Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Palma, Andreza Aparecida
Data de Publicação: 2011
Outros Autores: Portugal, Marcelo Savino
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: por
eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491
Resumo: This work aims to estimate the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil during the inflation targeting regime, using a standard new keynesian model with forward-looking expectations, as proposed by Givens (2010). The presence of rational expectations in the model makes a distinction between two modes of optimization, commitment and discretion, and thus allows us to evaluate which of these specifications is favored by the data. Using quarterly data for the period from 2000-1 to 2010-4, the obtained results allow us to affirm that the data favor a discretionary policy. Estimates of the loss function show that the monetary authority gives great weight to inflation stabilization, followed by interest rate smoothing and stabilization of the output gap.
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spelling Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretionMetas de InflaçãoPreferências do Banco Central do BrasilFiltro de KalmanThis work aims to estimate the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil during the inflation targeting regime, using a standard new keynesian model with forward-looking expectations, as proposed by Givens (2010). The presence of rational expectations in the model makes a distinction between two modes of optimization, commitment and discretion, and thus allows us to evaluate which of these specifications is favored by the data. Using quarterly data for the period from 2000-1 to 2010-4, the obtained results allow us to affirm that the data favor a discretionary policy. Estimates of the loss function show that the monetary authority gives great weight to inflation stabilization, followed by interest rate smoothing and stabilization of the output gap.O objetivo principal deste trabalho é estimar as preferências do Banco Central do Brasil durante o regime de metas de inflação, usando um modelo novo-keynesiano padrão com expectativas forward-looking, conforme proposto por Givens (2010). A consideração de expectativas racionais separa as políticas em dois casos possíveis, regras e discrição e, portanto, permite avaliar com qual desses dois casos os dados são mais consistentes. Usando observações trimestrais, para o período de 2000-1 a 2010-4, os resultados obtidos permitem afirmar que, para o período considerado, os dados favorecem uma política discricionária. As estimativas da função perda revelam que a autoridade monetária dá um grande peso para a estabilização da inflação, seguida pela suavização da taxa de juros e pela estabilização do hiato do produto.EGV EPGE2011-11-16info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionArticlesArtigosapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491Revista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 65 No. 4 (2011): Out-Dez; 347-358Revista Brasileira de Economia; v. 65 n. 4 (2011): Out-Dez; 347-3581806-91340034-7140reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVporenghttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491/2292https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491/2294Palma, Andreza AparecidaPortugal, Marcelo Savinoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess2016-12-16T12:30:05Zoai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/3491Revistahttps://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/oai||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2024-03-06T13:03:29.700472Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)true
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
title Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
spellingShingle Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
Palma, Andreza Aparecida
Metas de Inflação
Preferências do Banco Central do Brasil
Filtro de Kalman
title_short Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
title_full Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
title_fullStr Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
title_full_unstemmed Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
title_sort Preferences of the Central Bank of Brasil under the inflation targeting regime: commitment vs. discretion
author Palma, Andreza Aparecida
author_facet Palma, Andreza Aparecida
Portugal, Marcelo Savino
author_role author
author2 Portugal, Marcelo Savino
author2_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Palma, Andreza Aparecida
Portugal, Marcelo Savino
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Metas de Inflação
Preferências do Banco Central do Brasil
Filtro de Kalman
topic Metas de Inflação
Preferências do Banco Central do Brasil
Filtro de Kalman
description This work aims to estimate the preferences of the Central Bank of Brazil during the inflation targeting regime, using a standard new keynesian model with forward-looking expectations, as proposed by Givens (2010). The presence of rational expectations in the model makes a distinction between two modes of optimization, commitment and discretion, and thus allows us to evaluate which of these specifications is favored by the data. Using quarterly data for the period from 2000-1 to 2010-4, the obtained results allow us to affirm that the data favor a discretionary policy. Estimates of the loss function show that the monetary authority gives great weight to inflation stabilization, followed by interest rate smoothing and stabilization of the output gap.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011-11-16
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Articles
Artigos
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491
url https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv por
eng
language por
eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491/2292
https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/3491/2294
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv EGV EPGE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv EGV EPGE
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia; Vol. 65 No. 4 (2011): Out-Dez; 347-358
Revista Brasileira de Economia; v. 65 n. 4 (2011): Out-Dez; 347-358
1806-9134
0034-7140
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rbe@fgv.br
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