Essays on credit and bankruptcy law

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Funchal, Bruno
Data de Publicação: 2006
Tipo de documento: Tese
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/1610
Resumo: This thesis is composed of four papers referent to the subject of Credit and Bankruptcy Law. In each essay - that corresponds to one chapter - we aim at analyzing the influence of default on credit market, considering different legal situations. In the first chapter we studied the costs of informational failures, as moral hazard, on Brazilian credit market. To measure this effect, we used the recently approved law that regulates payroll loans. The payroll loan is a type of personal credit with repayments directly deducted from the borrowers’ payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income. Taking advantage of this experiment our objective was to identify the average effect of the new law on personal credit, using the difference-in-difference procedure, and accounting for general-equilibrium effects. Also, we verified both the direct and indirect effects of the new law (the partial equilibrium effects). Our results indicates that, the new law is associated with an increase of the volume of new personal loans and a reduction in its interest rates, which indicates that the costs generated by information failures is highly significant for the personal credit market. For the institutions directly effected the same results are observed, but stronger. Financial institutions that were not directly affected also suffered, in some way, an impact with the implementation of the new law. In this case, however, we notice a reduction in the volume of the new personal loans, which represents a migration of agents from financial institutions that are not able to offer payroll loans to institutions that are allowed to do that. Also, in the same direction of directly affected financial institutions, a reduction in the interest rate for personal loans was observed. The explanation for this result comes from the fact that the demand for credit decreases for such institutions due to the migration of their clients to institutions benefited with the new law. 2 The chapter 2 continues our study on individuals, but now we use the U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law to study the effect of creditors’ protection on credit markets development. The conventional wisdom argues that creditor protection through the legal system is associated with a broader credit market in a monotone way, or simply the higher the protection to creditors the better is to the credit market. In this essay we analyze if this finding is still true if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment. Taking advantage of the heterogeneity between U.S. states provided by a specific issue of the Personal Bankruptcy Law, called bankruptcy exemptions (which determines the creditors’ protection), we show that if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment, the results highlighted by the current literature doesn’t hold any more. In fact, there will be a non-monotonic relationship between the creditors’ protection (or debtors’ punishment) and the size of the credit market, where an intermediate level of protection is optimal for the development of such market. In the chapters 3 and 4 our focus changes to corporations. The chapter 3 studies the corporate bankruptcy law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We use a simple model to examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures, as well as the trade-offs involved, showing how changes in the system could affect a firm’s investment, effort, and other choices. Then, we compare bankruptcy procedures across groups of countries, and test empirically the effects of the quality of bankruptcy law. Finally, we studied the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main components and possible effects on credit markets. At last, the chapter 4 also dresses a question about the corporative bankruptcy law. In this essay, our main challenge was to explore the best bankruptcy procedure considering two important cross-country differences: the industry sector characteristic (like the physical capital intensity of each industry sector and its share in the economy) and the costs - direct and indirect - of the bankruptcy procedure. When lawmakers design a bankruptcy law that is best for their specific economy, they cannot just resort to existing theories in economi 3 and corporate finance because countries differ in their economic environments and usually, these theories do not capture such cross-country differences. Understanding these differences, we can search the best bankruptcy law for particular countries. The theoretical framework was drawn upon the general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and default. Simulating it for a range of parameters that describe the characteristics of the countries (bankruptcy costs and industry sectors) we proposed the best Corporate Bankruptcy Law for a sample of 44 countries.
id FGV_e9d6366e8345d56569e9e2d86f292cbf
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/1610
network_acronym_str FGV
network_name_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
repository_id_str 3974
spelling Funchal, BrunoEscolas::EPGEBraido, Luis Henrique BertolinoCosta, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa daMello, João Manoel Pinho deCosta, Ana Carla AbrãoAraújo, Aloísio Pessoa de2008-05-14T20:51:39Z2008-05-14T20:51:39Z2006FUNCHAL, Bruno. Essays on credit and bankruptcy law. Tese (Doutorado em Economia) - Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 2006.https://hdl.handle.net/10438/1610This thesis is composed of four papers referent to the subject of Credit and Bankruptcy Law. In each essay - that corresponds to one chapter - we aim at analyzing the influence of default on credit market, considering different legal situations. In the first chapter we studied the costs of informational failures, as moral hazard, on Brazilian credit market. To measure this effect, we used the recently approved law that regulates payroll loans. The payroll loan is a type of personal credit with repayments directly deducted from the borrowers’ payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income. Taking advantage of this experiment our objective was to identify the average effect of the new law on personal credit, using the difference-in-difference procedure, and accounting for general-equilibrium effects. Also, we verified both the direct and indirect effects of the new law (the partial equilibrium effects). Our results indicates that, the new law is associated with an increase of the volume of new personal loans and a reduction in its interest rates, which indicates that the costs generated by information failures is highly significant for the personal credit market. For the institutions directly effected the same results are observed, but stronger. Financial institutions that were not directly affected also suffered, in some way, an impact with the implementation of the new law. In this case, however, we notice a reduction in the volume of the new personal loans, which represents a migration of agents from financial institutions that are not able to offer payroll loans to institutions that are allowed to do that. Also, in the same direction of directly affected financial institutions, a reduction in the interest rate for personal loans was observed. The explanation for this result comes from the fact that the demand for credit decreases for such institutions due to the migration of their clients to institutions benefited with the new law. 2 The chapter 2 continues our study on individuals, but now we use the U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law to study the effect of creditors’ protection on credit markets development. The conventional wisdom argues that creditor protection through the legal system is associated with a broader credit market in a monotone way, or simply the higher the protection to creditors the better is to the credit market. In this essay we analyze if this finding is still true if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment. Taking advantage of the heterogeneity between U.S. states provided by a specific issue of the Personal Bankruptcy Law, called bankruptcy exemptions (which determines the creditors’ protection), we show that if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment, the results highlighted by the current literature doesn’t hold any more. In fact, there will be a non-monotonic relationship between the creditors’ protection (or debtors’ punishment) and the size of the credit market, where an intermediate level of protection is optimal for the development of such market. In the chapters 3 and 4 our focus changes to corporations. The chapter 3 studies the corporate bankruptcy law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We use a simple model to examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures, as well as the trade-offs involved, showing how changes in the system could affect a firm’s investment, effort, and other choices. Then, we compare bankruptcy procedures across groups of countries, and test empirically the effects of the quality of bankruptcy law. Finally, we studied the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main components and possible effects on credit markets. At last, the chapter 4 also dresses a question about the corporative bankruptcy law. In this essay, our main challenge was to explore the best bankruptcy procedure considering two important cross-country differences: the industry sector characteristic (like the physical capital intensity of each industry sector and its share in the economy) and the costs - direct and indirect - of the bankruptcy procedure. When lawmakers design a bankruptcy law that is best for their specific economy, they cannot just resort to existing theories in economi 3 and corporate finance because countries differ in their economic environments and usually, these theories do not capture such cross-country differences. Understanding these differences, we can search the best bankruptcy law for particular countries. The theoretical framework was drawn upon the general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and default. Simulating it for a range of parameters that describe the characteristics of the countries (bankruptcy costs and industry sectors) we proposed the best Corporate Bankruptcy Law for a sample of 44 countries.engTodo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessEssays on credit and bankruptcy lawinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesisEconomiaFalênciaDireito e economiaCréditosreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINAL034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdf034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdfPDFapplication/pdf912629https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/5dc44c16-30cd-4ace-8a4a-a33f22bfd473/download558e9e77e877909fa4a03c6be9dcba72MD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-81840https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/eafc1684-e56a-4448-8fb2-a4d0fd4f0ed6/download7e1b17ff4e8f1926a70c349595c6a90aMD52TEXT034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdf.txt034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdf.txtExtracted Texttext/plain296445https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/63efd325-5595-4b37-909f-328b0c52e39b/downloadd1d7e00dc65d660fcb04634659bd07bbMD53THUMBNAIL034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdf.jpg034203002_Tese_Bruno_Funchal.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg1589https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/ba55f51b-5344-437e-aa99-870d5e04e7cf/download2ff23b6cafd893b1b6e822ed16525cdcMD5410438/16102024-06-14 16:32:46.6open.accessoai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/1610https://repositorio.fgv.brRepositório InstitucionalPRIhttp://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/dspace-oai/requestopendoar:39742024-06-14T16:32:46Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)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
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
title Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
spellingShingle Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
Funchal, Bruno
Economia
Falência
Direito e economia
Créditos
title_short Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
title_full Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
title_fullStr Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
title_full_unstemmed Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
title_sort Essays on credit and bankruptcy law
author Funchal, Bruno
author_facet Funchal, Bruno
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EPGE
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Braido, Luis Henrique Bertolino
Costa, Carlos Eugênio Ellery Lustosa da
Mello, João Manoel Pinho de
Costa, Ana Carla Abrão
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Funchal, Bruno
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
contributor_str_mv Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
topic Economia
Falência
Direito e economia
Créditos
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Falência
Direito e economia
Créditos
description This thesis is composed of four papers referent to the subject of Credit and Bankruptcy Law. In each essay - that corresponds to one chapter - we aim at analyzing the influence of default on credit market, considering different legal situations. In the first chapter we studied the costs of informational failures, as moral hazard, on Brazilian credit market. To measure this effect, we used the recently approved law that regulates payroll loans. The payroll loan is a type of personal credit with repayments directly deducted from the borrowers’ payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income. Taking advantage of this experiment our objective was to identify the average effect of the new law on personal credit, using the difference-in-difference procedure, and accounting for general-equilibrium effects. Also, we verified both the direct and indirect effects of the new law (the partial equilibrium effects). Our results indicates that, the new law is associated with an increase of the volume of new personal loans and a reduction in its interest rates, which indicates that the costs generated by information failures is highly significant for the personal credit market. For the institutions directly effected the same results are observed, but stronger. Financial institutions that were not directly affected also suffered, in some way, an impact with the implementation of the new law. In this case, however, we notice a reduction in the volume of the new personal loans, which represents a migration of agents from financial institutions that are not able to offer payroll loans to institutions that are allowed to do that. Also, in the same direction of directly affected financial institutions, a reduction in the interest rate for personal loans was observed. The explanation for this result comes from the fact that the demand for credit decreases for such institutions due to the migration of their clients to institutions benefited with the new law. 2 The chapter 2 continues our study on individuals, but now we use the U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law to study the effect of creditors’ protection on credit markets development. The conventional wisdom argues that creditor protection through the legal system is associated with a broader credit market in a monotone way, or simply the higher the protection to creditors the better is to the credit market. In this essay we analyze if this finding is still true if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment. Taking advantage of the heterogeneity between U.S. states provided by a specific issue of the Personal Bankruptcy Law, called bankruptcy exemptions (which determines the creditors’ protection), we show that if the creditors’ protection is directly determined by the debtors’ punishment, the results highlighted by the current literature doesn’t hold any more. In fact, there will be a non-monotonic relationship between the creditors’ protection (or debtors’ punishment) and the size of the credit market, where an intermediate level of protection is optimal for the development of such market. In the chapters 3 and 4 our focus changes to corporations. The chapter 3 studies the corporate bankruptcy law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We use a simple model to examine the economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures, as well as the trade-offs involved, showing how changes in the system could affect a firm’s investment, effort, and other choices. Then, we compare bankruptcy procedures across groups of countries, and test empirically the effects of the quality of bankruptcy law. Finally, we studied the recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main components and possible effects on credit markets. At last, the chapter 4 also dresses a question about the corporative bankruptcy law. In this essay, our main challenge was to explore the best bankruptcy procedure considering two important cross-country differences: the industry sector characteristic (like the physical capital intensity of each industry sector and its share in the economy) and the costs - direct and indirect - of the bankruptcy procedure. When lawmakers design a bankruptcy law that is best for their specific economy, they cannot just resort to existing theories in economi 3 and corporate finance because countries differ in their economic environments and usually, these theories do not capture such cross-country differences. Understanding these differences, we can search the best bankruptcy law for particular countries. The theoretical framework was drawn upon the general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets and default. Simulating it for a range of parameters that describe the characteristics of the countries (bankruptcy costs and industry sectors) we proposed the best Corporate Bankruptcy Law for a sample of 44 countries.
publishDate 2006
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2006
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2008-05-14T20:51:39Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2008-05-14T20:51:39Z
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
format doctoralThesis
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv FUNCHAL, Bruno. Essays on credit and bankruptcy law. Tese (Doutorado em Economia) - Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 2006.
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10438/1610
identifier_str_mv FUNCHAL, Bruno. Essays on credit and bankruptcy law. Tese (Doutorado em Economia) - Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia, Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV, Rio de Janeiro, 2006.
url https://hdl.handle.net/10438/1610
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron:FGV
instname_str Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
instacron_str FGV
institution FGV
reponame_str Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
collection Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/5dc44c16-30cd-4ace-8a4a-a33f22bfd473/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/eafc1684-e56a-4448-8fb2-a4d0fd4f0ed6/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/63efd325-5595-4b37-909f-328b0c52e39b/download
https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/ba55f51b-5344-437e-aa99-870d5e04e7cf/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 558e9e77e877909fa4a03c6be9dcba72
7e1b17ff4e8f1926a70c349595c6a90a
d1d7e00dc65d660fcb04634659bd07bb
2ff23b6cafd893b1b6e822ed16525cdc
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
MD5
MD5
MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) - Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1810023930786742272