ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165 |
Resumo: | Objective: I suggest that Ronald Dworkin's theory of associative political obligations, known for justifying moral obedience to law by citizens, especially judges, is incorrect. Associative theories propose that the bond formed between individuals in social practices is the factor responsible for justifying moral obligations. However, associative ties will prove to be incompatible with the socio-political context, especially regarding the role played by judges.Methodology: I present a critical-reflective exposition of the main arguments for and against Dworkin's associative obligations. The theoretical discussion assumes assumptions of analytic philosophy, where I proceed with a normative analysis about this type of obligation.Results: I try to demonstrate how associative reasons that underlie the theory under discussion are motivated by more intimate and partial social relationships between individuals. Hence, they would be incompatible with the kind of moral and political obligation expected between citizens and judges.Contributions: the arguments discussed outline the limits and scope of theories based on associative obligations. They also allow for a more careful reflection on the normative justification of the political obligations of citizens and judges. |
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ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGESOBLIGACIONES POLÍTICAS ASOCIATIVAS Y (O) DE PAPEL: UNA CRÍTICA DE LA TEORÍA DE DWORKIN SOBRE LA OBEDIENCIA DE LO DERECHO POR PARTE DE CIUDADANOS Y JUECESOBRIGAÇÕES POLÍTICAS ASSOCIATIVAS E (OU) DE PAPEL: UMA CRÍTICA À TEORIA DE DWORKIN PARA A OBEDIÊNCIA DO DIREITO POR CIDADÃOS E JUÍZESpolitical obligationsassociative reasonsrole reasonsprofessional ethicsjudicial decisionsobligaciones políticasrazones associativasrazones del papelética professionaldecisiones judicialesobrigações políticasrazões associativasrazões de papelética profissionaldecisões judiciaisObjective: I suggest that Ronald Dworkin's theory of associative political obligations, known for justifying moral obedience to law by citizens, especially judges, is incorrect. Associative theories propose that the bond formed between individuals in social practices is the factor responsible for justifying moral obligations. However, associative ties will prove to be incompatible with the socio-political context, especially regarding the role played by judges.Methodology: I present a critical-reflective exposition of the main arguments for and against Dworkin's associative obligations. The theoretical discussion assumes assumptions of analytic philosophy, where I proceed with a normative analysis about this type of obligation.Results: I try to demonstrate how associative reasons that underlie the theory under discussion are motivated by more intimate and partial social relationships between individuals. Hence, they would be incompatible with the kind of moral and political obligation expected between citizens and judges.Contributions: the arguments discussed outline the limits and scope of theories based on associative obligations. They also allow for a more careful reflection on the normative justification of the political obligations of citizens and judges.Objetivo: Sugiero que la teoría de las obligaciones políticas asociativas de Ronald Dworkin, conocida por justificar la obediencia moral a lo derecho por parte de los ciudadanos, especialmente los jueces, es incorrecta. Las teorías asociativas proponen que el vínculo que se forma entre los individuos en las prácticas sociales es el factor responsable de justificar las obligaciones morales. Sin embargo, los lazos asociativos resultarán incompatibles con el contexto sociopolítico, especialmente en lo que se refiere al papel que juegan los jueces.Metodología: Presento una exposición crítico-reflexiva de los principales argumentos a favor y en contra de las obligaciones asociativas de Dworkin. La discusión teórica asume supuestos de la filosofía analítica, donde procedo con un análisis normativo sobre este tipo de obligación.Resultados: Intento demostrar cómo las razones asociativas que subyacen a la teoría en discusión están motivadas por relaciones sociales más íntimas y parciales entre los individuos. Por lo tanto, serían incompatibles con el tipo de obligación moral y política esperada entre ciudadanos y jueces.Contribuciones: Los argumentos discutidos esbozan los límites y el alcance de las teorías basadas en las obligaciones asociativas. También permiten una reflexión más cuidadosa sobre la justificación normativa de las obligaciones políticas de ciudadanos y jueces.Objetivo: sugiro que a teoria das obrigações políticas associativas de Ronald Dworkin, conhecida por justificar a obediência moral ao direito pelos cidadãos, especialmente os juízes, está incorreta. Teorias associativas propõem que o vínculo constituído entre os indivíduos em práticas sociais é o fator responsável por justificar obrigações morais. Porém, vínculos associativos se mostrarão incompatíveis com o contexto sociopolítico, sobretudo, quanto ao papel exercido pelos juízes.Metodologia: apresento uma exposição crítico-reflexiva dos principais argumentos em favor e contra as obrigações associativas de Dworkin. A discussão teórica assume pressupostos da filosofia analítica, em que prossigo com uma análise normativa acerca desse tipo de obrigação.Resultados: procuro demonstrar como razões associativas que embasam a teoria em discussão são motivadas por relacionamentos sociais mais íntimos e parciais entre os indivíduos. Por isso, elas seriam incompatíveis com o tipo de obrigação moral e política esperado entre cidadãos e juízes.Contribuições: os argumentos abordados traçam quais são os limites e o escopo de teorias baseadas em obrigações associativas. Também permitem uma reflexão mais cuidadosa acerca da justificação normativa das obrigações políticas dos cidadãos e dos juízes.Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus)2023-02-06info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArtigoapplication/pdfapplication/xmlhttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/416510.12662/2447-6641oj.v21i36.p55-84.2023Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 No. 36 (2023); 55-84Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 Núm. 36 (2023); 55-84Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 No 36 (2023); 55-84Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 21 n. 36 (2023); 55-842447-66411806-042010.12662/2447-6641oj.v21i36.2023reponame:Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)instname:Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus)instacron:UNICHRISTUSporhttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165/1698https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165/1714Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFaggion, Vinicius de Souza2023-03-01T11:45:22Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/4165Revistahttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridicaPRIhttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/oaiopiniaojuridica01@unichristus.edu.br || secretaria.oj@unichristus.edu.br2447-66411806-0420opendoar:2023-03-01T11:45:22Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) - Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES OBLIGACIONES POLÍTICAS ASOCIATIVAS Y (O) DE PAPEL: UNA CRÍTICA DE LA TEORÍA DE DWORKIN SOBRE LA OBEDIENCIA DE LO DERECHO POR PARTE DE CIUDADANOS Y JUECES OBRIGAÇÕES POLÍTICAS ASSOCIATIVAS E (OU) DE PAPEL: UMA CRÍTICA À TEORIA DE DWORKIN PARA A OBEDIÊNCIA DO DIREITO POR CIDADÃOS E JUÍZES |
title |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
spellingShingle |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES Faggion, Vinicius de Souza political obligations associative reasons role reasons professional ethics judicial decisions obligaciones políticas razones associativas razones del papel ética professional decisiones judiciales obrigações políticas razões associativas razões de papel ética profissional decisões judiciais |
title_short |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
title_full |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
title_fullStr |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
title_full_unstemmed |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
title_sort |
ASSOCIATIVE AND (OR) ROLE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS: A CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN'S THEORY FOR THE OBEDIENCE OF LAW BY CITIZENS AND JUDGES |
author |
Faggion, Vinicius de Souza |
author_facet |
Faggion, Vinicius de Souza |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Faggion, Vinicius de Souza |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
political obligations associative reasons role reasons professional ethics judicial decisions obligaciones políticas razones associativas razones del papel ética professional decisiones judiciales obrigações políticas razões associativas razões de papel ética profissional decisões judiciais |
topic |
political obligations associative reasons role reasons professional ethics judicial decisions obligaciones políticas razones associativas razones del papel ética professional decisiones judiciales obrigações políticas razões associativas razões de papel ética profissional decisões judiciais |
description |
Objective: I suggest that Ronald Dworkin's theory of associative political obligations, known for justifying moral obedience to law by citizens, especially judges, is incorrect. Associative theories propose that the bond formed between individuals in social practices is the factor responsible for justifying moral obligations. However, associative ties will prove to be incompatible with the socio-political context, especially regarding the role played by judges.Methodology: I present a critical-reflective exposition of the main arguments for and against Dworkin's associative obligations. The theoretical discussion assumes assumptions of analytic philosophy, where I proceed with a normative analysis about this type of obligation.Results: I try to demonstrate how associative reasons that underlie the theory under discussion are motivated by more intimate and partial social relationships between individuals. Hence, they would be incompatible with the kind of moral and political obligation expected between citizens and judges.Contributions: the arguments discussed outline the limits and scope of theories based on associative obligations. They also allow for a more careful reflection on the normative justification of the political obligations of citizens and judges. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-02-06 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Artigo |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165 10.12662/2447-6641oj.v21i36.p55-84.2023 |
url |
https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.12662/2447-6641oj.v21i36.p55-84.2023 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165/1698 https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/4165/1714 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2023 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/xml |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus) |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus) |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 No. 36 (2023); 55-84 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 Núm. 36 (2023); 55-84 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); Vol. 21 No 36 (2023); 55-84 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 21 n. 36 (2023); 55-84 2447-6641 1806-0420 10.12662/2447-6641oj.v21i36.2023 reponame:Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) instname:Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus) instacron:UNICHRISTUS |
instname_str |
Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus) |
instacron_str |
UNICHRISTUS |
institution |
UNICHRISTUS |
reponame_str |
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) |
collection |
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) - Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
opiniaojuridica01@unichristus.edu.br || secretaria.oj@unichristus.edu.br |
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1797052896073744384 |