The impact of the Brazilian institutional arrangement on political control over bureaucracy

• Autor(a) principal: Lima, Iana Alves de
• Data de Publicação: 2018
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por; eng
• Título da fonte: Cadernos EBAPE.BR
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.fgv.br/cadernosebape/article/view/65820
• topic: Control of bureaucracy. Accountability. Coalitional presidentialism.; Control de la burocracia. Accountability. Presidencialismo de coalición.; Controle da burocracia. Accountability. Presidencialismo de coalizão.

This article aims to discuss which characteristics of the Brazilian political system hinder the political control over the bureaucracy and, consequently, hamper accountability in the country. Through a review of the literature on the topic and theoretical debate, we intend to investigate to what extent the institutions of Brazilian coalitional presidentialism facilitate or hinder bureaucratic control, which may impact the outcome of public policies. Initially, a review of the comparative literature on the subject was conducted, followed by the analysis of the Brazilian institutional arrangement and its impact on the appointment and monitoring strategies of Ministers in the Cabinet. In conclusion, despite the centrality of the executive in the Brazilian political system, it is noticed that there are informal constraints to the Presidency that can hamper the coordination of policies. In this sense, the federative structure and the multiparty system act as aggravating factors in this scenario and lead the executive to adopt various informal strategies of control over the bureaucracy. These strategies, while contributing to the management of the Office, may have negative impacts on policy outcomes, coupled with a lack of transparency in the control mechanisms used.