OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER?
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2022 |
Outros Autores: | , , |
Tipo de documento: | Artigo |
Idioma: | por |
Título da fonte: | Revista Universo Contábil |
Texto Completo: | https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774 |
Resumo: | This study aimed to determine to what extent ownership concentration influences tax avoidance behaviors of state control firms. We quantified tax avoidance with two metrics proposed by Atwood et al. (2012) and Tang (2015). Based on reference forms, we calculated the percentage of ownership concentration for each firm in the sample, including all firms traded on B3 in 2010-2017, represented by 1740-1781 observations. We scored state ownership with a dummy variable. We found a positive and significant association between firms with majority state ownership and the tax avoidance metric TA1 (percentage of current expenditures paid by the firm). When the interaction variable ‘ownership concentration x state control’ was inserted into the model, the coefficient was positive and significant (indicating that the higher the percentage of state-owned shares, the smaller the likelihood of engagement in tax avoidance). In contrast, while the association between ownership concentration and TA1 was negative and significant. Thus, we may infer that firms with low ownership concentration tend to adopt more aggressive fiscal practices. There is evidence that the higher the percentage of ownership concentration of companies with majority state control, the lower the level of aggressive fiscal practices and, consequently, the lower the adoption of strategies that aim to improve the company's cash flow and the amount of resources available for distribution to shareholders. |
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OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER?CONCENTRACIÓN ACCIONARIA Y TAX AVOIDANCE: ¿Y CUANDO EL ESTADO ES EL MAYOR ACCIONISTA?CONCENTRAÇÃO ACIONÁRIA E TAX AVOIDANCE: E QUANDO O ESTADO É O MAIOR ACIONISTA?Ownership concentrationState controlTax avoidanceConcentración accionariaControl estatalTax avoidanceConcentração acionáriaControle estatalTax avoidanceThis study aimed to determine to what extent ownership concentration influences tax avoidance behaviors of state control firms. We quantified tax avoidance with two metrics proposed by Atwood et al. (2012) and Tang (2015). Based on reference forms, we calculated the percentage of ownership concentration for each firm in the sample, including all firms traded on B3 in 2010-2017, represented by 1740-1781 observations. We scored state ownership with a dummy variable. We found a positive and significant association between firms with majority state ownership and the tax avoidance metric TA1 (percentage of current expenditures paid by the firm). When the interaction variable ‘ownership concentration x state control’ was inserted into the model, the coefficient was positive and significant (indicating that the higher the percentage of state-owned shares, the smaller the likelihood of engagement in tax avoidance). In contrast, while the association between ownership concentration and TA1 was negative and significant. Thus, we may infer that firms with low ownership concentration tend to adopt more aggressive fiscal practices. There is evidence that the higher the percentage of ownership concentration of companies with majority state control, the lower the level of aggressive fiscal practices and, consequently, the lower the adoption of strategies that aim to improve the company's cash flow and the amount of resources available for distribution to shareholders.Este estudio examina hasta qué punto la concentración accionaria impacta el nivel de actividades de tax avoidance de las empresas de control estatal. Para estimar el nivel de tax avoidance, se utilizaron dos métricas, propuestas por Atwood et al. (2012) y Tang (2015). A partir de los datos de los Formularios de Referencia, se calculó el porcentaje de concentración accionaria de las empresas. Para identificar a las empresas controladas por el Estado se utilizó una variable dummy. Basados en una muestra que reúne entre 1.740 y 1.781 observaciones de empresas listadas en la B3, correspondientes al período 2010-2017, se constató una relación positiva y significativa entre las empresas que tienen al Estado como mayor accionista y la métrica de Tax Avoidance (TA1), que indica el porcentaje de los respectivos gastos corrientes pagados por la empresa. Cuando la variable de interacción de la concentración accionaria con el control estatal se inserta en el modelo, además de presentarse un coeficiente positivo y significativo, indicando que a un mayor porcentaje de acciones propiedad del Estado, menor es la adopción de estrategias de evasión fiscal, la asociación entre la concentración de acciones y TA1 se muestra significativa y negativa. Por tanto, se puede inferir que las empresas con baja concentración accionaria son más agresivas en términos fiscales, e que cuanto mayor es el porcentaje de concentración accionaria de las empresas con control estatal mayoritario, menor es el nivel de actividades fiscales agresivas y, en consecuencia, menor es la adopción de estrategias que apuntan a mejorar el flujo de caja de la empresa y la cantidad de recursos disponibles para su distribución a los accionistas.Este estudo examina em que extensão a concentração acionária impacta o nível de atividades de tax avoidance das empresas controladas pelo Estado. Para estimação do nível de tax avoidance, foram utilizadas duas métricas, propostas por Atwood et al. (2012) e Tang (2015). A partir dos dados dos Formulários de Referência, foi calculada a porcentagem de concentração acionária das empresas. Para identificação das empresas controladas pelo Estado, utilizou-se uma variável dummy. A partir de uma amostra que reúne entre 1.740 e 1.781 observações de empresas listadas na B3, referentes ao período 2010-2017, constatou-se uma relação positiva e significante entre as empresas que têm o Estado como maior acionista e a métrica de Tax Avoidance (TA1), que indica a porcentagem das respectivas despesas correntes pagas pela empresa. Quando a variável de interação da concentração acionária com o controle estatal é inserida no modelo, além de apresentar coeficiente positivo e significante, indicando que quanto maior for a porcentagem de ações de propriedade do Estado, menor será a adoção de estratégias de tax avoidance, a associação entre a concentração acionária e a TA1 se mostra significante e negativa. Dessa forma, além dos resultados indicarem que as empresas com baixa concentração acionária são mais agressivas em termos fiscais, há evidências de que quanto maior o percentual de controle acionário das empresas que têm o Estado como acionista controlador, menor o nível de agressividade fiscal e, consequentemente, menor a adoção de estratégias que visam melhorar o fluxo de caixa da empresa e a quantidade de recursos disponíveis para distribuição aos acionistas.Universidade Regional de Blumenau2022-07-26info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774Revista Universo Contábil; v. 17 n. 2 (2021)1809-33371809-3337reponame:Revista Universo Contábilinstname:Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)instacron:FURBporhttps://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774/5766Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Universo Contábilinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessMedeiros, Jislene TrindadeSoares, Rômulo AlvesDe Luca, Márcia Martins MendesTeodosio, Igor Rodrigo Menezes2022-09-27T20:30:42Zoai:ojs.bu.furb.br:article/9774Revistahttps://proxy.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/PUBhttps://proxy.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/oai||universocontabil@furb.br1809-33371809-3337opendoar:2022-09-27T20:30:42Revista Universo Contábil - Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? CONCENTRACIÓN ACCIONARIA Y TAX AVOIDANCE: ¿Y CUANDO EL ESTADO ES EL MAYOR ACCIONISTA? CONCENTRAÇÃO ACIONÁRIA E TAX AVOIDANCE: E QUANDO O ESTADO É O MAIOR ACIONISTA? |
title |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
spellingShingle |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? Medeiros, Jislene Trindade Ownership concentration State control Tax avoidance Concentración accionaria Control estatal Tax avoidance Concentração acionária Controle estatal Tax avoidance |
title_short |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
title_full |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
title_fullStr |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
title_full_unstemmed |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
title_sort |
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AND TAX AVOIDANCE: WHAT IF THE STATE IS THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDER? |
author |
Medeiros, Jislene Trindade |
author_facet |
Medeiros, Jislene Trindade Soares, Rômulo Alves De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes Teodosio, Igor Rodrigo Menezes |
author_role |
author |
author2 |
Soares, Rômulo Alves De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes Teodosio, Igor Rodrigo Menezes |
author2_role |
author author author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Medeiros, Jislene Trindade Soares, Rômulo Alves De Luca, Márcia Martins Mendes Teodosio, Igor Rodrigo Menezes |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Ownership concentration State control Tax avoidance Concentración accionaria Control estatal Tax avoidance Concentração acionária Controle estatal Tax avoidance |
topic |
Ownership concentration State control Tax avoidance Concentración accionaria Control estatal Tax avoidance Concentração acionária Controle estatal Tax avoidance |
description |
This study aimed to determine to what extent ownership concentration influences tax avoidance behaviors of state control firms. We quantified tax avoidance with two metrics proposed by Atwood et al. (2012) and Tang (2015). Based on reference forms, we calculated the percentage of ownership concentration for each firm in the sample, including all firms traded on B3 in 2010-2017, represented by 1740-1781 observations. We scored state ownership with a dummy variable. We found a positive and significant association between firms with majority state ownership and the tax avoidance metric TA1 (percentage of current expenditures paid by the firm). When the interaction variable ‘ownership concentration x state control’ was inserted into the model, the coefficient was positive and significant (indicating that the higher the percentage of state-owned shares, the smaller the likelihood of engagement in tax avoidance). In contrast, while the association between ownership concentration and TA1 was negative and significant. Thus, we may infer that firms with low ownership concentration tend to adopt more aggressive fiscal practices. There is evidence that the higher the percentage of ownership concentration of companies with majority state control, the lower the level of aggressive fiscal practices and, consequently, the lower the adoption of strategies that aim to improve the company's cash flow and the amount of resources available for distribution to shareholders. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-07-26 |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
format |
article |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774 |
url |
https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774 |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
por |
language |
por |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://ojsrevista.furb.br/ojs/index.php/universocontabil/article/view/9774/5766 |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Universo Contábil info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Revista Universo Contábil |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Regional de Blumenau |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidade Regional de Blumenau |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
Revista Universo Contábil; v. 17 n. 2 (2021) 1809-3337 1809-3337 reponame:Revista Universo Contábil instname:Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB) instacron:FURB |
instname_str |
Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB) |
instacron_str |
FURB |
institution |
FURB |
reponame_str |
Revista Universo Contábil |
collection |
Revista Universo Contábil |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Revista Universo Contábil - Universidade Regional de Blumenau (FURB) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
||universocontabil@furb.br |
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1798945117828022272 |