Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Pinheiro de Sá, Luciano
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia, Simeone Gomes, Josir
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
por
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)
Texto Completo: https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4129
Resumo: Purpose – This study analyzes the relationship between strategic behavior and earnings management in a sample of Eurozone companies between 2009 and 2018. Theoretical framework – The theoretical lens used is the agency theory derived from the managers-owners problem. As support for understanding strategic behavior, we adopted Miles et al. (1978). For earnings information quality, we follow Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010). Design/methodology/approach – We opted for a positivist approach and tested our hypotheses on panel data, using regression models and the average test. From Miles et al. (1978), we used the measurement adopted by Bentley, Omer, and Sharp (2013) on public data from Eurozone companies to categorize them in the three typologies of strategic behavior. To estimate earnings management, we adopted the performance-modified Jones model. Findings – There is the suggestion that, in the case of Eurozone companies, business strategy is positively related to earnings management. It was not possible to find statistically significant results of prospectors managing their earnings differently from other companies. We tested the relationships for positive and negative abnormal accruals. We cannot affirm that there is any relationship with the strategy of managing positive earnings. In the case of negative errors, the study suggests that prospectors act to reduce their earnings. Practical & social implications of research – This study contributes to the literature on earnings information quality, especially regarding earnings management. The study both corroborates and departs from the previous literature. It shows the relationship between strategy and earnings management, however, we cannot confirm that prospectors engage in higher levels of earnings management. As practical implications, the evidence that emerged could serve as a contribution to other researchers, regulators, and players in the European financial market. Originality/value – The originality of the research derives from the application of agency theory, earnings quality studies, and business strategy to the European market. Keywords – agency theory; earnings management; strategy behavior.
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spelling Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from EuropeStrategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from EuropeComportamento Estratégico e Gerenciamento de Resultados: Evidências da EuropaPurpose – This study analyzes the relationship between strategic behavior and earnings management in a sample of Eurozone companies between 2009 and 2018. Theoretical framework – The theoretical lens used is the agency theory derived from the managers-owners problem. As support for understanding strategic behavior, we adopted Miles et al. (1978). For earnings information quality, we follow Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010). Design/methodology/approach – We opted for a positivist approach and tested our hypotheses on panel data, using regression models and the average test. From Miles et al. (1978), we used the measurement adopted by Bentley, Omer, and Sharp (2013) on public data from Eurozone companies to categorize them in the three typologies of strategic behavior. To estimate earnings management, we adopted the performance-modified Jones model. Findings – There is the suggestion that, in the case of Eurozone companies, business strategy is positively related to earnings management. It was not possible to find statistically significant results of prospectors managing their earnings differently from other companies. We tested the relationships for positive and negative abnormal accruals. We cannot affirm that there is any relationship with the strategy of managing positive earnings. In the case of negative errors, the study suggests that prospectors act to reduce their earnings. Practical & social implications of research – This study contributes to the literature on earnings information quality, especially regarding earnings management. The study both corroborates and departs from the previous literature. It shows the relationship between strategy and earnings management, however, we cannot confirm that prospectors engage in higher levels of earnings management. As practical implications, the evidence that emerged could serve as a contribution to other researchers, regulators, and players in the European financial market. Originality/value – The originality of the research derives from the application of agency theory, earnings quality studies, and business strategy to the European market. Keywords – agency theory; earnings management; strategy behavior.Purpose – This study analyzes the relationship between strategic behavior and earnings management in a sample of Eurozone companies between 2009 and 2018. Theoretical framework – The theoretical lens used is the agency theory derived from the managers-owners problem. As support for understanding strategic behavior, we adopted Miles et al. (1978). For earnings information quality, we follow Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010). Design/methodology/approach – We opted for a positivist approach and tested our hypotheses on panel data, using regression models and the average test. From Miles et al. (1978), we used the measurement adopted by Bentley, Omer, and Sharp (2013) on public data from Eurozone companies to categorize them in the three typologies of strategic behavior. To estimate earnings management, we adopted the performance-modified Jones model. Findings – There is the suggestion that, in the case of Eurozone companies, business strategy is positively related to earnings management. It was not possible to find statistically significant results of prospectors managing their earnings differently from other companies. We tested the relationships for positive and negative abnormal accruals. We cannot affirm that there is any relationship with the strategy of managing positive earnings. In the case of negative errors, the study suggests that prospectors act to reduce their earnings. Practical & social implications of research – This study contributes to the literature on earnings information quality, especially regarding earnings management. The study both corroborates and departs from the previous literature. It shows the relationship between strategy and earnings management, however, we cannot confirm that prospectors engage in higher levels of earnings management. As practical implications, the evidence that emerged could serve as a contribution to other researchers, regulators, and players in the European financial market. Originality/value – The originality of the research derives from the application of agency theory, earnings quality studies, and business strategy to the European market. Keywords – agency theory; earnings management; strategy behavior.Objetivo: Este estudo analisa a relação entre o comportamento estratégico e o gerenciamento de resultados de uma amostra de empresas da Zona do Euro entre o período de 2009 e 2018. Referencial teórico: A lente teórica usada é a Teoria da Agência a partir dos problemas entre gestores e proprietários. Como suporte para entender o comportamento estratégico, adotamos o trabalho de Miles et al. (1978). No âmbito da qualidade da informação contábil, nos apoiamos no trabalho de Dechow, Ge e Schrand (2010). Metodologia: Optamos por uma abordagem positivista com hipóteses testadas em um conjunto de dados em painel, com modelos de regressão e teste de média. A partir do trabalho de Miles et al. (1978), empreendemos a mensuração adotada por Bentley, Omer e Sharp (2013) com dados públicos de empresas da Zona do Euro para categorização nas três tipologias de comportamento estratégico. Como aproximação do gerenciamento de resultados, adotamos o modelo de Jones modificado por desempenho. Resultados: Os resultados sugerem que, no caso de empresas da Zona do Euro, a estratégia do negócio é relacionada positivamente com o gerenciamento de resultados. Não foi possível constatar resultados estatisticamente significativos em que prospectoras gerenciam seus resultados de forma diferenciada das demais empresas. Testamos as relações para anomalias dos accruals positivas e negativas. Não podemos afirmar relação com a estratégia para o gerenciamento de resultados positivos. No caso dos erros negativos, os resultados sugerem que prospectoras atuam de forma a reduzir seus resultados. Implicações práticas e sociais da pesquisa: Este estudo contribui para a literatura relativa à qualidade das informações contábeis, especialmente quanto ao gerenciamento de resultados. Os resultados corroboram e afastam da literatura prévia. O estudo mostra a relação da estratégia e o gerenciamento de resultados; contudo, não confirmamos que as prospectoras apresentam maiores níveis de gerenciamento de seus ganhos. Como implicações práticas, evidências que foram emergidas podem contribuir para outros pesquisadores, reguladores e atuantes do mercado financeiro europeu. Contribuições: A originalidade da pesquisa surge na aplicabilidade para o mercado europeu da teoria da agência, estudos da qualidade dos ganhos e estratégia de negócios. Palavras-chave: Teoria da agência, gerenciamento de resultados, comportamento estratégico.FECAP2022-01-13info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionAvaliado por paresapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/412910.7819/rbgn.v23i4.4129Review of Business Management; Vol. 23 No. 4 (2021)RBGN Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; Vol. 23 Núm. 4 (2021)RBGN - Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios; v. 23 n. 4 (2021)1983-08071806-4892reponame:Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online)instname:Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)instacron:FECAPengporhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4129/1784https://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/article/view/4129/1785Pinheiro de Sá, LucianoLima Rodrigues, LúciaSimeone Gomes, Josirinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-01-13T20:38:30Zoai:ojs.emnuvens.com.br:article/4129Revistahttp://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/indexhttps://rbgn.fecap.br/RBGN/oai||jmauricio@fecap.br1983-08071806-4892opendoar:2022-01-13T20:38:30Revista Brasileira de Gestão de Negócios (Online) - Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado (FECAP)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
Comportamento Estratégico e Gerenciamento de Resultados: Evidências da Europa
title Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
spellingShingle Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
Pinheiro de Sá, Luciano
title_short Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
title_full Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
title_fullStr Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
title_full_unstemmed Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
title_sort Strategic Behavior and Earnings Management: Evidence from Europe
author Pinheiro de Sá, Luciano
author_facet Pinheiro de Sá, Luciano
Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia
Simeone Gomes, Josir
author_role author
author2 Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia
Simeone Gomes, Josir
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Pinheiro de Sá, Luciano
Lima Rodrigues, Lúcia
Simeone Gomes, Josir
description Purpose – This study analyzes the relationship between strategic behavior and earnings management in a sample of Eurozone companies between 2009 and 2018. Theoretical framework – The theoretical lens used is the agency theory derived from the managers-owners problem. As support for understanding strategic behavior, we adopted Miles et al. (1978). For earnings information quality, we follow Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010). Design/methodology/approach – We opted for a positivist approach and tested our hypotheses on panel data, using regression models and the average test. From Miles et al. (1978), we used the measurement adopted by Bentley, Omer, and Sharp (2013) on public data from Eurozone companies to categorize them in the three typologies of strategic behavior. To estimate earnings management, we adopted the performance-modified Jones model. Findings – There is the suggestion that, in the case of Eurozone companies, business strategy is positively related to earnings management. It was not possible to find statistically significant results of prospectors managing their earnings differently from other companies. We tested the relationships for positive and negative abnormal accruals. We cannot affirm that there is any relationship with the strategy of managing positive earnings. In the case of negative errors, the study suggests that prospectors act to reduce their earnings. Practical & social implications of research – This study contributes to the literature on earnings information quality, especially regarding earnings management. The study both corroborates and departs from the previous literature. It shows the relationship between strategy and earnings management, however, we cannot confirm that prospectors engage in higher levels of earnings management. As practical implications, the evidence that emerged could serve as a contribution to other researchers, regulators, and players in the European financial market. Originality/value – The originality of the research derives from the application of agency theory, earnings quality studies, and business strategy to the European market. Keywords – agency theory; earnings management; strategy behavior.
publishDate 2022
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dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Review of Business Management; Vol. 23 No. 4 (2021)
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