Information exchanges in cournot duopolies

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Faíña Medín,J. Andrés
Data de Publicação: 2003
Outros Autores: López Rodríguez,Jesús, López Rodríguez,José
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000100007
Resumo: In this paper we analyze the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand. We model the random demand as a linear demand having, 1) an unknown intercept, and 2) an unknown slope. In each of these two scenarios, firms observe private signals about the unknown parameter. We show that in the scenario-1, if the private signal observed by firms is accurate enough, information exchange is profitable and in the scenario-2, if there is a sufficiently large variation in the demand slope and private signals are accurate enough, firms earn strictly higher profits by sharing their information rather than keeping it private.
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spelling Information exchanges in cournot duopoliesinformation exchangecournot equilibriumaccuracy effectslope uncertaintyintercept demand uncertaintyIn this paper we analyze the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand. We model the random demand as a linear demand having, 1) an unknown intercept, and 2) an unknown slope. In each of these two scenarios, firms observe private signals about the unknown parameter. We show that in the scenario-1, if the private signal observed by firms is accurate enough, information exchange is profitable and in the scenario-2, if there is a sufficiently large variation in the demand slope and private signals are accurate enough, firms earn strictly higher profits by sharing their information rather than keeping it private.Fundação Getúlio Vargas2003-03-01info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontext/htmlhttp://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000100007Revista Brasileira de Economia v.57 n.1 2003reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGV10.1590/S0034-71402003000100007info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessFaíña Medín,J. AndrésLópez Rodríguez,JesúsLópez Rodríguez,Joséeng2004-01-15T00:00:00Zoai:scielo:S0034-71402003000100007Revistahttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rbe/issue/archivehttps://old.scielo.br/oai/scielo-oai.php||rbe@fgv.br1806-91340034-7140opendoar:2004-01-15T00:00Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
title Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
spellingShingle Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
Faíña Medín,J. Andrés
information exchange
cournot equilibrium
accuracy effect
slope uncertainty
intercept demand uncertainty
title_short Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
title_full Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
title_fullStr Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
title_full_unstemmed Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
title_sort Information exchanges in cournot duopolies
author Faíña Medín,J. Andrés
author_facet Faíña Medín,J. Andrés
López Rodríguez,Jesús
López Rodríguez,José
author_role author
author2 López Rodríguez,Jesús
López Rodríguez,José
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Faíña Medín,J. Andrés
López Rodríguez,Jesús
López Rodríguez,José
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv information exchange
cournot equilibrium
accuracy effect
slope uncertainty
intercept demand uncertainty
topic information exchange
cournot equilibrium
accuracy effect
slope uncertainty
intercept demand uncertainty
description In this paper we analyze the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand. We model the random demand as a linear demand having, 1) an unknown intercept, and 2) an unknown slope. In each of these two scenarios, firms observe private signals about the unknown parameter. We show that in the scenario-1, if the private signal observed by firms is accurate enough, information exchange is profitable and in the scenario-2, if there is a sufficiently large variation in the demand slope and private signals are accurate enough, firms earn strictly higher profits by sharing their information rather than keeping it private.
publishDate 2003
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2003-03-01
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000100007
url http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-71402003000100007
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv 10.1590/S0034-71402003000100007
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv text/html
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Fundação Getúlio Vargas
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia v.57 n.1 2003
reponame:Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
collection Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Revista Brasileira de Economia (Online) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv ||rbe@fgv.br
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