The Impossibility of Maintaining the Minimal State of Robert Nozick

• Autor(a) principal: Paula, Virgílio Queiroz de
• Data de Publicação: 2015
• Outros Autores: Oliveira, Adriano Ferreira de
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Filosofia do Direito
• Texto Completo: https://www.indexlaw.org/index.php/filosofiadireito/article/view/950
• topic: Anarchy, state and utopia; Game theory; Prisoner's dilemma; Logic of collective action; Free-rider; Anarquia, estado e utopia; Teoria dos jogos; Dilema do prisioneiro; Lógica da ação coletiva; Free-rider

In this paper we analyze how Robert Nozicks minimal state proposed would invariably end, unless its members were coerced by the central government to contribute to its maintenance. And, in this case, rights and freedom protected under the philosophers state would obviously be violated. We also analyze the flaws in Nozicks model through economic bias in order to show - through game theory and logic of collective action  how an organization that provides nonexclusive public goods is vulnerable to the action of free-riders, thus increasing the costs of its performance, and decreasing motivation for its existence.