A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: HILLBRECHT,RONALD
Data de Publicação: 1999
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Economia Política
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571999000400705
Resumo: ABSTRACT A political economy model is developed to provide a rationale of monetary policy in high inflation regimes, such as the Brazilian experience until the advent of the Plano Real. Decision making of monetary policy is assumed to be decentralized, where several decision-makers competitively determine the quantity of money. It is shown that equilibrium inflation is higher than under the alternative monetary regime where decision making is centralized at the Central Bank. An important additional feature of this political economy model is that it does not rely on time-inconsistency to generate high and sub-optimal inflation.
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spelling A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorageNew political economymonetary policyinflationtaxationseigniorageABSTRACT A political economy model is developed to provide a rationale of monetary policy in high inflation regimes, such as the Brazilian experience until the advent of the Plano Real. Decision making of monetary policy is assumed to be decentralized, where several decision-makers competitively determine the quantity of money. It is shown that equilibrium inflation is higher than under the alternative monetary regime where decision making is centralized at the Central Bank. An important additional feature of this political economy model is that it does not rely on time-inconsistency to generate high and sub-optimal inflation.Centro de Economia Política1999-10-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571999000400705Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.19 n.4 1999reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/0101-31571999-1038info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessHILLBRECHT,RONALDeng2022-04-27T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31571999000400705Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2022-04-27T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
title A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
spellingShingle A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
HILLBRECHT,RONALD
New political economy
monetary policy
inflation
taxation
seigniorage
title_short A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
title_full A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
title_fullStr A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
title_full_unstemmed A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
title_sort A political economy model of monetary policy: decentralized decision making and competition for seigniorage
author HILLBRECHT,RONALD
author_facet HILLBRECHT,RONALD
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv HILLBRECHT,RONALD
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv New political economy
monetary policy
inflation
taxation
seigniorage
topic New political economy
monetary policy
inflation
taxation
seigniorage
description ABSTRACT A political economy model is developed to provide a rationale of monetary policy in high inflation regimes, such as the Brazilian experience until the advent of the Plano Real. Decision making of monetary policy is assumed to be decentralized, where several decision-makers competitively determine the quantity of money. It is shown that equilibrium inflation is higher than under the alternative monetary regime where decision making is centralized at the Central Bank. An important additional feature of this political economy model is that it does not rely on time-inconsistency to generate high and sub-optimal inflation.
publishDate 1999
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 1999-10-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571999000400705
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571999000400705
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/0101-31571999-1038
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.19 n.4 1999
reponame:Revista de Economia Política
instname:EDITORA 34
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collection Revista de Economia Política
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br
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