National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2007 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista de Economia Política |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004 |
Resumo: | This paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively. |
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National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002exchange rate policiesIMF Stand-By Arrangementsprobability of defaultThis paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively.Centro de Economia Política2007-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.1 2007reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/S0101-31572007000100004info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJohnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyoneng2007-04-09T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31572007000100004Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2007-04-09T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
title |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
spellingShingle |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon exchange rate policies IMF Stand-By Arrangements probability of default |
title_short |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
title_full |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
title_fullStr |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
title_full_unstemmed |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
title_sort |
National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002 |
author |
Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon |
author_facet |
Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
exchange rate policies IMF Stand-By Arrangements probability of default |
topic |
exchange rate policies IMF Stand-By Arrangements probability of default |
description |
This paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively. |
publishDate |
2007 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2007-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.1590/S0101-31572007000100004 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Centro de Economia Política |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.1 2007 reponame:Revista de Economia Política instname:EDITORA 34 instacron:EDITORA_34 |
instname_str |
EDITORA 34 |
instacron_str |
EDITORA_34 |
institution |
EDITORA_34 |
reponame_str |
Revista de Economia Política |
collection |
Revista de Economia Política |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34 |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br |
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1754122480372416512 |