The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Abreu da Silveira, Gabriel
Data de Publicação: 2022
Outros Autores: Klein, Vinícius
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496
Resumo: Severance packages are granted to senior executives to mitigate management problems, such as risk aversion. When the incentive plan stipulates the acquisition of control as a hypothesis for triggering the indemnity, the benefit takes the form of a golden parachute and works as a defensive measure against hostile acquisitions by increasing the cost of the operation for the acquirer. It is understood that the evaluation of the board of directors performance in the executive pay approval must be based on the convenience of the instrument for social interest, which requires an institutional analysis. Both the ownership structure and the market for corporate control are relevant elements to determine if the incentive seeks to fulfill the purpose for which it is being planned, especially when the threat of hostile acquisitions is used as a justification for implementation. Therefore, based on the HRT Case, the severance pay is analyzed in observance of the Brazilian capital market characteristics. Although it does not represent all the complexity of the issue, the case chosen is a portrait of a specific reality and offers important thoughts for an efficient regulation of executive pay in Brazil. This work intends to demonstrate that Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM] took into account purely theoretical benefits of the severance pay and did not incorporate the brazilian stock market specificities in the analysis, a decision that brought losses to HRT Participações em Petróleo S/A shareholders.
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spelling The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT CaseO severance pay no Brasil: uma análise do Caso HRTSeverance packagescompensationmarket for corporate controlentrenchmentHRT CasePacotes de indenizaçãoremuneraçãomercado de controle acionárioentrincheiramentoCaso HRTSeverance packages are granted to senior executives to mitigate management problems, such as risk aversion. When the incentive plan stipulates the acquisition of control as a hypothesis for triggering the indemnity, the benefit takes the form of a golden parachute and works as a defensive measure against hostile acquisitions by increasing the cost of the operation for the acquirer. It is understood that the evaluation of the board of directors performance in the executive pay approval must be based on the convenience of the instrument for social interest, which requires an institutional analysis. Both the ownership structure and the market for corporate control are relevant elements to determine if the incentive seeks to fulfill the purpose for which it is being planned, especially when the threat of hostile acquisitions is used as a justification for implementation. Therefore, based on the HRT Case, the severance pay is analyzed in observance of the Brazilian capital market characteristics. Although it does not represent all the complexity of the issue, the case chosen is a portrait of a specific reality and offers important thoughts for an efficient regulation of executive pay in Brazil. This work intends to demonstrate that Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM] took into account purely theoretical benefits of the severance pay and did not incorporate the brazilian stock market specificities in the analysis, a decision that brought losses to HRT Participações em Petróleo S/A shareholders.Os severance packages (“pacotes de indenização”) são pagamentos concedidos a executivos de alto escalão para mitigar problemas de gestão, como a aversão ao risco. Quando o plano de incentivo estipula a aquisição do controle como hipótese de disparo da indenização, o benefício passa a assumir a forma de um golden parachute e serve também como medida defensiva contra aquisições hostis pelo aumento do custo da operação para o adquirente. Compreende-se que a avaliação da atuação do conselho de administração na aprovação do pagamento executivo deve se fundamentar na conveniência do instrumento para o interesse social. Tanto a estrutura de propriedade como o mercado de controle acionário são elementos relevantes para que se possa apurar se o incentivo busca cumprir o fim para o qual está sendo previsto, em especial quando a ameaça de aquisições hostis é utilizada como justificativa para a implementação. Assim, com base no estudo do Caso HRT, analisa-se o severance pay a partir das características do mercado de capitais brasileiro. Ainda que não represente toda a complexidade do tema, o caso escolhido retrata uma realidade específica e oferece reflexões importantes para a regulação eficiente do pagamento executivo no Brasil. O presente artigo pretende demonstrar que a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) levou em conta benefícios meramente teóricos do severance pay e não incorporou as especificidades do mercado acionário brasileiro na análise, decisão que trouxe prejuízos aos acionistas da HRT Participações em Petróleo S/A.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2022-11-25info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e2236Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e2236Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e22362317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496/83240Abreu da Silveira, GabrielKlein, Viníciusinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-12-06T18:17:03Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/88496Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2022-12-06T18:17:03Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
O severance pay no Brasil: uma análise do Caso HRT
title The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
spellingShingle The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
Abreu da Silveira, Gabriel
Severance packages
compensation
market for corporate control
entrenchment
HRT Case
Pacotes de indenização
remuneração
mercado de controle acionário
entrincheiramento
Caso HRT
title_short The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
title_full The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
title_fullStr The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
title_full_unstemmed The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
title_sort The Severance Pay in Brazil: An Analysis of the HRT Case
author Abreu da Silveira, Gabriel
author_facet Abreu da Silveira, Gabriel
Klein, Vinícius
author_role author
author2 Klein, Vinícius
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Abreu da Silveira, Gabriel
Klein, Vinícius
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Severance packages
compensation
market for corporate control
entrenchment
HRT Case
Pacotes de indenização
remuneração
mercado de controle acionário
entrincheiramento
Caso HRT
topic Severance packages
compensation
market for corporate control
entrenchment
HRT Case
Pacotes de indenização
remuneração
mercado de controle acionário
entrincheiramento
Caso HRT
description Severance packages are granted to senior executives to mitigate management problems, such as risk aversion. When the incentive plan stipulates the acquisition of control as a hypothesis for triggering the indemnity, the benefit takes the form of a golden parachute and works as a defensive measure against hostile acquisitions by increasing the cost of the operation for the acquirer. It is understood that the evaluation of the board of directors performance in the executive pay approval must be based on the convenience of the instrument for social interest, which requires an institutional analysis. Both the ownership structure and the market for corporate control are relevant elements to determine if the incentive seeks to fulfill the purpose for which it is being planned, especially when the threat of hostile acquisitions is used as a justification for implementation. Therefore, based on the HRT Case, the severance pay is analyzed in observance of the Brazilian capital market characteristics. Although it does not represent all the complexity of the issue, the case chosen is a portrait of a specific reality and offers important thoughts for an efficient regulation of executive pay in Brazil. This work intends to demonstrate that Comissão de Valores Mobiliários [CVM] took into account purely theoretical benefits of the severance pay and did not incorporate the brazilian stock market specificities in the analysis, a decision that brought losses to HRT Participações em Petróleo S/A shareholders.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-11-25
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
language por
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/88496/83240
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e2236
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e2236
Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 3 (2022): set.-dez. (43); e2236
2317-6172
reponame:Revista Direito GV
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instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Direito GV
collection Revista Direito GV
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br
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