Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Bortolon, Patricia Maria
Data de Publicação: 2015
Outros Autores: Silva Junior, Annor da
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
Texto Completo: http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109
Resumo: This paper proposes to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and delisting process of public companies listed on the Brazilian Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros de São Paulo – BM&FBovespa). The sample comprises 86 voluntary delisting operations in 2008-2012 period and a matching sample with companies that remained public, identified here as “comparable”. A corporate governance index comprising four dimensions (ownership structure, ethics and conflicts of interest, disclosure and board of directors) and a set of 16 questions was used to analyse the two groups. As expected, delisted companies score lower than their comparable ones is the broad index. However, board of directors, disclosure and ethics and conflicts of interest dimensions didn’t show statistical significant differences between the two groups. In the ownership structure dimension the issues related to concentration of control differentiate the groups. Despite the mean differences, corporate governance doesn’t seem to impact significantly the chances to delist in a model with ownership structure and financial variables.
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spelling Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance IssuesDeslistagem de Companhias Brasileiras Listadas na Bolsa de Valores: Evidências Empíricas sobre a Governança CorporativaCorporate governanceCorporate governance indexDelisting (going private)Governança corporativaÍndice de governança corporativaDeslistagemThis paper proposes to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and delisting process of public companies listed on the Brazilian Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros de São Paulo – BM&FBovespa). The sample comprises 86 voluntary delisting operations in 2008-2012 period and a matching sample with companies that remained public, identified here as “comparable”. A corporate governance index comprising four dimensions (ownership structure, ethics and conflicts of interest, disclosure and board of directors) and a set of 16 questions was used to analyse the two groups. As expected, delisted companies score lower than their comparable ones is the broad index. However, board of directors, disclosure and ethics and conflicts of interest dimensions didn’t show statistical significant differences between the two groups. In the ownership structure dimension the issues related to concentration of control differentiate the groups. Despite the mean differences, corporate governance doesn’t seem to impact significantly the chances to delist in a model with ownership structure and financial variables.Este artigo se propõe a analisar o relacionamento entre governança corporativa e o processo de deslistagem de companhias de capital aberto listadas na Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros de São Paulo (BM&FBovespa). A amostra compreende 86 operações de deslistagens voluntárias, no período de 2008-2012, e uma amostra de correspondência com companhias que se mantiveram com o capital aberto (listadas em bolsa), identificadas aqui como “comparáveis”. Um índice de governança corporativa que compreende quatro dimensões (estrutura de propriedade, ética e conflitos de interesse, disclosure e conselho de administração) e um conjunto de 16 perguntas foi usado para analisar esses dois grupos. Como esperado, ao se analisar o índice de forma mais ampla, constatou-se que as companhias que se deslistaram tiveram uma pontuação mais baixa do que as “comparáveis”. No entanto as dimensões conselho de administração, disclosure e ética e conflitos de interesse não mostraram diferenças estatísticas significativas entre os dois grupos. Na dimensão estrutura de propriedade, as questões relacionadas com a concentração de controle diferenciam os grupos. Apesar das diferenças de médias, a governança corporativa parece não impactar significativamente as chances de deslistagem da bolsa em um modelo com variáveis relacionadas à estrutura de propriedade e variáveis financeiras.FUCAPE Business Shool2015-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPeer-reviewed ArticleArtigo revisado pelos paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/10910.15728/bbrconf.2015.5Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 12 No. Special Ed (2015): BBR Conference - 2015; 97-124Brazilian Business Review; v. 12 n. Special Ed (2015): BBR Conference - 2015; 97-1241808-23861807-734Xreponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)instacron:FBSengporhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109/158http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109/571Bortolon, Patricia MariaSilva Junior, Annor dainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2018-10-31T19:06:42Zoai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/109Revistahttps://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/indexONGhttp://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/oai|| bbronline@bbronline.com.br1808-23861808-2386opendoar:2018-10-31T19:06:42BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
Deslistagem de Companhias Brasileiras Listadas na Bolsa de Valores: Evidências Empíricas sobre a Governança Corporativa
title Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
spellingShingle Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
Bortolon, Patricia Maria
Corporate governance
Corporate governance index
Delisting (going private)
Governança corporativa
Índice de governança corporativa
Deslistagem
title_short Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
title_full Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
title_fullStr Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
title_full_unstemmed Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
title_sort Delisting Brazilian Public Companies: Empirical Evidence about Corporate Governance Issues
author Bortolon, Patricia Maria
author_facet Bortolon, Patricia Maria
Silva Junior, Annor da
author_role author
author2 Silva Junior, Annor da
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Bortolon, Patricia Maria
Silva Junior, Annor da
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corporate governance
Corporate governance index
Delisting (going private)
Governança corporativa
Índice de governança corporativa
Deslistagem
topic Corporate governance
Corporate governance index
Delisting (going private)
Governança corporativa
Índice de governança corporativa
Deslistagem
description This paper proposes to analyse the relationship between corporate governance and delisting process of public companies listed on the Brazilian Securities, Commodities and Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros de São Paulo – BM&FBovespa). The sample comprises 86 voluntary delisting operations in 2008-2012 period and a matching sample with companies that remained public, identified here as “comparable”. A corporate governance index comprising four dimensions (ownership structure, ethics and conflicts of interest, disclosure and board of directors) and a set of 16 questions was used to analyse the two groups. As expected, delisted companies score lower than their comparable ones is the broad index. However, board of directors, disclosure and ethics and conflicts of interest dimensions didn’t show statistical significant differences between the two groups. In the ownership structure dimension the issues related to concentration of control differentiate the groups. Despite the mean differences, corporate governance doesn’t seem to impact significantly the chances to delist in a model with ownership structure and financial variables.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Peer-reviewed Article
Artigo revisado pelos pares
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109
10.15728/bbrconf.2015.5
url http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109
identifier_str_mv 10.15728/bbrconf.2015.5
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
por
language eng
por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109/158
http://www.bbronline.com.br/index.php/bbr/article/view/109/571
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv FUCAPE Business Shool
publisher.none.fl_str_mv FUCAPE Business Shool
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Business Review; Vol. 12 No. Special Ed (2015): BBR Conference - 2015; 97-124
Brazilian Business Review; v. 12 n. Special Ed (2015): BBR Conference - 2015; 97-124
1808-2386
1807-734X
reponame:BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
instname:Fucape Business School (FBS)
instacron:FBS
instname_str Fucape Business School (FBS)
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reponame_str BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
collection BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv BBR. Brazilian Business Review (English edition. Online) - Fucape Business School (FBS)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv || bbronline@bbronline.com.br
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