James Griffin on Human Rights

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabriel
Data de Publicação: 2022
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Revista Direito GV
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610
Resumo: In On Human Rights, James Griffin argues persuasively that human rights should be conceived as protections of personhood, that is, of the distinctive status of human beings as self-directing moral agents. Adopting a holistic interpretation of the author’s work, this article conducts a critical analysis of the central elements of Griffin’s account of human rights, including its methodology, objectives, and central concepts, as well as its attempt to ground human rights norms in basic human interests and practicalities. Lastly, the text considers the merits of Joseph Raz’s critique of Griffin, which claims that his proposal is inconsistent and incapable of accounting for most of the human rights traditionally recognized in international practice. I conclude, with Griffin, that his theory has enough resources at its disposal to offer a compelling answer to Raz’s objection.
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spelling James Griffin on Human RightsOs direitos humanos no pensamento de James GriffinJames GriffinPhilosophy of LawHuman rightsPersonhoodPracticalitiesJames GriffinFilosofia do DireitoDireitos humanosPersonalidadePraticidadesIn On Human Rights, James Griffin argues persuasively that human rights should be conceived as protections of personhood, that is, of the distinctive status of human beings as self-directing moral agents. Adopting a holistic interpretation of the author’s work, this article conducts a critical analysis of the central elements of Griffin’s account of human rights, including its methodology, objectives, and central concepts, as well as its attempt to ground human rights norms in basic human interests and practicalities. Lastly, the text considers the merits of Joseph Raz’s critique of Griffin, which claims that his proposal is inconsistent and incapable of accounting for most of the human rights traditionally recognized in international practice. I conclude, with Griffin, that his theory has enough resources at its disposal to offer a compelling answer to Raz’s objection.Em On Human Rights, James Griffin defende persuasivamente a tese jusnaturalista de que direitos humanos devem ser concebidos como proteções da personalidade, isto é, da capacidade inerente a membros da espécie humana de agir enquanto agentes morais autônomos e livres. A partir de uma interpretação holística do pensamento do autor, e por meio de uma abordagem analítica, este artigo examina os principais elementos da teoria dos direitos humanos de Griffin, passando por sua metodologia e objetivos, conceitos centrais e fundamentação filosófico-normativa nas noções de interesses humanos básicos e praticidades. O texto considera, ainda, a crítica de Joseph Raz de que a proposta de Griffin seria inconsistente e incapaz de explicar boa parte dos direitos humanos tradicionalmente reconhecidos na prática internacional. Conclui-se que a teoria de Griffin tem recursos suficientes para oferecer uma resposta à altura da objeção levantada por Raz.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2022-03-31info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e2212Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e2212Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e22122317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610/80785Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabrielinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2022-04-25T13:49:04Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/85610Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2022-04-25T13:49:04Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv James Griffin on Human Rights
Os direitos humanos no pensamento de James Griffin
title James Griffin on Human Rights
spellingShingle James Griffin on Human Rights
Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabriel
James Griffin
Philosophy of Law
Human rights
Personhood
Practicalities
James Griffin
Filosofia do Direito
Direitos humanos
Personalidade
Praticidades
title_short James Griffin on Human Rights
title_full James Griffin on Human Rights
title_fullStr James Griffin on Human Rights
title_full_unstemmed James Griffin on Human Rights
title_sort James Griffin on Human Rights
author Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabriel
author_facet Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabriel
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Costa Val Rodrigues, Gabriel
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv James Griffin
Philosophy of Law
Human rights
Personhood
Practicalities
James Griffin
Filosofia do Direito
Direitos humanos
Personalidade
Praticidades
topic James Griffin
Philosophy of Law
Human rights
Personhood
Practicalities
James Griffin
Filosofia do Direito
Direitos humanos
Personalidade
Praticidades
description In On Human Rights, James Griffin argues persuasively that human rights should be conceived as protections of personhood, that is, of the distinctive status of human beings as self-directing moral agents. Adopting a holistic interpretation of the author’s work, this article conducts a critical analysis of the central elements of Griffin’s account of human rights, including its methodology, objectives, and central concepts, as well as its attempt to ground human rights norms in basic human interests and practicalities. Lastly, the text considers the merits of Joseph Raz’s critique of Griffin, which claims that his proposal is inconsistent and incapable of accounting for most of the human rights traditionally recognized in international practice. I conclude, with Griffin, that his theory has enough resources at its disposal to offer a compelling answer to Raz’s objection.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-03-31
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610
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dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85610/80785
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 No. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e2212
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 18 Núm. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e2212
Revista Direito GV; v. 18 n. 1 (2022): jan.-abr. (41); e2212
2317-6172
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
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