Mechanism design and the collective approach to household behavior

• Autor(a) principal: Costa, Carlos Eugênio da
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Outros Autores: Lima, Lucas Alves Estevam de
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/27929
• topic: FGV EPGE; FGV EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças; Princípios da tributação; Impostos

Do the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person householDo the Revelation and Taxation Principles hold for multi-person households? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.ds? We provide a positive answer to the former and a negative to the latter if the household decision process is such that no mechanism can lead to inefficient choices. This unconditional version of Chiappori’s (1988) collective approach, offers a household model which can be used in a standard mechanism design approach.