Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 1996 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/847 |
Resumo: | This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index). |
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Boff, Hugo PedroWerlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da CostaEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:37:09Z2008-05-13T15:37:09Z1996-070104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/847This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;282Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessOligopolistic competition under knightian uncertaintyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaIncerteza (Economia)Economiareponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINAL000090393.pdf000090393.pdfapplication/pdf1217103https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/63b44e05-5e8c-4053-a45b-a4ed762a1907/downloadc704dd802f359a916c4abd86c1d1c2a3MD51TEXT000090393.pdf.txt000090393.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain63436https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/f43ee966-05a6-45b7-b24a-bbda48479c74/download97955ddcbc36c3756e7227cad07d604fMD56THUMBNAIL000090393.pdf.jpg000090393.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg2390https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/0f083861-b058-418f-9db8-37b6f1b3c7bc/download418f818005865f2d056a6d125f526d35MD5710438/8472023-11-08 22:20:16.527open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/847https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-08T22:20:16Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
title |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
spellingShingle |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty Boff, Hugo Pedro Economia Incerteza (Economia) Economia |
title_short |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
title_full |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
title_fullStr |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
title_full_unstemmed |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
title_sort |
Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty |
author |
Boff, Hugo Pedro |
author_facet |
Boff, Hugo Pedro Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Boff, Hugo Pedro Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Incerteza (Economia) Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Incerteza (Economia) Economia |
description |
This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index). |
publishDate |
1996 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
1996-07 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:37:09Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:37:09Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/847 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
identifier_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/10438/847 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Ensaios Econômicos;282 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
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