Signalling and arbitrage
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1986 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/497 |
Resumo: | Given a competitive signalling game, we study a transformed game which includes the natural enrichment of contractual opportunities in a market. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the new game which satisfy certa in competitive hypotheses induce sequential equilibrium outcomes in the original game which satisfy the Cho-Kreps extended intuitive criterion. Arbitrage opportunities in the transformed game achieve results similar to refinements of sequential equilibria in the original game. |
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Chin-Chiu Tan, TommyMadrigal, VicenteEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:25:16Z2008-05-13T15:25:16Z19860104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/497Given a competitive signalling game, we study a transformed game which includes the natural enrichment of contractual opportunities in a market. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the new game which satisfy certa in competitive hypotheses induce sequential equilibrium outcomes in the original game which satisfy the Cho-Kreps extended intuitive criterion. Arbitrage opportunities in the transformed game achieve results similar to refinements of sequential equilibria in the original game.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;85Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessSignalling and arbitrageinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaTeoria dos jogosEconomiareponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINAL85_000048941.pdf85_000048941.pdfapplication/pdf1068232https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/a03dcb90-47c4-4e4b-ba0c-ce57f80a5f9c/download26c179086b2827e366e5cfe487c8580fMD51TEXT85_000048941.pdf.txt85_000048941.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain52131https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/2c1643c1-c20e-4f9a-9b5a-574b7fc8d445/download768cd4e907c732107f05da825147a47cMD56THUMBNAIL85_000048941.pdf.jpg85_000048941.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2148https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/1b44f11d-820b-46a6-9038-df5fdf3db801/downloadd7b565e2a6393c84e0e9f541163917c6MD5710438/4972023-11-09 17:40:11.358open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/497https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T17:40:11Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Signalling and arbitrage |
title |
Signalling and arbitrage |
spellingShingle |
Signalling and arbitrage Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy Economia Teoria dos jogos Economia |
title_short |
Signalling and arbitrage |
title_full |
Signalling and arbitrage |
title_fullStr |
Signalling and arbitrage |
title_full_unstemmed |
Signalling and arbitrage |
title_sort |
Signalling and arbitrage |
author |
Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy |
author_facet |
Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy Madrigal, Vicente |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Madrigal, Vicente |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy Madrigal, Vicente |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Teoria dos jogos Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Teoria dos jogos Economia |
description |
Given a competitive signalling game, we study a transformed game which includes the natural enrichment of contractual opportunities in a market. We show that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in the new game which satisfy certa in competitive hypotheses induce sequential equilibrium outcomes in the original game which satisfy the Cho-Kreps extended intuitive criterion. Arbitrage opportunities in the transformed game achieve results similar to refinements of sequential equilibria in the original game. |
publishDate |
1986 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
1986 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:25:16Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:25:16Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/497 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
identifier_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/497 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Ensaios Econômicos;85 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
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Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
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FGV |
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FGV |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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