Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2024 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35385 |
Resumo: | This thesis is composed of three articles that explore the implicit subsidies of banks and how they are affected by regulatory, institutional, and political factors and macroeconomic conditions. In the first paper, we investigate the effect of bank resolution reforms on the implicit subsidy of banks across 19 countries. We find that the implementation of bank resolution reforms does not reduce the implicit guarantee of large banks, but it does for the non-large ones. Non-large banks also reduce their risk-taking compared to large banks. Those findings indicate that, while resolution regulations alter the perceived implicit guarantees for non-large banks, they do not impact investors’ perceptions of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) for large banks. In the second paper, we investigate whether extractive institutions affect banks’ funding costs advantage using a cross-country sample of banks from 35 countries. We claim that banks in countries with extractive institutions have the power to impose the use of public resources to guarantee their survival in distressed events, creating implicit subsidies on their funding costs. Our results indicate that the less extractive the institutional environment, the lower the banks' funding advantage. Finally, in the third paper, we explored the effect of fiscal constraints on the value of banks in a cross-country sample. Our results indicate that an increase in fiscal constraints negatively impacts the banks’ valuation, possibly due to the reduction of banks' value composed of implicit or explicit guarantees. |
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Vasconcelos, Lucas Nogueira Cabral deEscolasGenaro, Alan deRicca, Bernardo de Oliveira GuerraOliveira, Raquel de FreitasSchiozer, Rafael FelipeGiacomini, Emanuela2024-06-03T15:39:51Z2024-06-03T15:39:51Z2024-04-30https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35385This thesis is composed of three articles that explore the implicit subsidies of banks and how they are affected by regulatory, institutional, and political factors and macroeconomic conditions. In the first paper, we investigate the effect of bank resolution reforms on the implicit subsidy of banks across 19 countries. We find that the implementation of bank resolution reforms does not reduce the implicit guarantee of large banks, but it does for the non-large ones. Non-large banks also reduce their risk-taking compared to large banks. Those findings indicate that, while resolution regulations alter the perceived implicit guarantees for non-large banks, they do not impact investors’ perceptions of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) for large banks. In the second paper, we investigate whether extractive institutions affect banks’ funding costs advantage using a cross-country sample of banks from 35 countries. We claim that banks in countries with extractive institutions have the power to impose the use of public resources to guarantee their survival in distressed events, creating implicit subsidies on their funding costs. Our results indicate that the less extractive the institutional environment, the lower the banks' funding advantage. Finally, in the third paper, we explored the effect of fiscal constraints on the value of banks in a cross-country sample. Our results indicate that an increase in fiscal constraints negatively impacts the banks’ valuation, possibly due to the reduction of banks' value composed of implicit or explicit guarantees.Esta tese é composta por três artigos que exploram os subsídios implícitos dos bancos e como eles são afetados por fatores regulatórios, institucionais e políticos e pelas condições macroeconômicas dos países. No primeiro artigo, investigamos o efeito das reformas de resolução bancária no subsídio implícito em 19 países. Concluímos que a implementação de reformas de resolução bancária não reduz o subsídio implícito dos grandes bancos, mas ele é reduzido para os bancos “não grandes”. Os bancos “não grandes” também reduzem o seu risco em comparação com os grandes bancos. Estas conclusões indicam que, embora as resoluções alterem as garantias implícitas percebidas para os bancos não grandes, elas não apresentam impacto na percepção dos investidores de que os bancos grandes ainda são considerados grandes demais para falir. No segundo artigo, investigamos se as instituições extrativas afetam a vantagem dos custos de financiamento dos bancos utilizando uma amostra de bancos de 35 países. Conjecturamos que os bancos em países com instituições extrativas têm o poder de impor a utilização de recursos públicos para garantir a sua sobrevivência em situações de dificuldade, criando subsídios implícitos nos seus custos de financiamento. Os nossos resultados indicam que quanto menos extrativo for o ambiente institucional, menor será a vantagem de financiamento dos bancos. Finalmente, no terceiro artigo, explorámos o efeito das restrições fiscais sobre o valor dos bancos numa amostra global. Os nossos resultados indicam que um aumento nas restrições fiscais impacta negativamente o valor dos bancos, possivelmente devido à redução da parte do valor composta por garantias implícitas ou explícitas.engBank resolutionBail-inImplicit subsidyToo-big-to-failCost of equityFinancial stabilityExtractive institutionsPolitical institutionsBanks’ funding costs advantageImplicit subsidyFinancial regulationsBank valueFiscal constraintsGovernment capacityImplicit subsidyBancosInstituições financeirasSubsídios governamentaisAdministração de empresasBancos - FinançasInstituições financeiras - RegulamentaçãoSubsídios governamentaisEssays on banks’ implicit subsidiesinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas 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|
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
title |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
spellingShingle |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies Vasconcelos, Lucas Nogueira Cabral de Bank resolution Bail-in Implicit subsidy Too-big-to-fail Cost of equity Financial stability Extractive institutions Political institutions Banks’ funding costs advantage Implicit subsidy Financial regulations Bank value Fiscal constraints Government capacity Implicit subsidy Bancos Instituições financeiras Subsídios governamentais Administração de empresas Bancos - Finanças Instituições financeiras - Regulamentação Subsídios governamentais |
title_short |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
title_full |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
title_fullStr |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
title_full_unstemmed |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
title_sort |
Essays on banks’ implicit subsidies |
author |
Vasconcelos, Lucas Nogueira Cabral de |
author_facet |
Vasconcelos, Lucas Nogueira Cabral de |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Genaro, Alan de Ricca, Bernardo de Oliveira Guerra Oliveira, Raquel de Freitas |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Vasconcelos, Lucas Nogueira Cabral de |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Schiozer, Rafael Felipe Giacomini, Emanuela |
contributor_str_mv |
Schiozer, Rafael Felipe Giacomini, Emanuela |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Bank resolution Bail-in Implicit subsidy Too-big-to-fail Cost of equity Financial stability Extractive institutions Political institutions Banks’ funding costs advantage Implicit subsidy Financial regulations Bank value Fiscal constraints Government capacity Implicit subsidy |
topic |
Bank resolution Bail-in Implicit subsidy Too-big-to-fail Cost of equity Financial stability Extractive institutions Political institutions Banks’ funding costs advantage Implicit subsidy Financial regulations Bank value Fiscal constraints Government capacity Implicit subsidy Bancos Instituições financeiras Subsídios governamentais Administração de empresas Bancos - Finanças Instituições financeiras - Regulamentação Subsídios governamentais |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Bancos Instituições financeiras Subsídios governamentais |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Administração de empresas |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Bancos - Finanças Instituições financeiras - Regulamentação Subsídios governamentais |
description |
This thesis is composed of three articles that explore the implicit subsidies of banks and how they are affected by regulatory, institutional, and political factors and macroeconomic conditions. In the first paper, we investigate the effect of bank resolution reforms on the implicit subsidy of banks across 19 countries. We find that the implementation of bank resolution reforms does not reduce the implicit guarantee of large banks, but it does for the non-large ones. Non-large banks also reduce their risk-taking compared to large banks. Those findings indicate that, while resolution regulations alter the perceived implicit guarantees for non-large banks, they do not impact investors’ perceptions of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) for large banks. In the second paper, we investigate whether extractive institutions affect banks’ funding costs advantage using a cross-country sample of banks from 35 countries. We claim that banks in countries with extractive institutions have the power to impose the use of public resources to guarantee their survival in distressed events, creating implicit subsidies on their funding costs. Our results indicate that the less extractive the institutional environment, the lower the banks' funding advantage. Finally, in the third paper, we explored the effect of fiscal constraints on the value of banks in a cross-country sample. Our results indicate that an increase in fiscal constraints negatively impacts the banks’ valuation, possibly due to the reduction of banks' value composed of implicit or explicit guarantees. |
publishDate |
2024 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2024-06-03T15:39:51Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2024-06-03T15:39:51Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2024-04-30 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35385 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35385 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
collection |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
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MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
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1813797830738837504 |