A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Sotomayor,Marilda
Data de Publicação: 2002
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006
Resumo: This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.
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spelling A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demandauction mechanismcompetitive equilibriumdemand setThis paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.Fundação Getúlio Vargas2002-09-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006Revista Brasileira de Economia v.56 n.3 2002reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.1590/S0034-71402002000300006info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSotomayor,Marildaeng2003-07-15T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-71402002000300006Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/issue/archivehttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2003-07-15T00:00Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
title A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
spellingShingle A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
Sotomayor,Marilda
auction mechanism
competitive equilibrium
demand set
title_short A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
title_full A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
title_fullStr A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
title_full_unstemmed A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
title_sort A simultaneous descending bid auction for multiple items and unitary demand
author Sotomayor,Marilda
author_facet Sotomayor,Marilda
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Sotomayor,Marilda
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv auction mechanism
competitive equilibrium
demand set
topic auction mechanism
competitive equilibrium
demand set
description This paper proposes a new descending bid method for auctioning multiple objects. The auctioneer announces a current price, bidders indicate their demands at that price, and the auctioneer lowers the prices until every object can be allocated to a buyer who demands it and no buyer receives more than one item. The features of this mechanism lie on the facts that: the objects are sold simultaneously at prices that clear the market; every two similar objects are sold at the same price; the mechanism always produces the same final price, namely, the maximum competitive equilibrium price. In addition, the auctioneer can choose an efficient allocation.
publishDate 2002
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2002-09-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402002000300006
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0034-71402002000300006
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia v.56 n.3 2002
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rbe@fgv.br
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