An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2000 |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) |
Texto Completo: | http://hdl.handle.net/10438/909 |
Resumo: | I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation. |
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Menezes, Flavio MarquesEscolas::EPGEFGV2008-05-13T15:40:27Z2010-09-23T18:57:16Z2008-05-13T15:40:27Z2010-09-23T18:57:16Z2000-12-010104-8910http://hdl.handle.net/10438/909I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.engEscola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGVEnsaios Econômicos;406An auction theoretical approach to fiscal warsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleEconomiaEconomiareponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTHUMBNAIL1255.pdf.jpg1255.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4162https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/4ab69c38-b4d9-41e3-9c6c-6670170e6113/downloadfab9963bce25ca8b14cb09c0a1931f14MD59TEXT1255.pdf.txt1255.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain30510https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/e0c1b393-c5c0-4621-841e-525ce8e3602a/downloade99f3809365e0d3c97a6cfd893395af1MD58ORIGINAL1255.pdfapplication/pdf275775https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/5dd9af7a-364a-4b63-b387-915e8f9d7dab/download2d3e4f070f918c7952dafcc9063e095dMD5310438/9092023-11-08 12:14:53.705open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/909https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742023-11-08T12:14:53Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)false |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
title |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
spellingShingle |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars Menezes, Flavio Marques Economia Economia |
title_short |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
title_full |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
title_fullStr |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
title_full_unstemmed |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
title_sort |
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars |
author |
Menezes, Flavio Marques |
author_facet |
Menezes, Flavio Marques |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv |
Escolas::EPGE |
dc.contributor.affiliation.none.fl_str_mv |
FGV |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Menezes, Flavio Marques |
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
topic |
Economia Economia |
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv |
Economia |
description |
I examine a situation where a firm has to choose to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdiction compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infraestructure, commitments to spend on infraestructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation. |
publishDate |
2000 |
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv |
2000-12-01 |
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:40:27Z 2010-09-23T18:57:16Z |
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv |
2008-05-13T15:40:27Z 2010-09-23T18:57:16Z |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/909 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
identifier_str_mv |
0104-8910 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/909 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.ispartofseries.por.fl_str_mv |
Ensaios Econômicos;406 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV |
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