National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon
Data de Publicação: 2007
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Economia Política
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004
Resumo: This paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively.
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spelling National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002exchange rate policiesIMF Stand-By Arrangementsprobability of defaultThis paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively.Centro de Economia Política2007-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.1 2007reponame:Revista de Economia Políticainstname:EDITORA 34instacron:EDITORA_3410.1590/S0101-31572007000100004info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessJohnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyoneng2007-04-09T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0101-31572007000100004Revistahttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journalONGhttps://centrodeeconomiapolitica.org.br/repojs/index.php/journal/oai||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br1809-45380101-3157opendoar:2007-04-09T00:00Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
title National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
spellingShingle National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon
exchange rate policies
IMF Stand-By Arrangements
probability of default
title_short National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
title_full National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
title_fullStr National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
title_full_unstemmed National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
title_sort National exchange rate policies and international debt crises: how Brazil did not follow Argentina into a default in 2001-2002
author Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon
author_facet Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Johnson,Bryan Andrew Kenyon
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv exchange rate policies
IMF Stand-By Arrangements
probability of default
topic exchange rate policies
IMF Stand-By Arrangements
probability of default
description This paper examines how exchange rate policies and IMF Stand-By Arrangements affect debt crises using econometrics and a comparison between Argentina and Brazil. It refines an existing diagram outlining crisis development to propose crisis prevention strategies. Flexible exchange rate policies reduce a country's probability of default by over 4%, but Stand-By Arrangements increase it by an inconsequential percentage. Unlike Argentina, Brazil avoided a default via a freely-floating exchange rate system, fiscal deficit reduction, and a cooperative and coordinated relationship with the IMF. The results provide policymakers from developing countries with lessons to manage their countries' default risks more effectively.
publishDate 2007
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2007-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572007000100004
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0101-31572007000100004
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Centro de Economia Política
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Political Economy v.27 n.1 2007
reponame:Revista de Economia Política
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collection Revista de Economia Política
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Economia Política - EDITORA 34
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||cecilia.heise@bjpe.org.br
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