Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista de Economia Política |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572021000300525 |
Resumo: | ABSTRACT The growing number of users, about 250 million, in 2016, and the sheer number of health problems, that cause 190,000 deaths per year, are just some of the data that has rekindled the debate and discussion into the efficiency of the prohibitionist drug policies concerning drug consumption throughout the world. As a result, there has been the establishment of a special branch of literature focused on the investigation into this theme. In this regard, the present article conducts an economic analysis of scenarios where there is no decriminalization of drugs and other areas where legalization has been partial (marijuana) or complete, based on Game Theory. Thus, different from other studies, this paper establishes conditions of compatibility of incentives so that the economy could become formal, after decriminalization, to avoid contraband under a legal guise. This paper also manages to show which situation (Nash equilibrium) provides the greatest well-being for society. |
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Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviourDrug traffickingsmugglingdrug legalizationGame TheoryABSTRACT The growing number of users, about 250 million, in 2016, and the sheer number of health problems, that cause 190,000 deaths per year, are just some of the data that has rekindled the debate and discussion into the efficiency of the prohibitionist drug policies concerning drug consumption throughout the world. As a result, there has been the establishment of a special branch of literature focused on the investigation into this theme. In this regard, the present article conducts an economic analysis of scenarios where there is no decriminalization of drugs and other areas where legalization has been partial (marijuana) or complete, based on Game Theory. Thus, different from other studies, this paper establishes conditions of compatibility of incentives so that the economy could become formal, after decriminalization, to avoid contraband under a legal guise. This paper also manages to show which situation (Nash equilibrium) provides the greatest well-being for society.Centro de Economia Política2021-09-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572021000300525Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.41 n.3 2021reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/0101-31572021-3117info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessALBUQUERQUEMELLO,VINÍCIUS PHILLIPE DERAMOS,FRANCISCO S.eng2021-07-12T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31572021000300525Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2021-07-12T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
title |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
spellingShingle |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour ALBUQUERQUEMELLO,VINÍCIUS PHILLIPE DE Drug trafficking smuggling drug legalization Game Theory |
title_short |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
title_full |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
title_fullStr |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
title_full_unstemmed |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
title_sort |
Legalization of drugs and strategic behaviour |
author |
ALBUQUERQUEMELLO,VINÍCIUS PHILLIPE DE |
author_facet |
ALBUQUERQUEMELLO,VINÍCIUS PHILLIPE DE RAMOS,FRANCISCO S. |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
RAMOS,FRANCISCO S. |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
ALBUQUERQUEMELLO,VINÍCIUS PHILLIPE DE RAMOS,FRANCISCO S. |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Drug trafficking smuggling drug legalization Game Theory |
topic |
Drug trafficking smuggling drug legalization Game Theory |
description |
ABSTRACT The growing number of users, about 250 million, in 2016, and the sheer number of health problems, that cause 190,000 deaths per year, are just some of the data that has rekindled the debate and discussion into the efficiency of the prohibitionist drug policies concerning drug consumption throughout the world. As a result, there has been the establishment of a special branch of literature focused on the investigation into this theme. In this regard, the present article conducts an economic analysis of scenarios where there is no decriminalization of drugs and other areas where legalization has been partial (marijuana) or complete, based on Game Theory. Thus, different from other studies, this paper establishes conditions of compatibility of incentives so that the economy could become formal, after decriminalization, to avoid contraband under a legal guise. This paper also manages to show which situation (Nash equilibrium) provides the greatest well-being for society. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-09-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572021000300525 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572021000300525 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0101-31572021-3117 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.41 n.3 2021 reponame:Revista de Economia Política instname:EDITORA 34 instacron:EDITORA_34 |
instname_str |
EDITORA 34 |
instacron_str |
EDITORA_34 |
institution |
EDITORA_34 |
reponame_str |
Revista de Economia Política |
collection |
Revista de Economia Política |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34 |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br |
_version_ |
1754122482555551744 |