Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Data de Publicação: 2004
Outros Autores: Costa, Cristiano Machado, Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares
Tipo de documento: Artigo
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/745
Resumo: We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.
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spelling Moreira, Humberto AtaídeCosta, Cristiano MachadoFerreira, Daniel Bernardo SoaresEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:32:35Z2008-05-13T15:32:35Z2004-02-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/745We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;525Organizational designIncentive provisionCommon agencyEconomiaEconomiaBiased managers, organizational design, and incentive provisioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL1536.pdfapplication/pdf197396https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/b373f473-d9e5-489f-84b7-a3a7bed44d71/download5ea7ab869d114ea9fb8e20750d154f64MD51TEXT1536.pdf.txt1536.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain27254https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/93be3d7b-4d18-4f86-a266-cadbd67fc585/download336693fd0d06f9070d892b5758d4a812MD56THUMBNAIL1536.pdf.jpg1536.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg3207https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/29f54e05-dcf9-4d81-a9b4-77b685f918a8/downloada085f4d3fbd031a6dfdd45c747b6e139MD5710438/7452023-11-09 20:38:01.53open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/745https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T20:38:01Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
title Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
spellingShingle Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Organizational design
Incentive provision
Common agency
Economia
Economia
title_short Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
title_full Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
title_fullStr Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
title_full_unstemmed Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
title_sort Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
author Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
author_facet Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Costa, Cristiano Machado
Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares
author_role author
author2 Costa, Cristiano Machado
Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv FGV
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Moreira, Humberto Ataíde
Costa, Cristiano Machado
Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Organizational design
Incentive provision
Common agency
topic Organizational design
Incentive provision
Common agency
Economia
Economia
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Economia
description We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high.
publishDate 2004
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2004-02-01
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:32:35Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-13T15:32:35Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10438/745
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0104-8910
identifier_str_mv 0104-8910
url http://hdl.handle.net/10438/745
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv Ensaios Econômicos;525
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
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