Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Page Junior, Frank H.
Data de Publicação: 2004
Outros Autores: Monteiro, P. K., Svaiter, Benar Fux
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/641
Resumo: Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.
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spelling Page Junior, Frank H.Monteiro, P. K.Svaiter, Benar FuxEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:28:55Z2008-05-13T15:28:55Z2004-03-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/641Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;537Optimal auctionsType exclusionMultidimensional typesEconomiaEconomiaLeilões - Modelos econômicosOptimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL1570.pdfapplication/pdf181241https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/6686402d-2642-40bc-ba87-ce9509d3e787/download9bbfaabde81c1c06171fac05791cb2d7MD51TEXT1570.pdf.txt1570.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain20209https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/65c5747d-6847-41da-b6af-9466df904518/download1cf99dfc279078b2f606444d58f1297bMD56THUMBNAIL1570.pdf.jpg1570.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3308https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/769761e3-bd64-411d-b739-8d317d267a63/downloade0926745fca1148f8a1f6e0d178a2e33MD5710438/6412023-11-09 19:29:59.386open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/641https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T19:29:59Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
title Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
spellingShingle Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
Page Junior, Frank H.
Optimal auctions
Type exclusion
Multidimensional types
Economia
Economia
Leilões - Modelos econômicos
title_short Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
title_full Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
title_fullStr Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
title_full_unstemmed Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
title_sort Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
author Page Junior, Frank H.
author_facet Page Junior, Frank H.
Monteiro, P. K.
Svaiter, Benar Fux
author_role author
author2 Monteiro, P. K.
Svaiter, Benar Fux
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Page Junior, Frank H.
Monteiro, P. K.
Svaiter, Benar Fux
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Optimal auctions
Type exclusion
Multidimensional types
topic Optimal auctions
Type exclusion
Multidimensional types
Economia
Economia
Leilões - Modelos econômicos
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Economia
Leilões - Modelos econômicos
description Within the context of a single-unit, independent private values auction model, we show that if bidder types are multidimensional, then under the optimal auction exclusion of some bidder types will occur. A second contribution of the paper is methodological in nature. In particular, we identify conditions under which an auction model with multidimensional types can be reduced to a model with one dimensional types without loss of generality. Reduction results of this type have achieved the status of folklore in the mechanism design literature. Here, we provide a proof of the reduction result for auctions.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2004-03-01
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:28:55Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:28:55Z
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dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0104-8910
identifier_str_mv 0104-8910
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dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
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