Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994
Autor(a) principal: | |
---|---|
Data de Publicação: | 1998 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | spa |
Título da fonte: | Revista de Economia Política |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571998000400623 |
Resumo: | ABSTRACT In all developing countries facing economic reform there are political and economic obstacles to such a radical change. In the case of Mexico, however, during the Salinas administration (1988-94), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have stabilized and was prepared for continuous growth under a new development strategy. By the end of the six-year presidential period, the old cycle of boom and bust returned. This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy has ended in two of the last three presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short-term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverría (1970-76) and López Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises. |
id |
EDITORA_34-1_c74151e3796403fc83e0e5e52b487786 |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:scielo:S0101-31571998000400623 |
network_acronym_str |
EDITORA_34-1 |
network_name_str |
Revista de Economia Política |
repository_id_str |
|
spelling |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994Currency crisiseconomic history of MexicoMexican peso crisisABSTRACT In all developing countries facing economic reform there are political and economic obstacles to such a radical change. In the case of Mexico, however, during the Salinas administration (1988-94), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have stabilized and was prepared for continuous growth under a new development strategy. By the end of the six-year presidential period, the old cycle of boom and bust returned. This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy has ended in two of the last three presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short-term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverría (1970-76) and López Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises.Centro de Economia Política1998-10-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571998000400623Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.18 n.4 1998reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/0101-31571998-1271info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMAYER-SERRA,CARLOS ELIZONDOspa2022-06-10T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31571998000400623Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2022-06-10T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
title |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
spellingShingle |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 MAYER-SERRA,CARLOS ELIZONDO Currency crisis economic history of Mexico Mexican peso crisis |
title_short |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
title_full |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
title_fullStr |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
title_full_unstemmed |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
title_sort |
Tres trampas: sobre los orígenes de la crisis económica mexicana de 1994 |
author |
MAYER-SERRA,CARLOS ELIZONDO |
author_facet |
MAYER-SERRA,CARLOS ELIZONDO |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
MAYER-SERRA,CARLOS ELIZONDO |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Currency crisis economic history of Mexico Mexican peso crisis |
topic |
Currency crisis economic history of Mexico Mexican peso crisis |
description |
ABSTRACT In all developing countries facing economic reform there are political and economic obstacles to such a radical change. In the case of Mexico, however, during the Salinas administration (1988-94), a new economic crisis exploded after serious changes had taken place and the economy seemed to have stabilized and was prepared for continuous growth under a new development strategy. By the end of the six-year presidential period, the old cycle of boom and bust returned. This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy has ended in two of the last three presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short-term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverría (1970-76) and López Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises. |
publishDate |
1998 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
1998-10-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571998000400623 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31571998000400623 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/0101-31571998-1271 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.18 n.4 1998 reponame:Revista de Economia Política instname:EDITORA 34 instacron:EDITORA_34 |
instname_str |
EDITORA 34 |
instacron_str |
EDITORA_34 |
institution |
EDITORA_34 |
reponame_str |
Revista de Economia Política |
collection |
Revista de Economia Política |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34 |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br |
_version_ |
1754122479334326272 |