevier2010-12-06T14:12:34Z2010-12-062000-01-01T00:00:00Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article151582 bytesapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260eng429–45630Regional Science and Urban EconomicslivreDepartamento de Gestãocpires@uevora.ptssarkar@uevora.pt639Pires, CesaltinaSarkar, Soumodipinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãoinstacron:RCAAP2024-01-03T18:38:37Zoai:dspace.uevora.pt:10174/2260Portal AgregadorONGhttps://www.rcaap.pt/oai/openaireopendoar:71602024-03-20T00:58:00.559717Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informaçãofalse
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
title Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
spellingShingle Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
Pires, Cesaltina
Nonlinear pricing
Delivered pricing
title_short Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
title_full Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
title_fullStr Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
title_full_unstemmed Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
title_sort Delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists
author Pires, Cesaltina
author_facet Pires, Cesaltina
Sarkar, Soumodip
author_role author
author2 Sarkar, Soumodip
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pires, Cesaltina
Sarkar, Soumodip
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Nonlinear pricing
Delivered pricing
topic Nonlinear pricing
Delivered pricing
description This paper presents a model of delivered nonlinear pricing by duopolists operating in a linear city with two types of consumers and having incomplete information. At each location, the higher cost firm offers a uniform price equal to its delivered marginal cost while the lower cost firm offers a nonlinear tariff. For nearby locations, the lower cost firm may charge monopoly nonlinear prices, but as the distance increases the quantity consumed by the low valuation consumer becomes less inefficient than under monopoly. In the market region closest to the competitor’s market we get an efficient outcome. If firms choose locations, before choosing tariff schedules, they will locate at the median of their equilibrium sales distribution.
publishDate 2000
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2000-01-01T00:00:00Z
2010-12-06T14:12:34Z
2010-12-06
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260
http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260
url http://hdl.handle.net/10174/2260
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 429–456
30
Regional Science and Urban Economics
livre
Departamento de Gestão
cpires@uevora.pt
ssarkar@uevora.pt
639
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 151582 bytes
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
instname:Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron:RCAAP
instname_str Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
instacron_str RCAAP
institution RCAAP
reponame_str Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
collection Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (Repositórios Cientìficos) - Agência para a Sociedade do Conhecimento (UMIC) - FCT - Sociedade da Informação
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1799136463866036224