Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Schapiro, Mario Gomes
Data de Publicação: 2017
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
Título da fonte: Revista de Administração Pública
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940
Resumo: This article aims to evaluate the institutional design of the political delegation that shapes The Brazilian Development Bank’s (BNDES) financial activities. It employs a normative framework of administrative law, concerning the types of political delegation, and studies two of them: legality and discretion. Legal governance is a type of arrangement in which policy objectives are delegated by the Congress, while discretionary public governance policy objectives are defined in the Executive branch of government. Both types have different comparative advantages in governing policies. Whereas legality favors predictability and publicity, discretion enables flexibility and less political involvement. The main claim is that, due to Brazil’s institutional environment, discretionary governance has proven advantageous. BNDES has been kept from the games of political and parliamentary clientele and it has suitable operational flexibility to act in times of economic crisis. However, this configuration also has costs, including financial agenda opacity and social accountability deficits.
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spelling Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDESLegalidad y discreción en la gobernanza de bancos publicos: un análisis aplicado al caso de BNDESLegalidade ou discricionariedade na governança de bancos públicos: uma análise aplicada ao caso do BNDESgovernancestate-owned bankslegalitydiscretionBNDESgobernanzabancos públicoslegalidaddiscreciónBNDESgovernançabancos públicoslegalidadediscricionariedadeBNDESThis article aims to evaluate the institutional design of the political delegation that shapes The Brazilian Development Bank’s (BNDES) financial activities. It employs a normative framework of administrative law, concerning the types of political delegation, and studies two of them: legality and discretion. Legal governance is a type of arrangement in which policy objectives are delegated by the Congress, while discretionary public governance policy objectives are defined in the Executive branch of government. Both types have different comparative advantages in governing policies. Whereas legality favors predictability and publicity, discretion enables flexibility and less political involvement. The main claim is that, due to Brazil’s institutional environment, discretionary governance has proven advantageous. BNDES has been kept from the games of political and parliamentary clientele and it has suitable operational flexibility to act in times of economic crisis. However, this configuration also has costs, including financial agenda opacity and social accountability deficits.El objetivo de este artículo es evaluar el diseño institucional de la relación de delegación política establecida en las operaciones del BNDES. Para ello, se utiliza el derecho administrativo (como marco referencial) en relación a las formas de delegación política, y se abordan dos tipos de gobernanza: legal y discrecional. La gobernanza legal es un tipo de organización en la que los objetivos de política pública son delegados por el Congreso, mientras que en la gobernanza discrecional tales objetivos son definidos por el Ejecutivo. Los dos tipos presentan diferentes ventajas comparativas para guiar las políticas públicas. Mientras que la legalidad favorece la previsibilidad y la publicidad, la discrecionalidad implica mayor flexibilidad y menor participación política. El argumento central es que, por cuenta del entorno institucional brasileño, la gobernanza discrecional ha resultado ser ventajosa. El BNDES se ha protegido de los juegos clientelares político-parlamentarios, y ha garantizado flexibilidad operativa para actuar en tiempos de crisis económica. Por otra parte esta configuración también implica costos, tales como la relativa opacidad (una agenda financiera poco transparente) y un limitado control social.O objetivo do artigo é avaliar o desenho institucional da relação de delegação política estabelecida na atuação do BNDES. Para isso, utiliza o referencial normativo do direito administrativo, respeitante às formas de delegação política, e trabalha com dois tipos de governança dessa delegação: a legal e a discricionária. A governança legal representa um tipo de arranjo em que os objetivos de política são delegados pelo Congresso, ao passo que na governança discricionária os objetivos públicos são definidos no âmbito do Executivo. Ambos os tipos têm diferentes vantagens comparativas para governar políticas públicas. Enquanto a legalidade favorece a previsibilidade e a publicidade, a discricionariedade enseja maior flexibilidade e menor envolvimento parlamentar. O argumento desenvolvido é o de que, em razão do ambiente institucional brasileiro, a governança discricionária tem se mostrado vantajosa. O BNDES tem sido preservado dos jogos de clientela político-parlamentar e tem garantido uma flexibilidade operacional para atuar em momentos de crise econômica. Por outro lado, essa conformação também apresenta custos, tais como: a relativa opacidade de sua agenda financeira e um menor controle social.Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)2017-02-20info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 51 No. 1 (2017); 105-128Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 51 Núm. 1 (2017); 105-128Revista de Administração Pública; v. 51 n. 1 (2017); 105-1281982-31340034-7612reponame:Revista de Administração Públicainstname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940/63610https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940/pdf_99Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Públicainfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSchapiro, Mario Gomes2017-02-23T17:45:23Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/65940Revistahttps://ebape.fgv.br/publicacoes/rapONGhttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rap@fgv.br1982-31340034-7612opendoar:2017-02-23T17:45:23Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
Legalidad y discreción en la gobernanza de bancos publicos: un análisis aplicado al caso de BNDES
Legalidade ou discricionariedade na governança de bancos públicos: uma análise aplicada ao caso do BNDES
title Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
spellingShingle Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
Schapiro, Mario Gomes
governance
state-owned banks
legality
discretion
BNDES
gobernanza
bancos públicos
legalidad
discreción
BNDES
governança
bancos públicos
legalidade
discricionariedade
BNDES
title_short Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
title_full Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
title_fullStr Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
title_full_unstemmed Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
title_sort Legality and discretion in public governance of state-owned banks: an analysis applied to the case of BNDES
author Schapiro, Mario Gomes
author_facet Schapiro, Mario Gomes
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Schapiro, Mario Gomes
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv governance
state-owned banks
legality
discretion
BNDES
gobernanza
bancos públicos
legalidad
discreción
BNDES
governança
bancos públicos
legalidade
discricionariedade
BNDES
topic governance
state-owned banks
legality
discretion
BNDES
gobernanza
bancos públicos
legalidad
discreción
BNDES
governança
bancos públicos
legalidade
discricionariedade
BNDES
description This article aims to evaluate the institutional design of the political delegation that shapes The Brazilian Development Bank’s (BNDES) financial activities. It employs a normative framework of administrative law, concerning the types of political delegation, and studies two of them: legality and discretion. Legal governance is a type of arrangement in which policy objectives are delegated by the Congress, while discretionary public governance policy objectives are defined in the Executive branch of government. Both types have different comparative advantages in governing policies. Whereas legality favors predictability and publicity, discretion enables flexibility and less political involvement. The main claim is that, due to Brazil’s institutional environment, discretionary governance has proven advantageous. BNDES has been kept from the games of political and parliamentary clientele and it has suitable operational flexibility to act in times of economic crisis. However, this configuration also has costs, including financial agenda opacity and social accountability deficits.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-02-20
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
language por
eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940/63610
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rap/article/view/65940/pdf_99
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Pública
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2017 Revista de Administração Pública
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV EBAPE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Brazilian Journal of Public Administration; Vol. 51 No. 1 (2017); 105-128
Revista de Administração Pública; Vol. 51 Núm. 1 (2017); 105-128
Revista de Administração Pública; v. 51 n. 1 (2017); 105-128
1982-3134
0034-7612
reponame:Revista de Administração Pública
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista de Administração Pública
collection Revista de Administração Pública
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista de Administração Pública - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rap@fgv.br
_version_ 1798943772518645760

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