Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades*
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2020 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) |
Texto Completo: | http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402020000100049 |
Resumo: | Abstract Hydroelectric generation is the main source of energy production in many countries. When firms operate in the same river, or in cascades, the output of an upstream firm is the input of its downstream rival. We build a dynamic stochastic duopoly model of competition in cascades and show that the decentralized market is inefficient when rain is frequent. However, at the critical times when rain is infrequente the market allocation is efficient. In an extension of our benchmark model, we show that regulatory intervention might be necessary if peak prices are sufficiently higher than off-peak prices. In such cases, upstream firms delay production in off-peak times, limiting their rival downstream generators’ production in peak times. |
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Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades*Electricity marketsdynamic gameshydroelectric generationAbstract Hydroelectric generation is the main source of energy production in many countries. When firms operate in the same river, or in cascades, the output of an upstream firm is the input of its downstream rival. We build a dynamic stochastic duopoly model of competition in cascades and show that the decentralized market is inefficient when rain is frequent. However, at the critical times when rain is infrequente the market allocation is efficient. In an extension of our benchmark model, we show that regulatory intervention might be necessary if peak prices are sufficiently higher than off-peak prices. In such cases, upstream firms delay production in off-peak times, limiting their rival downstream generators’ production in peak times.Fundação Getúlio Vargas2020-01-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402020000100049Revista Brasileira de Economia v.74 n.1 2020reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.5935/0034-7140.20200003info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMoita,RodrigoMonte,Danieleng2020-04-30T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-71402020000100049Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/issue/archivehttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2020-04-30T00:00Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
title |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
spellingShingle |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* Moita,Rodrigo Electricity markets dynamic games hydroelectric generation |
title_short |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
title_full |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
title_fullStr |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
title_full_unstemmed |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
title_sort |
Hydroelectric Generators Competing in Cascades* |
author |
Moita,Rodrigo |
author_facet |
Moita,Rodrigo Monte,Daniel |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Monte,Daniel |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Moita,Rodrigo Monte,Daniel |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Electricity markets dynamic games hydroelectric generation |
topic |
Electricity markets dynamic games hydroelectric generation |
description |
Abstract Hydroelectric generation is the main source of energy production in many countries. When firms operate in the same river, or in cascades, the output of an upstream firm is the input of its downstream rival. We build a dynamic stochastic duopoly model of competition in cascades and show that the decentralized market is inefficient when rain is frequent. However, at the critical times when rain is infrequente the market allocation is efficient. In an extension of our benchmark model, we show that regulatory intervention might be necessary if peak prices are sufficiently higher than off-peak prices. In such cases, upstream firms delay production in off-peak times, limiting their rival downstream generators’ production in peak times. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-01-01 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402020000100049 |
url |
http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402020000100049 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
10.5935/0034-7140.20200003 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
text/html |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getúlio Vargas |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getúlio Vargas |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Brasileira de Economia v.74 n.1 2020 reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) |
collection |
Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||rbe@fgv.br |
_version_ |
1754115906008514560 |