Essays on trade policy

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Ogeda, Pedro Molina
Data de Publicação: 2024
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35327
Resumo: This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter show that the Brazilian trade liberalization in the early 1990s led to a permanent relative decline in the vote share of left-wing presidential candidates in the regions more affected by the tariff cuts. This happened even though the shock, implemented by a right-wing party, induced a contraction in manufacturing and formal employment in the more affected regions, and despite the left’s identification with protectionist policies. To rationalize this response, we consider a new institutional channel for the political effects of trade shocks: the weakening of labor unions. We provide support for this mechanism in two steps. First, we show that union presence—proxied by the number of workers directly employed by unions, by union density, and by the number of union establishments—declined in regions that became more exposed to foreign competition. Second, we show that the negative effect of tariff reductions on the votes for the left was driven exclusively by political parties with historical links to unions. Furthermore, the impact of the trade liberalization on the vote share of these parties was significant only in regions that had unions operating before the reform. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that tariff cuts reduced the vote share of the left partly through the weakening of labor unions. This institutional channel is fundamentally different from the individual-level responses, motivated by economic or identity concerns, that have been considered in the literature. The second chapter examines the indirect effects of the U.S.-China trade war on the Brazilian labor market. We exploit the tariff increases across industries and the sectoral employment distribution across local labor markets to measure the degree of exposure of a Brazilian region to the trade war. Our findings reveal that while American discriminatory tariffs did not significantly impact Brazilian local labor markets, regions more exposed to Chinese retaliatory tariffs experienced a relative increase in the number of formal workers and wage bills. Additionally, we find that industries more exposed to Chinese duties experienced an increase in net exports. In contrast, industries exposed to American tariffs experienced a relative reduction in net exports. These insights contribute to a better understanding of the intricate worldwide implications of the U.S.-China trade war. The last chapter examines the impacts of Mercosur on Brazilian local labor markets. Our analysis reveals that the increasing export opportunities due to the preferential tariff reductions implemented by Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay led to an increase in the number of formal workers in Brazil’s most exposed regions compared to the less exposed ones. Interestingly, we also find that Brazil’s preferential tariffs on its Mercosur partners relatively increased earnings premia in harder-hit regions. Furthermore, given that Brazilian unilateral trade liberalization coincided with the establishment of Mercosur, we also investigate whether the existing literature’s findings on the negative effects of Brazilian unilateral liberalization on labor markets hold when accounting for Mercosur tariff reductions. Our findings indicate that the impact is even more pronounced when considering the Mercosur.
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spelling Ogeda, Pedro MolinaEscolas::EESPPessoa, João Paulo Cordeiro de NoronhaCavalcanti, TiagoDix-Carneiro, RafaelSoares, Rodrigo ReisOrnelas, Emanuel2024-05-21T13:36:33Z2024-05-21T13:36:33Z2024-05-07https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35327This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter show that the Brazilian trade liberalization in the early 1990s led to a permanent relative decline in the vote share of left-wing presidential candidates in the regions more affected by the tariff cuts. This happened even though the shock, implemented by a right-wing party, induced a contraction in manufacturing and formal employment in the more affected regions, and despite the left’s identification with protectionist policies. To rationalize this response, we consider a new institutional channel for the political effects of trade shocks: the weakening of labor unions. We provide support for this mechanism in two steps. First, we show that union presence—proxied by the number of workers directly employed by unions, by union density, and by the number of union establishments—declined in regions that became more exposed to foreign competition. Second, we show that the negative effect of tariff reductions on the votes for the left was driven exclusively by political parties with historical links to unions. Furthermore, the impact of the trade liberalization on the vote share of these parties was significant only in regions that had unions operating before the reform. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that tariff cuts reduced the vote share of the left partly through the weakening of labor unions. This institutional channel is fundamentally different from the individual-level responses, motivated by economic or identity concerns, that have been considered in the literature. The second chapter examines the indirect effects of the U.S.-China trade war on the Brazilian labor market. We exploit the tariff increases across industries and the sectoral employment distribution across local labor markets to measure the degree of exposure of a Brazilian region to the trade war. Our findings reveal that while American discriminatory tariffs did not significantly impact Brazilian local labor markets, regions more exposed to Chinese retaliatory tariffs experienced a relative increase in the number of formal workers and wage bills. Additionally, we find that industries more exposed to Chinese duties experienced an increase in net exports. In contrast, industries exposed to American tariffs experienced a relative reduction in net exports. These insights contribute to a better understanding of the intricate worldwide implications of the U.S.-China trade war. The last chapter examines the impacts of Mercosur on Brazilian local labor markets. Our analysis reveals that the increasing export opportunities due to the preferential tariff reductions implemented by Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay led to an increase in the number of formal workers in Brazil’s most exposed regions compared to the less exposed ones. Interestingly, we also find that Brazil’s preferential tariffs on its Mercosur partners relatively increased earnings premia in harder-hit regions. Furthermore, given that Brazilian unilateral trade liberalization coincided with the establishment of Mercosur, we also investigate whether the existing literature’s findings on the negative effects of Brazilian unilateral liberalization on labor markets hold when accounting for Mercosur tariff reductions. Our findings indicate that the impact is even more pronounced when considering the Mercosur.Esta tese é composta por três capítulos independentes. O primeiro capítulo demonstra que a liberalização comercial brasileira no início dos anos 1990 levou a uma queda relativa permanente na parcela de votos dos candidatos presidenciais de esquerda nas regiões mais afetadas pelos cortes tarifários. Isso ocorreu mesmo que o choque, implementado por um partido de direita, tenha induzido uma contração na manufatura e no emprego formal nas regiões mais afetadas, e apesar da identificação da esquerda com políticas protecionistas. Para racionalizar essa resposta, consideramos um novo canal institucional para os efeitos políticos dos choques comerciais: o enfraquecimento dos sindicatos trabalhistas. Apresentamos apoio a esse mecanismo em dois passos. Primeiro, mostramos que a presença sindical - representada pela quantidade de trabalhadores diretamente empregados por sindicatos, pela densidade sindical e pelo número de estabelecimentos sindicais - diminuiu em regiões que se tornaram mais expostas à competição estrangeira. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que o efeito negativo das reduções tarifárias nos votos para a esquerda foi impulsionado exclusivamente por partidos políticos com vínculos históricos com os sindicatos. Além disso, o impacto da liberalização comercial na parcela de votos desses partidos foi significativo apenas em regiões que tinham sindicatos operando antes da reforma. Essas descobertas são consistentes com a hipótese de que os cortes tarifários reduziram a parcela de votos da esquerda em parte através do enfraquecimento dos sindicatos trabalhistas. Este canal institucional é fundamentalmente diferente das respostas em nível individual, motivadas por preocupações econômicas ou de identidade, que foram consideradas na literatura. O segundo capítulo examina os efeitos indiretos da guerra comercial EUA-China no mercado de trabalho brasileiro. Exploramos os aumentos tarifários em diferentes setores industriais e a distribuição setorial do emprego nos mercados de trabalho locais brasileiros para medir o grau de exposição de uma região brasileira à guerra comercial. Nossas descobertas revelam que, enquanto as tarifas discriminatórias americanas não impactaram significativamente os mercados de trabalho locais brasileiros, as regiões mais expostas às tarifas retaliatórias chinesas experimentaram um aumento relativo no número de trabalhadores formais e na folha de pagamento. Além disso, descobrimos que indústrias mais expostas às tarifas chinesas experimentaram um aumento nas exportações líquidas. Em contraste, as indústrias expostas às tarifas americanas experimentaram uma redução relativa nas exportações líquidas. Essas percepções contribuem para uma melhor compreensão das complexas implicações mundiais da guerra comercial EUA-China. O último capítulo examina os impactos do Mercosul nos mercados de trabalho locais brasileiros. Nossa análise revela que as oportunidades de exportação crescentes devido às reduções tarifárias preferenciais implementadas pela Argentina, Paraguai e Uruguai levaram a um aumento no número de trabalhadores formais nas regiões mais expostas do Brasil em comparação com as menos expostas. Curiosamente, também descobrimos que as tarifas preferenciais do Brasil em seus parceiros do Mercosul aumentaram relativamente os prêmios salariais em regiões mais afetadas. Além disso, dado que a liberalização comercial unilateral do Brasil coincidiu com o estabelecimento do Mercosul, investigamos também se as descobertas da literatura existente sobre os efeitos negativos da liberalização unilateral brasileira nos mercados de trabalho se mantêm quando se consideram as reduções tarifárias do Mercosul. Nossas descobertas indicam que o impacto é ainda mais pronunciado ao se considerar o Mercosul.engTrade shocksElectionsUnionsLocal labor marketsTrade warFree trade agreementsBrazilMercosurChoques comerciaisEleiçõesSindicatosMercados de trabalho locaisGuerra comercialAcordos de livre comércioMercosulBrasilEconomiaPolítica comercialComércio internacionalRelações econômicas internacionaisMERCOSUL (Organização)Mercado de trabalho - BrasilEssays on trade policyinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVORIGINALTese Formatada - Com Ficha.pdfTese Formatada - Com Ficha.pdfPDFapplication/pdf2017568https://repositorio.fgv.br/bitstreams/09b989f5-ee0f-4e0a-b91c-b0f094e757b0/download3c6201d088236148ebfb7254e19b203eMD51LICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; 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dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Essays on trade policy
title Essays on trade policy
spellingShingle Essays on trade policy
Ogeda, Pedro Molina
Trade shocks
Elections
Unions
Local labor markets
Trade war
Free trade agreements
Brazil
Mercosur
Choques comerciais
Eleições
Sindicatos
Mercados de trabalho locais
Guerra comercial
Acordos de livre comércio
Mercosul
Brasil
Economia
Política comercial
Comércio internacional
Relações econômicas internacionais
MERCOSUL (Organização)
Mercado de trabalho - Brasil
title_short Essays on trade policy
title_full Essays on trade policy
title_fullStr Essays on trade policy
title_full_unstemmed Essays on trade policy
title_sort Essays on trade policy
author Ogeda, Pedro Molina
author_facet Ogeda, Pedro Molina
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EESP
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Pessoa, João Paulo Cordeiro de Noronha
Cavalcanti, Tiago
Dix-Carneiro, Rafael
Soares, Rodrigo Reis
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Ogeda, Pedro Molina
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Ornelas, Emanuel
contributor_str_mv Ornelas, Emanuel
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Trade shocks
Elections
Unions
Local labor markets
Trade war
Free trade agreements
Brazil
Mercosur
topic Trade shocks
Elections
Unions
Local labor markets
Trade war
Free trade agreements
Brazil
Mercosur
Choques comerciais
Eleições
Sindicatos
Mercados de trabalho locais
Guerra comercial
Acordos de livre comércio
Mercosul
Brasil
Economia
Política comercial
Comércio internacional
Relações econômicas internacionais
MERCOSUL (Organização)
Mercado de trabalho - Brasil
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Choques comerciais
Eleições
Sindicatos
Mercados de trabalho locais
Guerra comercial
Acordos de livre comércio
Mercosul
Brasil
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Economia
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Política comercial
Comércio internacional
Relações econômicas internacionais
MERCOSUL (Organização)
Mercado de trabalho - Brasil
description This thesis consists of three independent chapters. The first chapter show that the Brazilian trade liberalization in the early 1990s led to a permanent relative decline in the vote share of left-wing presidential candidates in the regions more affected by the tariff cuts. This happened even though the shock, implemented by a right-wing party, induced a contraction in manufacturing and formal employment in the more affected regions, and despite the left’s identification with protectionist policies. To rationalize this response, we consider a new institutional channel for the political effects of trade shocks: the weakening of labor unions. We provide support for this mechanism in two steps. First, we show that union presence—proxied by the number of workers directly employed by unions, by union density, and by the number of union establishments—declined in regions that became more exposed to foreign competition. Second, we show that the negative effect of tariff reductions on the votes for the left was driven exclusively by political parties with historical links to unions. Furthermore, the impact of the trade liberalization on the vote share of these parties was significant only in regions that had unions operating before the reform. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that tariff cuts reduced the vote share of the left partly through the weakening of labor unions. This institutional channel is fundamentally different from the individual-level responses, motivated by economic or identity concerns, that have been considered in the literature. The second chapter examines the indirect effects of the U.S.-China trade war on the Brazilian labor market. We exploit the tariff increases across industries and the sectoral employment distribution across local labor markets to measure the degree of exposure of a Brazilian region to the trade war. Our findings reveal that while American discriminatory tariffs did not significantly impact Brazilian local labor markets, regions more exposed to Chinese retaliatory tariffs experienced a relative increase in the number of formal workers and wage bills. Additionally, we find that industries more exposed to Chinese duties experienced an increase in net exports. In contrast, industries exposed to American tariffs experienced a relative reduction in net exports. These insights contribute to a better understanding of the intricate worldwide implications of the U.S.-China trade war. The last chapter examines the impacts of Mercosur on Brazilian local labor markets. Our analysis reveals that the increasing export opportunities due to the preferential tariff reductions implemented by Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay led to an increase in the number of formal workers in Brazil’s most exposed regions compared to the less exposed ones. Interestingly, we also find that Brazil’s preferential tariffs on its Mercosur partners relatively increased earnings premia in harder-hit regions. Furthermore, given that Brazilian unilateral trade liberalization coincided with the establishment of Mercosur, we also investigate whether the existing literature’s findings on the negative effects of Brazilian unilateral liberalization on labor markets hold when accounting for Mercosur tariff reductions. Our findings indicate that the impact is even more pronounced when considering the Mercosur.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2024-05-21T13:36:33Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2024-05-21T13:36:33Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2024-05-07
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
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dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35327
url https://hdl.handle.net/10438/35327
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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