Controle acionário, remuneração de executivos e desempenho empresarial: evidências para o mercado brasileiro

• Autor(a) principal: Ermel, Marcelo Daniel Araújo
• Data de Publicação: 2016
• Outros Autores: Monte, Paulo Aguiar
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
• Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/16387
• topic: Ownership control; Pay performance; Corporate governance; Controle acionário; Remuneração de executivos; Governança corporativa; Administração de empresas; Administração de empresas; Desempenho; Salários

This paper aims to examine how the type of owner affects the relationship between compensation and performance in Brazilian companies in the period 2010 to 2013. First, the control in Brazil is still largely exercised by family firms, and that ownership is also concentrated, on average 65% of shares are held by the five largest shareholders. The econometric analysis showed that: The family and the government controlled companies remunerate their managers with a lower value in relation to other types of control; inferences about the influence of the controller in the institutional companies were not possible to make; and firms that don’t have a controller remunerate their manager with a higher amount of compensation. Finally, about performance, in any of the equations ROA was significant, demonstrating weak compensation mechanisms or manager's ability to determine their compensation