Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Monteiro,Paulo Klinger
Data de Publicação: 2000
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402000000200003
Resumo: This paper proves the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated. In an all-pay auction every bidder pays his bid. The war of attrition is an auction in which every bidder but the winner pays his bid. The winner pays the second highest bid. Recently Krishna and Morgan showed that the war of attrition, if signals are correlated, dominates the all-pay auction. Examples in the paper show that the optimal all-pay auction may be optimal among all auctions and may dominate the war of attrition.
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spelling Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlatedall-pay auctioncorrelated signalsThis paper proves the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated. In an all-pay auction every bidder pays his bid. The war of attrition is an auction in which every bidder but the winner pays his bid. The winner pays the second highest bid. Recently Krishna and Morgan showed that the war of attrition, if signals are correlated, dominates the all-pay auction. Examples in the paper show that the optimal all-pay auction may be optimal among all auctions and may dominate the war of attrition.Fundação Getúlio Vargas2000-06-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402000000200003Revista Brasileira de Economia v.54 n.2 2000reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.1590/S0034-71402000000200003info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMonteiro,Paulo Klingereng2010-09-09T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-71402000000200003Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/issue/archivehttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2010-09-09T00:00Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
title Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
spellingShingle Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
Monteiro,Paulo Klinger
all-pay auction
correlated signals
title_short Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
title_full Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
title_fullStr Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
title_full_unstemmed Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
title_sort Optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated
author Monteiro,Paulo Klinger
author_facet Monteiro,Paulo Klinger
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Monteiro,Paulo Klinger
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv all-pay auction
correlated signals
topic all-pay auction
correlated signals
description This paper proves the existence of the optimal all-pay auction when signals are correlated. In an all-pay auction every bidder pays his bid. The war of attrition is an auction in which every bidder but the winner pays his bid. The winner pays the second highest bid. Recently Krishna and Morgan showed that the war of attrition, if signals are correlated, dominates the all-pay auction. Examples in the paper show that the optimal all-pay auction may be optimal among all auctions and may dominate the war of attrition.
publishDate 2000
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2000-06-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402000000200003
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402000000200003
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0034-71402000000200003
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia v.54 n.2 2000
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rbe@fgv.br
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