Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Aldrighi,Dante Mendes
Data de Publicação: 2005
Outros Autores: Mazzer Neto,Roberto
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista de Economia Política
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000200009
Resumo: This paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM.
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spelling Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasilcash-flow rightscontrol rightscontrolling shareholderpyramidal arrangementsminority shareholdersno-voting-rights preferred sharesownership structurevoting agreementsThis paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM.Centro de Economia Política2005-04-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000200009Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.25 n.2 2005reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/S0101-31572005000200009info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessAldrighi,Dante MendesMazzer Neto,Robertopor2005-09-01T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31572005000200009Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2005-09-01T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
title Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
spellingShingle Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
Aldrighi,Dante Mendes
cash-flow rights
control rights
controlling shareholder
pyramidal arrangements
minority shareholders
no-voting-rights preferred shares
ownership structure
voting agreements
title_short Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
title_full Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
title_fullStr Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
title_full_unstemmed Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
title_sort Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil
author Aldrighi,Dante Mendes
author_facet Aldrighi,Dante Mendes
Mazzer Neto,Roberto
author_role author
author2 Mazzer Neto,Roberto
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Aldrighi,Dante Mendes
Mazzer Neto,Roberto
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv cash-flow rights
control rights
controlling shareholder
pyramidal arrangements
minority shareholders
no-voting-rights preferred shares
ownership structure
voting agreements
topic cash-flow rights
control rights
controlling shareholder
pyramidal arrangements
minority shareholders
no-voting-rights preferred shares
ownership structure
voting agreements
description This paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM.
publishDate 2005
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2005-04-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000200009
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572005000200009
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0101-31572005000200009
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.25 n.2 2005
reponame:Revista de Economia Política
instname:EDITORA 34
instacron:EDITORA_34
instname_str EDITORA 34
instacron_str EDITORA_34
institution EDITORA_34
reponame_str Revista de Economia Política
collection Revista de Economia Política
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br
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