Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2023 |
Tipo de documento: | Tese |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551 |
Resumo: | Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners. |
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Mesnik, Samy SznajderEscolasDomingos, Fernando DeodatoBorges, AlexParente, Tobias CoutinhoGama, Marina Amado Bahia2023-04-17T14:57:06Z2023-04-17T14:57:06Z2023-02-23https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners.As empresas familiares podem adotar diferentes práticas de governança corporativa e enfrentar problemas específicos de agência entre executivos e membros do conselho. Este estudo abrange os mais completos e atualizados dados não estruturados da região para fornecer evidências empíricas sobre o impacto da presença de conselheiros independentes no desempenho financeiro das empresas familiares e não familiares, também suas respectivas diferenças. Além disto, forneço evidências de que a independência do conselho tem um impacto positivo no desempenho financeiro de um grupo específico de empresas familiares e que os resultados são antagônicos para os casos de dualidade de CEO. Assim proponho que a presença de conselheiros independentes no conselho é relevante para explicar o desempenho das empresas familiares, por lidarem melhor com mecanismos que reduzem os conflitos de agência do tipo II. Investiguei também a relação entre a mudança dos membros do conselho de administração e o desempenho financeiro, incluindo diferentes funções desta variável, e se esse efeito é mais proeminente para empresas familiares do que para empresas não familiares. Por fim, investiguei se o tempo de mandato dos conselheiros é estatisticamente significante nesta equação. Após uma série de testes de robustez, os resultados indicam que as mudanças dos membros do conselho são estatisticamente significantes para empresas familiares em relação a um indicador de desempenho financeiro de curto prazo, com efeito positivo acima de um determinado intervalo. O indicador de desempenho financeiro de longo prazo medido neste estudo não se mostrou significante, considerando a sinalização ao mercado sobre mudanças dos membros do conselho. Com base na teoria da agência e na stewardship theory, este estudo aprofunda a análise sobre empresas familiares e considera diferentes clusters de empresas dissociadas por características de governança corporativa relacionadas à estrutura do conselho de administração e fornece evidências relevantes para acadêmicos, reguladores, investidores e executivos.engCorporate governanceFamily firmsOutside directorsFirm performanceEmerging marketsGovernança corporativaConselheiros independentesMembros do Conselho de AdministraçãoEmpresas familiaresDesempenho financeiroAdministração de empresasEmpresas familiaresGovernança corporativaConselhos de administradoresAdministração de empresasCharacteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected?info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório 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 |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
title |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
spellingShingle |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? Mesnik, Samy Sznajder Corporate governance Family firms Outside directors Firm performance Emerging markets Governança corporativa Conselheiros independentes Membros do Conselho de Administração Empresas familiares Desempenho financeiro Administração de empresas Empresas familiares Governança corporativa Conselhos de administradores Administração de empresas |
title_short |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
title_full |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
title_fullStr |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
title_full_unstemmed |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
title_sort |
Characteristics of board composition and their influences on financial performance: can family firms be differently affected? |
author |
Mesnik, Samy Sznajder |
author_facet |
Mesnik, Samy Sznajder |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas |
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv |
Domingos, Fernando Deodato Borges, Alex Parente, Tobias Coutinho |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Mesnik, Samy Sznajder |
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv |
Gama, Marina Amado Bahia |
contributor_str_mv |
Gama, Marina Amado Bahia |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Corporate governance Family firms Outside directors Firm performance Emerging markets |
topic |
Corporate governance Family firms Outside directors Firm performance Emerging markets Governança corporativa Conselheiros independentes Membros do Conselho de Administração Empresas familiares Desempenho financeiro Administração de empresas Empresas familiares Governança corporativa Conselhos de administradores Administração de empresas |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Governança corporativa Conselheiros independentes Membros do Conselho de Administração Empresas familiares Desempenho financeiro |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Administração de empresas |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Empresas familiares Governança corporativa Conselhos de administradores Administração de empresas |
description |
Family firms may adopt different corporate governance practices and face particular agency problems between executives and board members. This study embraces the most extensive and unstructured data in the region to deliver an updated empirical-quantitative papers that demonstrates the impact of the presence of outside directors on the board of directors could be different across family vs. non-family firms regarding the financial performance. Also, I provide evidence that board independence has a statistically significant positive impact on firm performance for a specific cohort of family firms and that the outcomes are antagonistic for cases of CEO duality. This suggests that the presence of outside directors in the board is relevant to explain firm performance of family firms, because they better deal with mechanisms that reduce the type II agency conflicts. In addition to that, I have investigated the relationship of board membership changes and financial performance, including different configurations of the functions and whether this effect is more pronounced for family firms over non-family firms. Finally, I have investigated whether the tenure of the board members is significant in this equation. After a series of robustness tests, the results indicate that board membership changes are significant for family firms towards a short-term financial performance indicator, with positive effect above a certain interval. The long-term financial performance indicator measured in this study has not demonstrated to be significant, though the signaling to the market of board membership changes should not be relevant. Based on the agency theory and the stewardship perspective, this study delves into the analysis of family firms and considers different clusters of companies dissociated by corporate governance characteristics related to the structure of the board of directors and provide insightful evidence for academics, policymakers, investors and practitioners. |
publishDate |
2023 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2023-04-17T14:57:06Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2023-04-17T14:57:06Z |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2023-02-23 |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis |
format |
doctoralThesis |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551 |
url |
https://hdl.handle.net/10438/33551 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
instname_str |
Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
instacron_str |
FGV |
institution |
FGV |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
collection |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/400c60e4-cf2f-4523-a88f-350ee3df7690/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/3d71993f-9fe0-405f-91f2-a26f691c5eaa/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/72074085-0af3-490d-b869-6c350877d6c1/download https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/ed38fcc7-1222-4a95-8908-900252a60bab/download |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
2ff423fe7b6f2179c02b3f6c77fae021 dfb340242cced38a6cca06c627998fa1 1913be9c2ad731eb56bfbba4467de7b4 49ce189eef20ce8da6e2c65c74e064a5 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
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1813797755957542912 |