ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Zezza, Michele Beniamino
Data de Publicação: 2021
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541
Resumo: The article describes two different miimalist approaches in the field of recognition and protection of rights: the anti-conflictual and the liberal variants. It explores their historical-cultural assumptions and highlights their main elements of their unreasonableness.Methodology: To this end, we use some theoretical tools deriving from the combination of contemporary interest theory with a dynamic approach.Aim: One of the most relevant purposes of the research is to demonstrate the theoretical non-sustainability of those reconstructions which attributes to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public provisions. Achievement: The combination of these frameworks (dynamic theory and interest theory) provides a valid conceptual basis for the recognition of social rights in a parity plan regarding traditional rights of freedom; on the other hand, this position leads directly to the rejection of minimalism: classical civil liberties, just as the material conditions necessary for a dignified living, make up protected goods or interests of the subjects who demand positive benefits to be guaranteed.Contributions: The work provides a philosophical research on the theoretical foundations of social rights in relation to the classical liberal rights of the first generation acquires a special relevance within the project. The present study looks forward to contributing to the unsustainability of those reconstructions that attribute to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public benefits of the State.
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spelling ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACHSOBRE EL MINIMALISMO ANTI-CONFLICTIVISTA Y LIBERAL: UN ANÁLISIS DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DE LA INTEREST THEORY Y DEL ENFOQUE DINÁMICOANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACHFilosofia do direitoAnti-conflictualist minimalism; Liberal minimalism; Interest theory; Dynamic approachMinimalismo anti-conflictivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Enfoque dinámicoMinimalismo anti-conflitivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Abordagem dinâmicaThe article describes two different miimalist approaches in the field of recognition and protection of rights: the anti-conflictual and the liberal variants. It explores their historical-cultural assumptions and highlights their main elements of their unreasonableness.Methodology: To this end, we use some theoretical tools deriving from the combination of contemporary interest theory with a dynamic approach.Aim: One of the most relevant purposes of the research is to demonstrate the theoretical non-sustainability of those reconstructions which attributes to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public provisions. Achievement: The combination of these frameworks (dynamic theory and interest theory) provides a valid conceptual basis for the recognition of social rights in a parity plan regarding traditional rights of freedom; on the other hand, this position leads directly to the rejection of minimalism: classical civil liberties, just as the material conditions necessary for a dignified living, make up protected goods or interests of the subjects who demand positive benefits to be guaranteed.Contributions: The work provides a philosophical research on the theoretical foundations of social rights in relation to the classical liberal rights of the first generation acquires a special relevance within the project. The present study looks forward to contributing to the unsustainability of those reconstructions that attribute to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public benefits of the State.El artículo describe dos enfoques minimalistas diferentes en materia de reconocimiento y protección de los derechos: las variantes anti-conflictivista y liberal. En ello, se reconstruyen sus fundamentos histórico-culturales y se destacan los principales elementos de su insostenibilidad teórica. Metodología. Para este fin, se utilizan algunas herramientas teóricas derivadas de la combinación de la interest theory contemporánea con un enfoque dinámico.Objetivo: Uno de los propósitos más relevantes de la investigación es demostrar la no sustentabilidad teórica de esas reconstrucciones, que atribuye a la sucesión histórica de las diferentes categorías de derechos una clara distinción estructural entre derechos negativos, entendidos como “autoejecutivos”, y derechos positivos a prestaciones públicas.Resultado: La conjunción de estos dos planteamientos (teoría dinámica e interest theory) proporciona un válido fundamento conceptual al reconocimiento de los derechos sociales, en un plano de paridad respecto a los tradicionales derechos de libertad; por otra parte, esta posición lleva directamente al rechazo del minimalismo: las libertades civiles clásicas, de la misma manera de las condiciones materiales necesarias para una existencia digna, constituyen bienes o intereses protegidos de los sujetos que exigen prestaciones positivas para ser garantizados. Contribuciones: El análisis realiza una investigación filosófica sobre los fundamentos teóricos de los derechos sociales respecto a los derechos liberales clásicos de la primera generación. Se produce, en este sentido, un desarrollo doctrinal de las bases conceptuales orientado a acabar definitivamente con la concepción canónica que defiende la superioridad axiológica de los derechos de la tradición liberal.O artigo descreve duas abordagens minimalistas diferentes em matéria de reconhecimento e proteção de direitos: as variantes anti-conflitivista e liberal. Nele, se reconstroem seus fundamentos histórico-culturais e se destacam os principais elementos de sua insustentabilidade teórica.Metodologia: Para esse efeito, utilizam-se algumas ferramentas teóricas derivadas da combinação da interest theory contemporânea com uma abordagem dinâmica.Objetivo: Um dos objetivos mais relevantes da pesquisa consiste em demonstrar a insustentabilidade teórica daquelas reconstruções que atribuem à sucessão histórica das diferentes categorias de direitos uma clara distinção estrutural entre direitos negativos, entendidos como “autoexecutivos”, e direitos positivos a prestações públicas.Resultado: A conjunção dessas duas abordagens (teoria dinâmica e interest theory) fornece uma base conceitual adecuada para o reconhecimento dos direitos sociais em um nível de paridade em relação com os direitos tradicionais de liberdade; por outro lado, esta posição conduz diretamente à rejeição do minimalismo: as liberdades civis clássicas, da mesma forma que as condições materiais necessárias para uma existência digna, constituem bens ou interesses protegidos dos sujeitos que exigem prestações para serem garantidos. Contribuições: A análise realiza uma investigação filosófica sobre os fundamentos teóricos dos direitos sociais em relação aos direitos liberais clássicos da primeira geração. Nesse sentido, produz-se um desenvolvimento doutrinal das suas bases conceituais com o objetivo de acabar definitivamente com a concepção canônica que defende a superioridade axiológica dos direitos da tradição liberal.Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus)FapespZezza, Michele Beniamino2021-01-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/xmlhttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/354110.12662/2447-6641oj.v19i30.p149-174.2021Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-1742447-66411806-042010.12662/2447-6641oj.v19i30.2021reponame:Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)instname:Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus)instacron:UNICHRISTUSenghttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541/1261https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541/1288Direitos autorais 2021 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2021-04-23T13:39:35Zoai:ojs.unichristus.emnuvens.com.br:article/3541Revistahttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridicaPRIhttps://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/oaiopiniaojuridica01@unichristus.edu.br || secretaria.oj@unichristus.edu.br2447-66411806-0420opendoar:2021-04-23T13:39:35Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza) - Centro Universitário Christus (Unichristus)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
SOBRE EL MINIMALISMO ANTI-CONFLICTIVISTA Y LIBERAL: UN ANÁLISIS DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DE LA INTEREST THEORY Y DEL ENFOQUE DINÁMICO
ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
title ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
spellingShingle ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
Zezza, Michele Beniamino
Filosofia do direito
Anti-conflictualist minimalism; Liberal minimalism; Interest theory; Dynamic approach
Minimalismo anti-conflictivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Enfoque dinámico
Minimalismo anti-conflitivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Abordagem dinâmica
title_short ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
title_full ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
title_fullStr ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
title_full_unstemmed ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
title_sort ANTI-CONFLICTUALIST AND LIBERAL MINIMALISM OF RIGHTS: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTEREST THEORY AND THE DYNAMIC APPROACH
author Zezza, Michele Beniamino
author_facet Zezza, Michele Beniamino
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Fapesp


dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Zezza, Michele Beniamino
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv

dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Filosofia do direito
Anti-conflictualist minimalism; Liberal minimalism; Interest theory; Dynamic approach
Minimalismo anti-conflictivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Enfoque dinámico
Minimalismo anti-conflitivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Abordagem dinâmica
topic Filosofia do direito
Anti-conflictualist minimalism; Liberal minimalism; Interest theory; Dynamic approach
Minimalismo anti-conflictivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Enfoque dinámico
Minimalismo anti-conflitivista; Minimalismo liberal; Interest theory; Abordagem dinâmica
description The article describes two different miimalist approaches in the field of recognition and protection of rights: the anti-conflictual and the liberal variants. It explores their historical-cultural assumptions and highlights their main elements of their unreasonableness.Methodology: To this end, we use some theoretical tools deriving from the combination of contemporary interest theory with a dynamic approach.Aim: One of the most relevant purposes of the research is to demonstrate the theoretical non-sustainability of those reconstructions which attributes to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public provisions. Achievement: The combination of these frameworks (dynamic theory and interest theory) provides a valid conceptual basis for the recognition of social rights in a parity plan regarding traditional rights of freedom; on the other hand, this position leads directly to the rejection of minimalism: classical civil liberties, just as the material conditions necessary for a dignified living, make up protected goods or interests of the subjects who demand positive benefits to be guaranteed.Contributions: The work provides a philosophical research on the theoretical foundations of social rights in relation to the classical liberal rights of the first generation acquires a special relevance within the project. The present study looks forward to contributing to the unsustainability of those reconstructions that attribute to the historical succession of the different categories of rights a clear structural distinction between negative rights, understood as “self-executing”, and positive rights to public benefits of the State.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-26
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv



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url https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541
identifier_str_mv 10.12662/2447-6641oj.v19i30.p149-174.2021
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541/1261
https://periodicos.unichristus.edu.br/opiniaojuridica/article/view/3541/1288
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Direitos autorais 2021 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
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rights_invalid_str_mv Direitos autorais 2021 Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza)
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Instituto para o Desenvolvimento da Educacao (Centro Universitário Christus - Unichristus)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174
Revista Opinião Jurídica (Fortaleza); v. 19, n. 30 (2021); 149-174
2447-6641
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