The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng por |
Título da fonte: | BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
DOI: | 10.15728/bbr.2020.17.1.2 |
Texto Completo: | http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560 |
Resumo: | Considering that principal-principal conflicts in companies under mixed public-private ownership are substantially different from the typical agency conflict model, this paper’s objective is to analyze principal-principal conflicts in mixed ownership companies in the Brazilian electric power industry. In order to expand understanding of the phenomenon which we are studying, we have integrated the assumptions that underlie agency theory and institutional theory, using a qualitative approach and collecting data during semi structured interviews with companies’ board members. Data was analyzed and interpreted as per Bardin (2006), with the aid of ATLAS®ti software. Our main findings suggest that while a government stake in a firm’s ownership structure can provide a useful channel for the government to seek support and resources, in counterpoint, it can also create distortions and uncertainties, and exacerbate principal-principal conflicts. The development of stronger institutions and corporate governance could bring about useful options for providing checks and balances and, in the final analysis, mitigate principal-principal conflict. The article contributes to the literature by providing additional elements that are not available in public reports. Analysis of the conflict between principal and principal, together with theoretical integration, seek to broaden the understanding of this theme. |
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BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
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The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power IndustryO Governo como Acionista e o Conflito Principal-Principal no Setor Elétrico BrasileiroGovernment as shareholderPrincipal-principal conflictsCorporate governanceInstitutionsGoverno como acionistaConflito Principal-PrincipalGovernança CorporativaInstituiçõesConsidering that principal-principal conflicts in companies under mixed public-private ownership are substantially different from the typical agency conflict model, this paper’s objective is to analyze principal-principal conflicts in mixed ownership companies in the Brazilian electric power industry. In order to expand understanding of the phenomenon which we are studying, we have integrated the assumptions that underlie agency theory and institutional theory, using a qualitative approach and collecting data during semi structured interviews with companies’ board members. Data was analyzed and interpreted as per Bardin (2006), with the aid of ATLAS®ti software. Our main findings suggest that while a government stake in a firm’s ownership structure can provide a useful channel for the government to seek support and resources, in counterpoint, it can also create distortions and uncertainties, and exacerbate principal-principal conflicts. The development of stronger institutions and corporate governance could bring about useful options for providing checks and balances and, in the final analysis, mitigate principal-principal conflict. The article contributes to the literature by providing additional elements that are not available in public reports. Analysis of the conflict between principal and principal, together with theoretical integration, seek to broaden the understanding of this theme.Considerando que os conflitos entre principal e principal em empresas de propriedade mista público-privada são substancialmente diferentes do modelo típico de conflito de agência, o objetivo deste artigo é analisar o conflito principal-principal em empresas de propriedade mista no setor elétrico brasileiro. A fim de ampliar a compreensão do fenômeno de interesse, integramos os pressupostos subjacentes à Teoria da Agência e à Teoria Institucional, usando uma abordagem qualitativa e coletando dados durante entrevistas semiestruturadas com membros do conselho. Os dados foram analisados e interpretados conforme Bardin (2006), com o auxílio do software ATLAS®ti. Nossas principais descobertas sugerem que, embora a participação do governo na estrutura acionária de uma empresa possa fornecer um canal útil para buscar apoio e recursos, em contrapartida, ela também pode criar uma série de distorções e incertezas, exacerbando os conflitos principal-principal. O desenvolvimento de instituições e a governança corporativa podem fornecer opções úteis para verificar e medir e, em última análise, mitigar o conflito principal-principal. O artigo contribui ampliando a compreensão do conflito principal-principal, integrando pressupostos subjacentes às teorias empregadas e analisando elementos que não estão disponíveis em relatórios públicos FUCAPE Business Shool2020-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed ArticleArtigo revisado pelos paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/56010.15728/bbr.2020.17.1.2Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2020): January to February 2020; 24-45Brazilian Business Review; v. 17 n. 1 (2020): Janeiro a Fevereiro 2020; 24-451808-23861807-734Xreponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)instacron:FBSengporhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560/848http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560/849Copyright (c) 2020 Brazilian Business Reviewhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessLoch, MurialdoSilva, Jaison Caetano Bueno, GiovanaMarcon, Rosilene2020-01-01T11:08:16Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/560Revistahttps://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/indexONGhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/oai|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br1808-23861808-2386opendoar:2020-01-01T11:08:16BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry O Governo como Acionista e o Conflito Principal-Principal no Setor Elétrico Brasileiro |
title |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
spellingShingle |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry Loch, Murialdo Government as shareholder Principal-principal conflicts Corporate governance Institutions Governo como acionista Conflito Principal-Principal Governança Corporativa Instituições Loch, Murialdo Government as shareholder Principal-principal conflicts Corporate governance Institutions Governo como acionista Conflito Principal-Principal Governança Corporativa Instituições |
title_short |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
title_full |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
title_fullStr |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
title_sort |
The Government as Shareholder and Principal-Principal Conflicts in the Brazilian Electric Power Industry |
author |
Loch, Murialdo |
author_facet |
Loch, Murialdo Loch, Murialdo Silva, Jaison Caetano Bueno, Giovana Marcon, Rosilene Silva, Jaison Caetano Bueno, Giovana Marcon, Rosilene |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Silva, Jaison Caetano Bueno, Giovana Marcon, Rosilene |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Loch, Murialdo Silva, Jaison Caetano Bueno, Giovana Marcon, Rosilene |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Government as shareholder Principal-principal conflicts Corporate governance Institutions Governo como acionista Conflito Principal-Principal Governança Corporativa Instituições |
topic |
Government as shareholder Principal-principal conflicts Corporate governance Institutions Governo como acionista Conflito Principal-Principal Governança Corporativa Instituições |
description |
Considering that principal-principal conflicts in companies under mixed public-private ownership are substantially different from the typical agency conflict model, this paper’s objective is to analyze principal-principal conflicts in mixed ownership companies in the Brazilian electric power industry. In order to expand understanding of the phenomenon which we are studying, we have integrated the assumptions that underlie agency theory and institutional theory, using a qualitative approach and collecting data during semi structured interviews with companies’ board members. Data was analyzed and interpreted as per Bardin (2006), with the aid of ATLAS®ti software. Our main findings suggest that while a government stake in a firm’s ownership structure can provide a useful channel for the government to seek support and resources, in counterpoint, it can also create distortions and uncertainties, and exacerbate principal-principal conflicts. The development of stronger institutions and corporate governance could bring about useful options for providing checks and balances and, in the final analysis, mitigate principal-principal conflict. The article contributes to the literature by providing additional elements that are not available in public reports. Analysis of the conflict between principal and principal, together with theoretical integration, seek to broaden the understanding of this theme. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion Peer-reviewed Article Artigo revisado pelos pares |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560 10.15728/bbr.2020.17.1.2 |
url |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.15728/bbr.2020.17.1.2 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng por |
language |
eng por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560/848 http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/560/849 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Brazilian Business Review http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2020 Brazilian Business Review http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
FUCAPE Business Shool |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
FUCAPE Business Shool |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2020): January to February 2020; 24-45 Brazilian Business Review; v. 17 n. 1 (2020): Janeiro a Fevereiro 2020; 24-45 1808-2386 1807-734X reponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) instname:Fucape Business School (FBS) instacron:FBS |
instname_str |
Fucape Business School (FBS) |
instacron_str |
FBS |
institution |
FBS |
reponame_str |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
collection |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br |
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1822152235716444160 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.15728/bbr.2020.17.1.2 |