Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Piffer, Daro Marcos
Data de Publicação: 2013
Tipo de documento: Dissertação
Idioma: por
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)
Texto Completo: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/10665
Resumo: The reaction of the banking authority during a crisis is very important for the mitigation of their effects. In Brazil, during the subprime crisis in 2008, it was observed a run on some banks that led the Central Bank to authorize a special line of attracting time deposits with special guarantee called DPGE. This is an opportunity to observe the depositors reaction to a shock that is exogenous to the domestic banking system, to then to explore an exogenous deposit inflow as a result of expansion within the limits of deposits insured, with coverage of the Brazilian Deposit Insurance Fund (FGC, for its acronym in Portuguese). In addition, it was analyzed the effect of the DPGE on credit supply, whereas insured and non-insured deposits are not perfect substitutes and an increase in the supply of insured deposits should increase the supply of credit in the market as a whole. The empirical strategy used allowed to recognize the issuing banks of DPGE, separating them from other factors related to the banking fundaments (size, liquidity, asset quality and return). The database used also allowed to observe the behavior of these banks and the strategy used by them at the origin and destination of such resources. Taken together, the results are consistent with the idea that depositors ran for safety during the crisis in the so-called 'flight to quality' and return when they give the security required. It is also consistent with the theory that the imperfect substitutability of insured deposits and uninsured deposits affect the tightness of banks’ financing constraints. The result of this study shows the importance of the role of the regulator facing critical situations, as well as the effects on the market caused by the permanence of a product designed for a specific situation.
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spelling Piffer, Daro MarcosEscolas::EAESPSaito, RichardMaia, Carlos DonizetiSchiozer, Rafael Felipe2013-03-27T16:03:12Z2013-03-27T16:03:12Z2013-02-25PIFFER, Daro Marcos. Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2013.http://hdl.handle.net/10438/10665The reaction of the banking authority during a crisis is very important for the mitigation of their effects. In Brazil, during the subprime crisis in 2008, it was observed a run on some banks that led the Central Bank to authorize a special line of attracting time deposits with special guarantee called DPGE. This is an opportunity to observe the depositors reaction to a shock that is exogenous to the domestic banking system, to then to explore an exogenous deposit inflow as a result of expansion within the limits of deposits insured, with coverage of the Brazilian Deposit Insurance Fund (FGC, for its acronym in Portuguese). In addition, it was analyzed the effect of the DPGE on credit supply, whereas insured and non-insured deposits are not perfect substitutes and an increase in the supply of insured deposits should increase the supply of credit in the market as a whole. The empirical strategy used allowed to recognize the issuing banks of DPGE, separating them from other factors related to the banking fundaments (size, liquidity, asset quality and return). The database used also allowed to observe the behavior of these banks and the strategy used by them at the origin and destination of such resources. Taken together, the results are consistent with the idea that depositors ran for safety during the crisis in the so-called 'flight to quality' and return when they give the security required. It is also consistent with the theory that the imperfect substitutability of insured deposits and uninsured deposits affect the tightness of banks’ financing constraints. The result of this study shows the importance of the role of the regulator facing critical situations, as well as the effects on the market caused by the permanence of a product designed for a specific situation.A reação da autoridade bancária frente a uma crise é de fundamental importância para a sua contenção. No Brasil, durante a crise do subprime, em 2008, observou-se a ocorrência de uma crise de liquidez em alguns bancos que levou o Banco Central a autorizar uma linha especial de captação de depósitos com limite muito superior ao habitual, denominado Depósito a Prazo com Garantia Especial (DPGE). Estes fatos propiciaram uma oportunidade de observar a reação dos depositantes frente a um choque exógeno ao sistema financeiro nacional para, em seguida, explorar a captação exógena de recursos devido à ampliação nos limites dos depósitos assegurados, com cobertura do Fundo Garantidor de Crédito (FGC). Além disso, analisou-se o efeito do DPGE sobre o crédito, considerando que depósitos assegurados e não-assegurados não são substitutos perfeitos e um aumento na oferta de depósitos assegurados deveria aumentar a oferta de crédito do mercado, como um todo. A estratégia empírica utilizada permitiu reconhecer os bancos emissores de DPGE, separando-os por outros fatores relacionados aos fundamentos bancários (tamanho, liquidez, qualidade dos ativos e retorno) e analisar os efeitos do DPGE nas taxas de juros praticadas na captação de depósitos a prazo, em geral. A base de dados utilizada também permitiu observar o comportamento desses bancos e a estratégia por eles utilizada na origem e destinação de tais recursos. Tomados em conjunto, os resultados encontrados são consistentes com a ideia de que depositantes migram seus recursos para a segurança durante a crise, na chamada “fuga para a qualidade” e retornam quando lhes dão a garantia necessária. Também é coerente com a teoria que diz que a substituição imperfeita entre depósitos assegurados e depósitos não-assegurados afeta a restrição de financiamentos dos bancos. O resultado deste estudo revela a importância da atuação da autoridade reguladora frente a situações críticas, bem como os efeitos no mercado causados pela permanência de um produto desenhado para uma situação específica.porCrise financeiraSistema financeiroBanco CentralSeguro depósitoDPGECrise bancáriaAdministração de empresasBanco Central do BrasilCrise financeiraLiquidez (Economia)Administração bancáriaSeguro de depósitosCrise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiroinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesisreponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital)instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV)instacron:FGVinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessORIGINAL2013_FGVDissertação_Daro_DPGE.pdf2013_FGVDissertação_Daro_DPGE.pdfDissertação de 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dc.title.por.fl_str_mv Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
title Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
spellingShingle Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
Piffer, Daro Marcos
Crise financeira
Sistema financeiro
Banco Central
Seguro depósito
DPGE
Crise bancária
Administração de empresas
Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Liquidez (Economia)
Administração bancária
Seguro de depósitos
title_short Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
title_full Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
title_fullStr Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
title_full_unstemmed Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
title_sort Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro
author Piffer, Daro Marcos
author_facet Piffer, Daro Marcos
author_role author
dc.contributor.unidadefgv.por.fl_str_mv Escolas::EAESP
dc.contributor.member.none.fl_str_mv Saito, Richard
Maia, Carlos Donizeti
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Piffer, Daro Marcos
dc.contributor.advisor1.fl_str_mv Schiozer, Rafael Felipe
contributor_str_mv Schiozer, Rafael Felipe
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Crise financeira
Sistema financeiro
Banco Central
Seguro depósito
DPGE
Crise bancária
topic Crise financeira
Sistema financeiro
Banco Central
Seguro depósito
DPGE
Crise bancária
Administração de empresas
Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Liquidez (Economia)
Administração bancária
Seguro de depósitos
dc.subject.area.por.fl_str_mv Administração de empresas
dc.subject.bibliodata.por.fl_str_mv Banco Central do Brasil
Crise financeira
Liquidez (Economia)
Administração bancária
Seguro de depósitos
description The reaction of the banking authority during a crisis is very important for the mitigation of their effects. In Brazil, during the subprime crisis in 2008, it was observed a run on some banks that led the Central Bank to authorize a special line of attracting time deposits with special guarantee called DPGE. This is an opportunity to observe the depositors reaction to a shock that is exogenous to the domestic banking system, to then to explore an exogenous deposit inflow as a result of expansion within the limits of deposits insured, with coverage of the Brazilian Deposit Insurance Fund (FGC, for its acronym in Portuguese). In addition, it was analyzed the effect of the DPGE on credit supply, whereas insured and non-insured deposits are not perfect substitutes and an increase in the supply of insured deposits should increase the supply of credit in the market as a whole. The empirical strategy used allowed to recognize the issuing banks of DPGE, separating them from other factors related to the banking fundaments (size, liquidity, asset quality and return). The database used also allowed to observe the behavior of these banks and the strategy used by them at the origin and destination of such resources. Taken together, the results are consistent with the idea that depositors ran for safety during the crisis in the so-called 'flight to quality' and return when they give the security required. It is also consistent with the theory that the imperfect substitutability of insured deposits and uninsured deposits affect the tightness of banks’ financing constraints. The result of this study shows the importance of the role of the regulator facing critical situations, as well as the effects on the market caused by the permanence of a product designed for a specific situation.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.accessioned.fl_str_mv 2013-03-27T16:03:12Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2013-03-27T16:03:12Z
dc.date.issued.fl_str_mv 2013-02-25
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
format masterThesis
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dc.identifier.citation.fl_str_mv PIFFER, Daro Marcos. Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2013.
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identifier_str_mv PIFFER, Daro Marcos. Crise de confiança e liquidez bancária: evidências empíricas no mercado bancário brasileiro. Dissertação (Mestrado em Administração de Empresas) - FGV - Fundação Getúlio Vargas, São Paulo, 2013.
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