Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Mesnik, Samy Sznajder
Data de Publicação: 2023
Tipo de documento: Tese
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551
Resumo: Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners.
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spelling Mesnik, Samy SznajderEscolasDomingos, Fernando DeodatoBorges, AlexParente, Tobias CoutinhoGama, Marina Amado Bahia2023-04-17T14:57:06Z2023-04-17T14:57:06Z2023-02-23https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners.As empresas familiares podem adotar diferentes práticas de governança corporativa e enfrentar problemas específicos de agência entre executivos e membros do conselho. Este estudo abrange os mais completos e atualizados dados não estruturados da região para fornecer evidências empíricas sobre o impacto da presença de conselheiros independentes no desempenho financeiro das empresas familiares e não familiares, também suas respectivas diferenças. Além disto, forneço evidências de que a independência do conselho tem um impacto positivo no desempenho financeiro de um grupo específico de empresas familiares e que os resultados são antagônicos para os casos de dualidade de CEO. Assim proponho que a presença de conselheiros independentes no conselho é relevante para explicar o desempenho das empresas familiares, por lidarem melhor com mecanismos que reduzem os conflitos de agência do tipo II. Investiguei também a relação entre a mudança dos membros do conselho de administração e o desempenho financeiro, incluindo diferentes funções desta variável, e se esse efeito é mais proeminente para empresas familiares do que para empresas não familiares. Por fim, investiguei se o tempo de mandato dos conselheiros é estatisticamente significante nesta equação. Após uma série de testes de robustez, os resultados indicam que as mudanças dos membros do conselho são estatisticamente significantes para empresas familiares em relação a um indicador de desempenho financeiro de curto prazo, com efeito positivo acima de um determinado intervalo. O indicador de desempenho financeiro de longo prazo medido neste estudo não se mostrou significante, considerando a sinalização ao mercado sobre mudanças dos membros do conselho. Com base na teoria da agência e na stewardship theory, este estudo aprofunda a análise sobre empresas familiares e considera diferentes clusters de empresas dissociadas por características de governança corporativa relacionadas à estrutura do conselho de administração e fornece evidências relevantes para acadêmicos, reguladores, investidores e executivos.engCorporate governanceFamily firmsOutside directorsFirm performanceEmerging marketsGovernança corporativaConselheiros independentesMembros do Conselho de AdministraçãoEmpresas familiaresDesempenho financeiroAdministração de empresasEmpresas familiaresGovernança corporativaConselhos de administradoresAdministração de empresasCharacteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório 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dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
title Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
spellingShingle Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
Mesnik, Samy Sznajder
Corporate governance
Family firms
Outside directors
Firm performance
Emerging markets
Governança corporativa
Conselheiros independentes
Membros do Conselho de Administração
Empresas familiares
Desempenho financeiro
Administração de empresas
Empresas familiares
Governança corporativa
Conselhos de administradores
Administração de empresas
title_short Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
title_full Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
title_fullStr Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
title_full_unstemmed Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
title_sort Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
author Mesnik, Samy Sznajder
author_facet Mesnik, Samy Sznajder
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Domingos, Fernando Deodato
Borges, Alex
Parente, Tobias Coutinho
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Mesnik, Samy Sznajder
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Gama, Marina Amado Bahia
contributor_str_mv Gama, Marina Amado Bahia
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Corporate governance
Family firms
Outside directors
Firm performance
Emerging markets
topic Corporate governance
Family firms
Outside directors
Firm performance
Emerging markets
Governança corporativa
Conselheiros independentes
Membros do Conselho de Administração
Empresas familiares
Desempenho financeiro
Administração de empresas
Empresas familiares
Governança corporativa
Conselhos de administradores
Administração de empresas
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Governança corporativa
Conselheiros independentes
Membros do Conselho de Administração
Empresas familiares
Desempenho financeiro
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Administração de empresas
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Empresas familiares
Governança corporativa
Conselhos de administradores
Administração de empresas
description Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2023-04-17T14:57:06Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2023-04-17T14:57:06Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2023-02-23
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
format doctoralThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551
url https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
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https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/ed38fcc7-1222-4a95-8908-900252a60bab/download
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bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
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repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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