Governança corporativa e investidores institucionais: o impacto do ativismo no desempenho das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil

• Autor(a) principal: Melo, Lauro Cesar Silva
• Data de Publicação: 2017
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Universitário da Ânima (RUNA)
• Texto Completo: https://repositorio.animaeducacao.com.br/handle/ANIMA/2871
• topic: Ativismo; Investidor institucional; Governança corporativa; Desempenho

Institutional investors are relevant to global macroeconomic development, in which pension funds, investment funds and foreign investors stand out. In this context, institutional investors represent a group that holds the largest volume of capital resources in the world (MONKS; MINOW, 2004). The role of the institutional investor as a shareholder has evolved with increasing ownership in companies, moving from a passive shareholder position to an active participant in corporate governance (GILLAN, STARKS, 2000). This active positioning of the institutional investor, known as activism, can be defined as a movement of direct interference in the management of executives, through corporate governance, in which the participation of shareholders in control enables a positive agenda focused on defending the interests of owners of the company (CRISÓSTOMO; GONZÁLEZ, 2006; GILLAN; STARKS, 2000; PUNSUVO; KAYO; BARROS, 2007). The measures of the activism effects of institutional investors go through the observance of the effective performance of the board of directors as one of the main forms of activism (ARANHA; ROSSONI; MENDES DA SILVA, 2016; ROSSONI; MACHADO DA SILVA, 2010). The typification of these measures is related to the characteristics of the activities carried out by the board of directors, focusing on the best performance, either in market value or in operational performance (GILLAN; STARKS, 2000). This paper aims to analyze the impact of institutional investors activism on the performance of publicly traded companies in Brazil. The agency theory was used for this analysis (JENSEN; MECKLING, 1976; EISENHARDT, 1989). Based on the classification of activism, in the light of the theoretical reference, data on the activism of listed companies, from 2006 to 2015, were extracted from the minutes of the annual meetings of the board of directors published on the BMF&BOVESPA website. The economic-financial data of the companies were extracted from Economatica®. The final sample had 351 companies, which generated 12338 comments about activism. Performance was measured using two variables: ROE and Market Value (Tobin's Q). For the data analysis we opted for a panel data effects model. The regressions were performed using fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE) and moderating effect, using STATA® software to estimate the models. The governance index of the segments listed on the BM & FBOVESPA was adopted with a moderating variable. The relationship between corporate governance and activism and its effect on performance was tested. The results confirm the significance of the relation of activism and performance with negative effect. The moderating effect of the governance index under activism has proved to be significant in companies where this index is traditional (less stringent governance rules) and its effect on performance increased ROE by 4%.