A psicologia moral minimalista de Nietzsche

• Autor(a) principal: Williams, Bernard
• Data de Publicação: 2019
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: por
• Título da fonte: Cadernos Nietzsche
• Texto Completo: https://periodicos.unifesp.br/index.php/cniet/article/view/7751
• topic: psicologia moral; realismo; vontade; censura; moral psychology; naturalism; realism; willing; blame

In this paper Bernard Williams points out the theoretical difficulties involved in any attempt to define what would be a “naturalistic” moral psychology. According to Williams´s reading, Nietzsche´s attempts to develop a minimalistic moral psychology in his explanation of moral phenomena by introducing in his analysis both non-moral vocabulary and information obtained from non-moral domains of human experiences would be more understandable if they were described as a kind of “realism”. Williams applied this hermeneutical hypothesis to the nietzschean analysis of the “willing” phenomenon, which is connected with a very peculiar view of the conditions for assigning responsibility and blame.