Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Menezes, Flavio Marques
Data de Publicação: 2001
Outros Autores: Dutra, Joísa Campanher
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/722
Resumo: In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in the sale of the companies constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System - the government-owned Telecom holding in Brazil. We designed an experiment where individuals participate in a sequence of independent …rst-price auctions followed by a sequence of hybrid auctions. Several conclusions emerged from this experimental study. First, ex-post e¢ciency was achieved overwhelmingly by the hybrid auctions. Secondly, although overbidding (with respect to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium) was a regular feature of participants’ bidding behavior in the …rst-price auctions — as it is commonly reported in most experimental studies of …rst-price auctions, it was less frequent in the hybrid auctions. By calibrating the results to allow for risk-averse behavior we were able to account for a signi…cant part of the overbidding. Finally, we compared the revenue generated by the hybrid auction with that generated by a standard …rst-price sealed bid auction and the results were ambiguous.
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spelling Menezes, Flavio MarquesDutra, Joísa CampanherEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:31:41Z2010-09-23T18:56:56Z2008-05-13T15:31:41Z2010-09-23T18:56:56Z2001-05-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/722In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in the sale of the companies constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System - the government-owned Telecom holding in Brazil. We designed an experiment where individuals participate in a sequence of independent …rst-price auctions followed by a sequence of hybrid auctions. Several conclusions emerged from this experimental study. First, ex-post e¢ciency was achieved overwhelmingly by the hybrid auctions. Secondly, although overbidding (with respect to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium) was a regular feature of participants’ bidding behavior in the …rst-price auctions — as it is commonly reported in most experimental studies of …rst-price auctions, it was less frequent in the hybrid auctions. By calibrating the results to allow for risk-averse behavior we were able to account for a signi…cant part of the overbidding. Finally, we compared the revenue generated by the hybrid auction with that generated by a standard …rst-price sealed bid auction and the results were ambiguous.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;422Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidenceinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaEconomiaLeilõesreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTHUMBNAIL1270.pdf.jpg1270.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4145https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/d2cb7950-9ffb-4283-ada4-ab4445ac0407/download4e3b295598954e4ef0952edddd1383dbMD58ORIGINAL1270.pdfapplication/pdf357091https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/2fe1baa2-598e-4652-9303-4b3c7f63c28f/download3b563ca2c915b440bdbedf69cd183e7cMD52TEXT1270.pdf.txt1270.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain44388https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/b5eb5732-c356-452a-9bf1-79fd99d2f04c/downloadb6bcf31318661a87ff5c86a5604a3f76MD5710438/7222023-11-09 17:11:45.11open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/722https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T17:11:45Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
title Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
spellingShingle Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
Menezes, Flavio Marques
Economia
Economia
Leilões
title_short Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
title_full Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
title_fullStr Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
title_full_unstemmed Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
title_sort Hybrid Auctions II: Experimental Evidence
author Menezes, Flavio Marques
author_facet Menezes, Flavio Marques
Dutra, Joísa Campanher
author_role author
author2 Dutra, Joísa Campanher
author2_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Menezes, Flavio Marques
Dutra, Joísa Campanher
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
topic Economia
Economia
Leilões
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Economia
Leilões
description In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to examine the properties of a hybrid auction - a Dutch-Vickrey auction, that combines a sealed bid …rst-price auction with a sealed bid second-price auction. This auction mechanism shares some important features with that used in the sale of the companies constituted through the partial division of the Telebras System - the government-owned Telecom holding in Brazil. We designed an experiment where individuals participate in a sequence of independent …rst-price auctions followed by a sequence of hybrid auctions. Several conclusions emerged from this experimental study. First, ex-post e¢ciency was achieved overwhelmingly by the hybrid auctions. Secondly, although overbidding (with respect to the risk-neutral Bayesian Nash equilibrium) was a regular feature of participants’ bidding behavior in the …rst-price auctions — as it is commonly reported in most experimental studies of …rst-price auctions, it was less frequent in the hybrid auctions. By calibrating the results to allow for risk-averse behavior we were able to account for a signi…cant part of the overbidding. Finally, we compared the revenue generated by the hybrid auction with that generated by a standard …rst-price sealed bid auction and the results were ambiguous.
publishDate 2001
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2010-09-23T18:56:56Z
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
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