An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Freitas Reis, Hugo
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Teodoro Lara, Fabiano
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162
Resumo: The study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person.
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spelling An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict SettlementUm estudo empírico dos fatores preditivos da autocomposiçãoAlternative dispute resolutionempirical studyCode of Civil Procedure of 2015Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlementrational actor modelMétodos alternativos de resolução de conflitosestudo empíricoCódigo de Processo Civil de 2015Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposiçãomodelo do agente racionalThe study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person.O trabalho objetiva testar hipóteses preexistentes de doutrinadores e legisladores sobre quais fatores influenciariam a probabilidade de conciliação em um processo judicial. Analisaram-se 864 processos cíveis nos quais foram realizadas audiência de conciliação em Centros Judiciários de Solução de Conflitos e Cidadania (Cejuscs) de Belo Horizonte. Os dados encontrados corroboram a hipótese, derivada do modelo do agente racional (premissa da análise econômica do Direito), segundo a qual os acordos não são realizados por falhas de informação; recomenda-se, assim, que a tentativa de conciliação só seja feita depois da produção de provas. Esse achado vai na contramão da hipótese majoritária, que postula que as partes são movidas principalmente pela emoção, e determinou o desenho da atual política de estímulo à autocomposição ao antecipar a audiência para antes de momentos de trocas de informações no processo. Concluiu-se que ações sobre contratos bancários estão entre as que tiveram a mais baixa chance de acordo; que os autores que silenciam na petição inicial a respeito de interesse ou não em audiência de conciliação (em descumprimento ao requisito do art. 319, VII, do Código de Processo Civil) tiveram probabilidade de realizar acordo comparável ao dos que informam expressamente desinteresse; e que as pessoas naturais no polo passivo têm maior probabilidade de fechar acordo do que as pessoas jurídicas.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2022-07-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e22212317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162/81157Freitas Reis, HugoTeodoro Lara, Fabianoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-08-04T18:37:58Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/86162Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2022-08-04T18:37:58Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
Um estudo empírico dos fatores preditivos da autocomposição
title An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
spellingShingle An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
Freitas Reis, Hugo
Alternative dispute resolution
empirical study
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015
Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement
rational actor model
Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos
estudo empírico
Código de Processo Civil de 2015
Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição
modelo do agente racional
title_short An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
title_full An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
title_fullStr An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
title_full_unstemmed An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
title_sort An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
author Freitas Reis, Hugo
author_facet Freitas Reis, Hugo
Teodoro Lara, Fabiano
author_role author
author2 Teodoro Lara, Fabiano
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Freitas Reis, Hugo
Teodoro Lara, Fabiano
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Alternative dispute resolution
empirical study
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015
Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement
rational actor model
Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos
estudo empírico
Código de Processo Civil de 2015
Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição
modelo do agente racional
topic Alternative dispute resolution
empirical study
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015
Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement
rational actor model
Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos
estudo empírico
Código de Processo Civil de 2015
Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição
modelo do agente racional
description The study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-07-18
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162/81157
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221
Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221
2317-6172
reponame:Revista Direito GV
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instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
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reponame_str Revista Direito GV
collection Revista Direito GV
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
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