An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Direito GV |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162 |
Resumo: | The study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person. |
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An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict SettlementUm estudo empírico dos fatores preditivos da autocomposiçãoAlternative dispute resolutionempirical studyCode of Civil Procedure of 2015Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlementrational actor modelMétodos alternativos de resolução de conflitosestudo empíricoCódigo de Processo Civil de 2015Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposiçãomodelo do agente racionalThe study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person.O trabalho objetiva testar hipóteses preexistentes de doutrinadores e legisladores sobre quais fatores influenciariam a probabilidade de conciliação em um processo judicial. Analisaram-se 864 processos cíveis nos quais foram realizadas audiência de conciliação em Centros Judiciários de Solução de Conflitos e Cidadania (Cejuscs) de Belo Horizonte. Os dados encontrados corroboram a hipótese, derivada do modelo do agente racional (premissa da análise econômica do Direito), segundo a qual os acordos não são realizados por falhas de informação; recomenda-se, assim, que a tentativa de conciliação só seja feita depois da produção de provas. Esse achado vai na contramão da hipótese majoritária, que postula que as partes são movidas principalmente pela emoção, e determinou o desenho da atual política de estímulo à autocomposição ao antecipar a audiência para antes de momentos de trocas de informações no processo. Concluiu-se que ações sobre contratos bancários estão entre as que tiveram a mais baixa chance de acordo; que os autores que silenciam na petição inicial a respeito de interesse ou não em audiência de conciliação (em descumprimento ao requisito do art. 319, VII, do Código de Processo Civil) tiveram probabilidade de realizar acordo comparável ao dos que informam expressamente desinteresse; e que as pessoas naturais no polo passivo têm maior probabilidade de fechar acordo do que as pessoas jurídicas.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2022-07-18info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e22212317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162/81157Freitas Reis, HugoTeodoro Lara, Fabianoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-08-04T18:37:58Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/86162Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2022-08-04T18:37:58Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement Um estudo empírico dos fatores preditivos da autocomposição |
title |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
spellingShingle |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement Freitas Reis, Hugo Alternative dispute resolution empirical study Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement rational actor model Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos estudo empírico Código de Processo Civil de 2015 Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição modelo do agente racional |
title_short |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
title_full |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
title_fullStr |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
title_sort |
An Empirical Study of the Factors that Predict Settlement |
author |
Freitas Reis, Hugo |
author_facet |
Freitas Reis, Hugo Teodoro Lara, Fabiano |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Teodoro Lara, Fabiano |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Freitas Reis, Hugo Teodoro Lara, Fabiano |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Alternative dispute resolution empirical study Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement rational actor model Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos estudo empírico Código de Processo Civil de 2015 Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição modelo do agente racional |
topic |
Alternative dispute resolution empirical study Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 Brazilian Policy of Incentives for Settlement rational actor model Métodos alternativos de resolução de conflitos estudo empírico Código de Processo Civil de 2015 Política Nacional de Incentivo à Autocomposição modelo do agente racional |
description |
The study aims to testing hypotheses put forth by scholars and congressmen regarding the factors affecting the likelihood of settlement in a lawsuit. 864 civil cases following the Brazilian Common Procedure and having gone through its mandatory conciliation hearing in a Cejusc were analyzed. The data corroborate the hypothesis, derived from the rational actor model posited by law and economics, that failure to settle can be explained by information failure leading agents to overestimate their victory odds; it is thus recommended that settlement attempts be preceded by bilateral presentations of evidence. These findings contradict the currently victorious view in Brazil that litigators’ behavior is primarily determined by emotion, hence proceedings that provide opportunities for information exchange should be postponed until after the settlement attempt has failed, lest they stir up tensions further. It was concluded that the odds of settlement were among the lowest when the lawsuit concerned contracts with a bank; that plaintiffs who failed to inform whether they were interested in a conciliation hearing (in breach of article 319, VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure) were about as likely to settle as those who voiced disinterest; and that settlement was more likely when the defendant was a natural person rather than a legal person. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-07-18 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162 |
url |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/86162/81157 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221 Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221 Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 2 (2022): maio-ago. (42); e2221 2317-6172 reponame:Revista Direito GV instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Revista Direito GV |
collection |
Revista Direito GV |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br |
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