The land assembly problem revisited
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2001 |
Outros Autores: | |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/848 |
Resumo: | As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. |
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Menezes, Flavio MarquesPitchford, RohanEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:37:12Z2010-09-23T18:58:02Z2008-05-13T15:37:12Z2010-09-23T18:58:02Z2001-06-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/848As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;427Land assemblyCoordinationInefficient delayEconomiaEconomiaPreços - DeterminaçãoSolo - UsoThe land assembly problem revisitedinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlereponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTHUMBNAIL1276.pdf.jpg1276.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4105https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/7f08f8a0-853a-4a9e-9902-1d0f7763d60b/downloadf0e293b110aa7b468f6b859a98892da1MD58ORIGINAL1276.pdfapplication/pdf245854https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/679430f7-1d69-4849-847b-e69d20d852cd/downloadb38dbb3f47e86bcbd4796ed2e849af99MD52TEXT1276.pdf.txt1276.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain19949https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/97d72430-af69-4997-be8b-f4047b92f2c5/download6522bfc3b80b34169106ac16e54773e6MD5710438/8482023-11-09 20:40:33.568open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/848https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-09T20:40:33Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
The land assembly problem revisited |
title |
The land assembly problem revisited |
spellingShingle |
The land assembly problem revisited Menezes, Flavio Marques Land assembly Coordination Inefficient delay Economia Economia Preços - Determinação Solo - Uso |
title_short |
The land assembly problem revisited |
title_full |
The land assembly problem revisited |
title_fullStr |
The land assembly problem revisited |
title_full_unstemmed |
The land assembly problem revisited |
title_sort |
The land assembly problem revisited |
author |
Menezes, Flavio Marques |
author_facet |
Menezes, Flavio Marques Pitchford, Rohan |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Pitchford, Rohan |
author2_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Menezes, Flavio Marques Pitchford, Rohan |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Land assembly Coordination Inefficient delay |
topic |
Land assembly Coordination Inefficient delay Economia Economia Preços - Determinação Solo - Uso |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia Preços - Determinação Solo - Uso |
description |
As in the standard land assembly problem, a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land belonging to two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each owner. Unlike the land assembly literature, however, our focus is on the incentive that each lot owner has to delay the start of negotiations, rather than on the public goods nature of the problem. An incentive for delay exists, for example, when owners perceive that being last to sell will allow them to capture a larger share of the joint surplus from the development. We show that competition at point of sale can cause equilibrium delay, and that cooperation at point of sale will eliminate delay. |
publishDate |
2001 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2001-06-01 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:37:12Z 2010-09-23T18:58:02Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:37:12Z 2010-09-23T18:58:02Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/848 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
identifier_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/848 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Ensaios Econômicos;427 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
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