Um modelo de leilões com conteúdo local: análise e modelagem dos leilões de concessão de blocos exploratórios de petróleo e gás promovidos pela ANP no Brasil

• Autor(a) principal: Francisco, Bruno Mattiello
• Data de Publicação: 2014
• Tipo de documento: Dissertação
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/14009
• topic: Local content; Game theory; Auctions; Multi-attribute auctions; ANP auctions; Brazil’s exploratory blocks auctions; Conteúdo local; Teoria dos jogos; Leilões; Leilões multi-atributos; Leilões da ANP; Leilões de blocos exploratórios no Brasil; Economia; Finanças; Indústria petrolífera; Leilões reversos; Conteúdo local; Teoria dos jogos

Brazil’s oil auctions use an equation to form a score that defines the winner. Each company or consortium interested in the oil block must bid in three attributes: Signature Bonus (BA), Minimum Exploration Program (PEM) and Local Content (CL). Each of these attributes receives a weight in the equation and bidder’s final score also depends on the others companies bid. Although oil auctions have being widely studied in the economy the multi-attribute score auction is still poorly analyzed specially as a mechanism of mining rights allocation. The present work highlights the insertion of the local content as an attribute which transforms the auction structure from what could be a first price auction to a multi-attribute score auction. Through the project’s costs curve is demonstrated how the local content is related to another important score attribute that is the signature bonus. To better understand the insertion of the local content attribute we have created three cases of hypothetical auctions. We also have fixed the minimum exploration program and made some simplifications in order to build those cases. In the first scenario (Sem CL), the structure comes down to a first-price auction, where only the BA attribute defines the auction winner. In the second scenario (CLO=CLR), where the local content does impact the final score, the bidder is obligated to realize the local content as was bid. The last scenario is the complete case (Com Multa) which allows the bidder to failure the local content bid when paying the penalty represents an economic gain to the company. Taking those cases into consideration we have verified that, although the company’s revenue and the allocation efficiency don’t vary, the government revenue drops significantly when the local content is introduced as an attribute of score auctions.