Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long.
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Publication Date: | 2017 |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | eng |
Source: | Repositório Institucional da UFOP |
Download full: | http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/handle/123456789/9413 https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030035 |
Summary: | Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability. |
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Wardil, LucasAmaral, Marco Antonio2018-02-01T14:11:05Z2018-02-01T14:11:05Z2017WARDIL, L.; AMARAL, M. A. Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long. Games, v. 8, p. 35-49, 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35>. Acesso em: 16 jan. 2018.2073-4336http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/handle/123456789/9413https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030035Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability.This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license. Fonte: o próprio artigo.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEvolutionary game theoryPublic goods gameRepeated gamesFixation probabilityCooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleengreponame:Repositório Institucional da UFOPinstname:Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (UFOP)instacron:UFOPLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-8924http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/bitstream/123456789/9413/2/license.txt62604f8d955274beb56c80ce1ee5dcaeMD52ORIGINALARTIGO_CooperationPublicGoods.pdfARTIGO_CooperationPublicGoods.pdfapplication/pdf714860http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/bitstream/123456789/9413/1/ARTIGO_CooperationPublicGoods.pdfa76e226e568e743a313cd301b1f4d888MD51123456789/94132020-02-27 10:28:49.589oai:localhost: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ório InstitucionalPUBhttp://www.repositorio.ufop.br/oai/requestrepositorio@ufop.edu.bropendoar:32332020-02-27T15:28:49Repositório Institucional da UFOP - Universidade Federal de Ouro Preto (UFOP)false |
dc.title.pt_BR.fl_str_mv |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
title |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
spellingShingle |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. Wardil, Lucas Evolutionary game theory Public goods game Repeated games Fixation probability |
title_short |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
title_full |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
title_fullStr |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
title_sort |
Cooperation in public goods games : stay, but not for too long. |
author |
Wardil, Lucas |
author_facet |
Wardil, Lucas Amaral, Marco Antonio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Amaral, Marco Antonio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Wardil, Lucas Amaral, Marco Antonio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Evolutionary game theory Public goods game Repeated games Fixation probability |
topic |
Evolutionary game theory Public goods game Repeated games Fixation probability |
description |
Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because cooperators would collect greater payoffs. In the context of evolutionary game theory, individuals that always cooperate cannot win the competition against defectors in well-mixed populations. Here, we study the evolution of a population where fitness is obtained in repeated public goods games and players have a fixed probability of playing the next round. As a result, the group size decreases during the game. The population is well-mixed and there are only two available strategies: always cooperate (ALLC) or always defect (ALLD). Through numerical calculation and analytical approximations we show that cooperation can emerge if the players stay playing the game, but not for too long. The essential mechanism is the interaction between the transition from strong to weak altruism, as the group size decreases, and the existence of an upper limit to the number of rounds representing limited time availability. |
publishDate |
2017 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2017 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2018-02-01T14:11:05Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2018-02-01T14:11:05Z |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
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publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv |
WARDIL, L.; AMARAL, M. A. Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long. Games, v. 8, p. 35-49, 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35>. Acesso em: 16 jan. 2018. |
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http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/handle/123456789/9413 |
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2073-4336 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030035 |
identifier_str_mv |
WARDIL, L.; AMARAL, M. A. Cooperation in public goods games: stay, but not for too long. Games, v. 8, p. 35-49, 2017. Disponível em: <http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/8/3/35>. Acesso em: 16 jan. 2018. 2073-4336 |
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http://www.repositorio.ufop.br/handle/123456789/9413 https://doi.org/10.3390/g8030035 |
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eng |
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