When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e
Data de Publicação: 2016
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16765
Resumo: Private-to-private corruption is a phenomenon that greatly affects both firms and countries they operate in. Both contextual and behavioral aspects of decision-making under corruption risk have been previously studied. However, as the phenomenon is very complex, the field lacks on understanding the causal relationships and comprehensive models for private-to-private corruption. Given the described research opportunities, this study investigated when it pays to be corrupt in the private sector. To conduct this study, it was employed a 3x2 (risk – high, medium, low and business as usual/not as) anecdotal field experiment through the vignette technique, emulating a procurement process. This experiment had a sample of n=168; respondents had, in average, both work experience and familiarity with the B2B procurement process. Through rational choice and expected utility theory, this thesis was able to combine contextual and individual factors for decisional process, disclosing the mechanisms through what a decision-maker opt whether to act or not corruptly. It was possible to establish the causal relationship of informal social norms and the risk of punishment in corruption inclination. Also, the present study assessed variables relationships’ robustness through employing three methods to analyze the empirical data. Variables were modeled jointly through two methods: OLS and SEM-PLS. This thesis contribution to literature is threefold. In the theoretical perspective, it contributed to literature by reinforcing rational choice theory appropriateness as a framework for studying decision making under corruption risk in the private sector. In the methodological perspective, there were built integrative multiple causation models for corruption (exploring mediating relationships, also), giving an important contribution to literature, which lacked on comprehensive models for corruption and where causal relationships were mostly ignored. In the practical perspective, it contributed by questioning current policy-making strategies: it was found that, despite bounded rationality evidences, people behave mostly rationally when deciding to engage or not in corruption. However, even then we found that punitive strategies that are based on this premise are effective on diminishing corruption, which implies the fact that other policies based on moral issues should be needed to combat this problem.
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spelling Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho eEscolas::EAESPPaiva, Ely LaureanoSouza, Sergio Mittlaender Leme deArvate, Paulo Roberto2016-08-19T16:58:47Z2016-08-19T16:58:47Z2016-07-13SILVA, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e. When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2016.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16765Private-to-private corruption is a phenomenon that greatly affects both firms and countries they operate in. Both contextual and behavioral aspects of decision-making under corruption risk have been previously studied. However, as the phenomenon is very complex, the field lacks on understanding the causal relationships and comprehensive models for private-to-private corruption. Given the described research opportunities, this study investigated when it pays to be corrupt in the private sector. To conduct this study, it was employed a 3x2 (risk – high, medium, low and business as usual/not as) anecdotal field experiment through the vignette technique, emulating a procurement process. This experiment had a sample of n=168; respondents had, in average, both work experience and familiarity with the B2B procurement process. Through rational choice and expected utility theory, this thesis was able to combine contextual and individual factors for decisional process, disclosing the mechanisms through what a decision-maker opt whether to act or not corruptly. It was possible to establish the causal relationship of informal social norms and the risk of punishment in corruption inclination. Also, the present study assessed variables relationships’ robustness through employing three methods to analyze the empirical data. Variables were modeled jointly through two methods: OLS and SEM-PLS. This thesis contribution to literature is threefold. In the theoretical perspective, it contributed to literature by reinforcing rational choice theory appropriateness as a framework for studying decision making under corruption risk in the private sector. In the methodological perspective, there were built integrative multiple causation models for corruption (exploring mediating relationships, also), giving an important contribution to literature, which lacked on comprehensive models for corruption and where causal relationships were mostly ignored. In the practical perspective, it contributed by questioning current policy-making strategies: it was found that, despite bounded rationality evidences, people behave mostly rationally when deciding to engage or not in corruption. However, even then we found that punitive strategies that are based on this premise are effective on diminishing corruption, which implies the fact that other policies based on moral issues should be needed to combat this problem.Corrupção entre agentes privados é um fenômeno que afeta enormemente tanto as firmas quanto os países em que operam. Ambos aspectos contextuais e comportamentais do processo decisório sob risco de corrupção foram estudados previamente. Contudo, como o fenômeno é muito complex, o campo carece de entendimento sobre relações causais e de modelos abrangentes para corrupção privada. Dadas as oportunidades de pesquisa descritas, esse estudo investigou quando vale se corromper no setor privado. Para realizar esse estudo, empregou-se um anecdotal field experiment 3x2 (risco – alto, médio e baixo e corrupção como regra do jogo/ não é regra do jogo) através da técnica de cenários, emulando uma situação de compra e venda. Esse experimento contou com uma amostra de n=168 respondentes; os respondents tinham, em media, tanto experiência de trabalho quanto familiaridade com o processo de compra e venda B2B. Através da teoria de escolha racional e de utilidade esperada, essa dissertção combinou a influência de fatores individuais e contextuais para o processo decisório, revelando os mecanismos através dos quais quem toma a decisão opta por agir ou não de forma corrupta. Foi possível estabelecer relações causais entre normas sociais informais e risco de punição na inclinação em se corromper. Além disso, o presente estudo investigou a robustez das relações entre as variáveis empregando três métodos para analizar os dados empíricos. As variáveis foram analisadas aos pares através de ANOVA e modeladas em conjunto através de dois métodos: OLS e SEM-PLS. A contribuição dessa dissertação para a literatura é tripla: teoricamente, contribuiu ao reforçar que a teoria das escolhas racionais é adequada para a investigação do processo decisório sob risco de corrupção no setor privado; metodologicamente, foi construído um modelo integrado de múltiplas causas para corrupção, explorando também as relações de mediação – oferecendo, portanto, uma importante contribuição à literatura, que carecia de modelos abrangentes para corrupção e em que a maioria das relações causais era desconhecida; por fim, contribui para a prática ao questionar as políticas atuais para o combate à corrupção: Foi descoberto que, embora haja evidências de que limitações à racionalidade, as pessoas se comportam basicamente de forma racional ao optar por se envolver ou não em corrupção; no entanto, ainda que tenhamos encontrado evidências de que estratégias punitivas baseadas nessa premissa seriam efetivas na redução da corrupção, outras políticas baseadas em questões morais devem se fazer necessárias para que se combata esse problema.engPrivate corruptionDecision-making process (ethics)Rational choice theoryCorrupção privadaProcesso decisório (Ética)ExperimentoTeoria da escolha racionalExperimentAdministração de empresasCorrupção administrativaProcesso decisório (Ética)CondutaTeoria da escolha racionalWhen does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTEXTde_carvalho_e_silva,_andrea_oliveira-master_thesis-2016-when_does_it_pay_to_be_corrupt_in_the_private_sector.pdf.txtde_carvalho_e_silva,_andrea_oliveira-master_thesis-2016-when_does_it_pay_to_be_corrupt_in_the_private_sector.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain100563https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/7739f611-9f89-4e94-a627-74d5107f6f2f/download3eb01c939dc2069ec117d2a1abc156deMD57ORIGINALde_carvalho_e_silva,_andrea_oliveira-master_thesis-2016-when_does_it_pay_to_be_corrupt_in_the_private_sector.pdfde_carvalho_e_silva,_andrea_oliveira-master_thesis-2016-when_does_it_pay_to_be_corrupt_in_the_private_sector.pdfde Carvalho e Silva, Andréa Oliveira. 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
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
title When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
spellingShingle When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e
Private corruption
Decision-making process (ethics)
Rational choice theory
Corrupção privada
Processo decisório (Ética)
Experimento
Teoria da escolha racional
Experiment
Administração de empresas
Corrupção administrativa
Processo decisório (Ética)
Conduta
Teoria da escolha racional
title_short When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
title_full When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
title_fullStr When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
title_full_unstemmed When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
title_sort When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?
author Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e
author_facet Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EAESP
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Paiva, Ely Laureano
Souza, Sergio Mittlaender Leme de
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Silva, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Arvate, Paulo Roberto
contributor_str_mv Arvate, Paulo Roberto
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Private corruption
Decision-making process (ethics)
Rational choice theory
topic Private corruption
Decision-making process (ethics)
Rational choice theory
Corrupção privada
Processo decisório (Ética)
Experimento
Teoria da escolha racional
Experiment
Administração de empresas
Corrupção administrativa
Processo decisório (Ética)
Conduta
Teoria da escolha racional
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Corrupção privada
Processo decisório (Ética)
Experimento
Teoria da escolha racional
Experiment
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Administração de empresas
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Corrupção administrativa
Processo decisório (Ética)
Conduta
Teoria da escolha racional
description Private-to-private corruption is a phenomenon that greatly affects both firms and countries they operate in. Both contextual and behavioral aspects of decision-making under corruption risk have been previously studied. However, as the phenomenon is very complex, the field lacks on understanding the causal relationships and comprehensive models for private-to-private corruption. Given the described research opportunities, this study investigated when it pays to be corrupt in the private sector. To conduct this study, it was employed a 3x2 (risk – high, medium, low and business as usual/not as) anecdotal field experiment through the vignette technique, emulating a procurement process. This experiment had a sample of n=168; respondents had, in average, both work experience and familiarity with the B2B procurement process. Through rational choice and expected utility theory, this thesis was able to combine contextual and individual factors for decisional process, disclosing the mechanisms through what a decision-maker opt whether to act or not corruptly. It was possible to establish the causal relationship of informal social norms and the risk of punishment in corruption inclination. Also, the present study assessed variables relationships’ robustness through employing three methods to analyze the empirical data. Variables were modeled jointly through two methods: OLS and SEM-PLS. This thesis contribution to literature is threefold. In the theoretical perspective, it contributed to literature by reinforcing rational choice theory appropriateness as a framework for studying decision making under corruption risk in the private sector. In the methodological perspective, there were built integrative multiple causation models for corruption (exploring mediating relationships, also), giving an important contribution to literature, which lacked on comprehensive models for corruption and where causal relationships were mostly ignored. In the practical perspective, it contributed by questioning current policy-making strategies: it was found that, despite bounded rationality evidences, people behave mostly rationally when deciding to engage or not in corruption. However, even then we found that punitive strategies that are based on this premise are effective on diminishing corruption, which implies the fact that other policies based on moral issues should be needed to combat this problem.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2016-08-19T16:58:47Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2016-08-19T16:58:47Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2016-07-13
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv SILVA, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e. When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2016.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16765
identifier_str_mv SILVA, Andréa Oliveira de Carvalho e. When does it pay to be corrupt in the private sector?. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2016.
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16765
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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