Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Da Ros, Luciano
Data de Publicação: 2021
Outros Autores: M. Taylor, Matthew
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030
Resumo: It is often assumed that checks and balances are effective in curbing corruption, in part because checks and balances are so often assumed to be synonymous with the separation of powers. We argue that checks and balances are only one of several potential manifestations of the separation of powers. We suggest that the apparent correlation between checks and balances and control of corruption is driven by a variety of conditions antecedent to both. Using examples from Western democracies, we demonstrate that the concept of checks and balances is by itself an empty vessel, made effective only by “hard” factors such as the balance of political forces and “soft” factors such as the adherence of elites to particular behavioral norms. This does not mean that checks and balances cannot be useful, but rather that our assumptions about their precise utility may be misinformed: the relationship between checks and balances and curbing corruption is at best indirect.
id FGV-2_2706f0207c33eaff0084c3d7b42f7e11
oai_identifier_str oai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/85030
network_acronym_str FGV-2
network_name_str Revista Direito GV
repository_id_str
spelling Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for CorruptionFreios e contrapesos: o conceito e suas implicações para a corrupçãoChecks and balancesSeparation of powersCorruptionFreios e contrapesosSeparação de poderesCorrupçãoIt is often assumed that checks and balances are effective in curbing corruption, in part because checks and balances are so often assumed to be synonymous with the separation of powers. We argue that checks and balances are only one of several potential manifestations of the separation of powers. We suggest that the apparent correlation between checks and balances and control of corruption is driven by a variety of conditions antecedent to both. Using examples from Western democracies, we demonstrate that the concept of checks and balances is by itself an empty vessel, made effective only by “hard” factors such as the balance of political forces and “soft” factors such as the adherence of elites to particular behavioral norms. This does not mean that checks and balances cannot be useful, but rather that our assumptions about their precise utility may be misinformed: the relationship between checks and balances and curbing corruption is at best indirect.Frequentemente, presume-se que o sistema de freios e contrapesos é efetivo para conter a corrupção, em parte porque ele   tipicamente entendido como sinônimo de separação de poderes. Argumentamos que o sistema de freios e contrapesos é apenas uma das várias possíveis manifestações da separação de poderes. Sugerimos que a aparente correlação entre freios e contrapesos e o controle da corrupção decorre de condições antecedentes a ambos. Utilizando exemplos de democracias ocidentais, demonstramos que o conceito de freios e contrapesos é em si mesmo vazio, e somente é efetivado por fatores “duros”, como o equilíbrio das forças políticas, e por fatores “brandos”, como a aderência de elites a normas de comportamento. Isso não significa que ele não possa ser um instrumento útil, mas que nossos pressupostos a respeito de sua utilidade talvez estejam mal informados: a relação com o controle da corrupção é, no melhor dos casos, indireta.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2120Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2120Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e21202317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030/80381Da Ros, LucianoM. Taylor, Matthewinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2021-12-01T17:57:53Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/85030Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2021-12-01T17:57:53Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
Freios e contrapesos: o conceito e suas implicações para a corrupção
title Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
spellingShingle Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
Da Ros, Luciano
Checks and balances
Separation of powers
Corruption
Freios e contrapesos
Separação de poderes
Corrupção
title_short Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
title_full Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
title_fullStr Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
title_full_unstemmed Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
title_sort Checks and Balances: The Concept and Its Implications for Corruption
author Da Ros, Luciano
author_facet Da Ros, Luciano
M. Taylor, Matthew
author_role author
author2 M. Taylor, Matthew
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Da Ros, Luciano
M. Taylor, Matthew
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Checks and balances
Separation of powers
Corruption
Freios e contrapesos
Separação de poderes
Corrupção
topic Checks and balances
Separation of powers
Corruption
Freios e contrapesos
Separação de poderes
Corrupção
description It is often assumed that checks and balances are effective in curbing corruption, in part because checks and balances are so often assumed to be synonymous with the separation of powers. We argue that checks and balances are only one of several potential manifestations of the separation of powers. We suggest that the apparent correlation between checks and balances and control of corruption is driven by a variety of conditions antecedent to both. Using examples from Western democracies, we demonstrate that the concept of checks and balances is by itself an empty vessel, made effective only by “hard” factors such as the balance of political forces and “soft” factors such as the adherence of elites to particular behavioral norms. This does not mean that checks and balances cannot be useful, but rather that our assumptions about their precise utility may be misinformed: the relationship between checks and balances and curbing corruption is at best indirect.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-12-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85030/80381
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2120
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2120
Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2120
2317-6172
reponame:Revista Direito GV
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Direito GV
collection Revista Direito GV
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br
_version_ 1798943710803656704