Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2000 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/351 |
Resumo: | Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract. |
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Moreira, Humberto AtaídeLisboa, Marcos de BarrosEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:22:40Z2010-09-23T18:58:21Z2008-05-13T15:22:40Z2010-09-23T18:58:21Z2000-04-030104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/351Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract.engFundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em EconomiaEnsaios Econômicos;365Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessmentinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaEconomiaSeguro-saúdereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTEXT1229.pdf.txt1229.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain69414https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/1f4b7de2-7dbc-4f4b-8c4f-23e4d7c66871/download1c1d0c682b9945f42f3bafc7f2f270bcMD531229(2).pdf.txt1229(2).pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain69477https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/3cb30ba2-58a5-463e-a44c-850cc981c40b/download239fa71e1d35783176da04b86b7fded3MD510ORIGINAL1229(2).pdf1229(2).pdfapplication/pdf9364296https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/1a1a1aff-2684-470c-a3ab-b5d2365b81ca/download22fd9a6a2888fa2da89d2b3553933d83MD55THUMBNAIL1229(2).pdf.jpg1229(2).pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4419https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/e843a8cc-84b2-44b5-a781-a7e5442d1da9/download63f5b9e71557eee289580dd8fad65375MD51110438/3512023-11-09 22:14:58.277open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/351https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T22:14:58Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
title |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
spellingShingle |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment Moreira, Humberto Ataíde Economia Economia Seguro-saúde |
title_short |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
title_full |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
title_fullStr |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
title_full_unstemmed |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
title_sort |
Should we be afraid of managed care?: a theoretical assessment |
author |
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde |
author_facet |
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde Lisboa, Marcos de Barros |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Lisboa, Marcos de Barros |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde Lisboa, Marcos de Barros |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Economia Seguro-saúde |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia Seguro-saúde |
description |
Managed caIe capitation contracts provide monetary incentives for doctoIs to save medical costs while standard health insurance contracts do noto The papeI proposes an alternative model for insurance markets which is used to analyze managed caIe contracts. In our model, households would like to buy insurance for the possible need of a service. The distinctive aspect of our model is that providers of service have privileged information on the most appropriate procedure to be followed. In the managed care application of the model, doctors are the providers of the service and through a diagnosis have better information of the patient's health condition. Equilibrium in our model is always constrained eflicient. A partial capitation contract arises when both the cost and net benefits of treatment are high enough. We show that a capitation contract provides incentives for doctors: i) to care about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (altruistic behamor); and ii) to save medical costs (managed care behamor). Doctors, in this case, choose less medically eflicient treatments as they would choose under a standard health insurance contract. Besides this, household' welfare is increased in comparison to the standard contract. This increased welfare translates into a revealed preference for the capitation contract. |
publishDate |
2000 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2000-04-03 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:22:40Z 2010-09-23T18:58:21Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:22:40Z 2010-09-23T18:58:21Z |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/351 |
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0104-8910 |
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0104-8910 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/351 |
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Ensaios Econômicos;365 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Fundação Getulio Vargas. Escola de Pós-graduação em Economia |
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