International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2021 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista Direito GV |
Texto Completo: | https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035 |
Resumo: | Transnational regulation of bribery involves several increasingly complex forms of cooperation among enforcement authorities. International investigative cooperation allows a foreign authority to assist another on criminal and/or civil investigations, through requests of mutual legal assistance, rogatory letters, as well as joint investigative teams. Sanction-based cooperation helps different authorities to transfer or extradite persons and recover proceeds of corruption to the victims. More recently, there has been a rise in cooperation in negotiated settlements with the accused. Settlement cooperation may entail joint resolutions or the coordination of settlement clauses. This paper focuses on how these three modes of cooperation intersect in cases with successive negotiated settlements. We use the Odebrecht case settlements to unpack the relation between investigative, sanction-based, and settlement cooperation in three case studies: the joint resolutions between the company and Brazil, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as two local agreements with the Dominican Republic and with Peru. We evidence how these modes of cooperation can reinforce or undermine one another. Beyond illustrating different cooperation dynamics, we also explore the role of sequencing. The existence of a previous joint resolution affects the developments of the subsequent agreements, but in different ways from those previously mapped by the literature. |
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International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht CaseCooperação internacional e acordos de leniência em casos de corrupção transnacional: um estudo do caso OdebrechtTransnational briberyNegotiated settlementsInternational cooperationCoordinationOdebrechtCorrupção transnacionalAcordos de leniênciaCooperação internacionalCoordenaçãoOdebrechtTransnational regulation of bribery involves several increasingly complex forms of cooperation among enforcement authorities. International investigative cooperation allows a foreign authority to assist another on criminal and/or civil investigations, through requests of mutual legal assistance, rogatory letters, as well as joint investigative teams. Sanction-based cooperation helps different authorities to transfer or extradite persons and recover proceeds of corruption to the victims. More recently, there has been a rise in cooperation in negotiated settlements with the accused. Settlement cooperation may entail joint resolutions or the coordination of settlement clauses. This paper focuses on how these three modes of cooperation intersect in cases with successive negotiated settlements. We use the Odebrecht case settlements to unpack the relation between investigative, sanction-based, and settlement cooperation in three case studies: the joint resolutions between the company and Brazil, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as two local agreements with the Dominican Republic and with Peru. We evidence how these modes of cooperation can reinforce or undermine one another. Beyond illustrating different cooperation dynamics, we also explore the role of sequencing. The existence of a previous joint resolution affects the developments of the subsequent agreements, but in different ways from those previously mapped by the literature.A regulação transnacional anticorrupção promove formas de cooperação cada vez mais complexas entre autoridades. A cooperação internacional em investigações permite que as autoridades auxiliem umas às outras em suas investigações criminais e/ou civis, por meio de solicitações de assistência jurídica mútua, cartas rogatórias e até mesmo equipes de investigação conjuntas. A cooperação baseada em sanções possibilita a transferência ou a extradição de pessoas, bem como a recuperação de ativos para as vítimas da corrupção. Mais recentemente, há aumento da cooperação entre autoridades por meio de acordos negociados com os acusados. Tal cooperação pode implicar resoluções conjuntas ou a coordenação de cláusulas específicas de acordos celebrados. O artigo analisa como esses três modos de cooperação se relacionam quando há acordos sucessivos negociados em diferentes jurisdições. Utilizamos o caso Odebrecht para desvendar a relação entre cooperação em investigação, cooperação baseada em sanções e cooperação em acordos de colaboração em três estudos de caso: as resoluções conjuntas entre Odebrecht e Brasil, Suíça e Estados Unidos, e dois acordos locais firmados com a República Dominicana e com o Peru. Mostramos como esses modos de cooperação podem reforçar ou enfraquecer uns aos outros. Além de ilustrar diferentes dinâmicas de cooperação, também exploramos o papel da sequência entre os acordos em diferentes jurisdições. A existência de uma resolução conjunta anterior afeta os desdobramentos dos acordos subsequentes, mas de formas distintas daquelas previamente mapeadas pela literatura.Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas2021-12-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2131Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2131Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e21312317-6172reponame:Revista Direito GVinstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035/80386Mattos Pimenta, RaquelVenturini, Otavioinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2021-12-01T17:57:40Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/85035Revistahttps://direitosp.fgv.br/publicacoes/revista/revista-direito-gvPRIhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br2317-61721808-2432opendoar:2021-12-01T17:57:40Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case Cooperação internacional e acordos de leniência em casos de corrupção transnacional: um estudo do caso Odebrecht |
title |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
spellingShingle |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case Mattos Pimenta, Raquel Transnational bribery Negotiated settlements International cooperation Coordination Odebrecht Corrupção transnacional Acordos de leniência Cooperação internacional Coordenação Odebrecht |
title_short |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
title_full |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
title_fullStr |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
title_full_unstemmed |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
title_sort |
International Cooperation and Negotiated Settlements for Transnational Bribery: A Study of the Odebrecht Case |
author |
Mattos Pimenta, Raquel |
author_facet |
Mattos Pimenta, Raquel Venturini, Otavio |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Venturini, Otavio |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mattos Pimenta, Raquel Venturini, Otavio |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Transnational bribery Negotiated settlements International cooperation Coordination Odebrecht Corrupção transnacional Acordos de leniência Cooperação internacional Coordenação Odebrecht |
topic |
Transnational bribery Negotiated settlements International cooperation Coordination Odebrecht Corrupção transnacional Acordos de leniência Cooperação internacional Coordenação Odebrecht |
description |
Transnational regulation of bribery involves several increasingly complex forms of cooperation among enforcement authorities. International investigative cooperation allows a foreign authority to assist another on criminal and/or civil investigations, through requests of mutual legal assistance, rogatory letters, as well as joint investigative teams. Sanction-based cooperation helps different authorities to transfer or extradite persons and recover proceeds of corruption to the victims. More recently, there has been a rise in cooperation in negotiated settlements with the accused. Settlement cooperation may entail joint resolutions or the coordination of settlement clauses. This paper focuses on how these three modes of cooperation intersect in cases with successive negotiated settlements. We use the Odebrecht case settlements to unpack the relation between investigative, sanction-based, and settlement cooperation in three case studies: the joint resolutions between the company and Brazil, Switzerland, and the United States, as well as two local agreements with the Dominican Republic and with Peru. We evidence how these modes of cooperation can reinforce or undermine one another. Beyond illustrating different cooperation dynamics, we also explore the role of sequencing. The existence of a previous joint resolution affects the developments of the subsequent agreements, but in different ways from those previously mapped by the literature. |
publishDate |
2021 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2021-12-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035 |
url |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://periodicos.fgv.br/revdireitogv/article/view/85035/80386 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Direito de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 No. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2131 Revista Direito GV; Vol. 17 Núm. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2131 Revista Direito GV; v. 17 n. 2 (2021): maio-ago. (39); e2131 2317-6172 reponame:Revista Direito GV instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Revista Direito GV |
collection |
Revista Direito GV |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Direito GV - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||revistadireitogv@fgv.br|| catarina.barbieri@fgv.br |
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