Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
Autor(a) principal: | |
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Data de Publicação: | 2012 |
Idioma: | eng |
Título da fonte: | Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) |
dARK ID: | ark:/51990/0013000000m4s |
Texto Completo: | https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255 |
Resumo: | The Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…) |
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Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in KenyaDo Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in KenyaThe Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…)1 p.2024-10-03T23:53:20Z2024-10-03T23:53:20Z2012One Pagerinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255ark:/51990/0013000000m4sInternational Policy Centre for Inclusive GrowthUnited Nations Development ProgrammeLicença total exclusivaO texto e dados desta publicação podem ser reproduzidos desde que as fontes sejam citadas. Reproduções com fins comerciais são proibidas.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTeam, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluationengreponame:Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)instname:Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)instacron:IPEA2024-10-04T06:16:04Zoai:repositorio.ipea.gov.br:11058/15255Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/oai/requestsuporte@ipea.gov.bropendoar:2024-10-04T06:16:04Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)false |
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
spellingShingle |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title_short |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title_full |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title_fullStr |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title_full_unstemmed |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
title_sort |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
author |
Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation |
author_facet |
Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation |
author_role |
author |
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv |
Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation |
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
topic |
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya |
description |
The Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…) |
publishDate |
2012 |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2012 2024-10-03T23:53:20Z 2024-10-03T23:53:20Z |
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv |
One Pager |
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255 |
dc.identifier.dark.fl_str_mv |
ark:/51990/0013000000m4s |
url |
https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255 |
identifier_str_mv |
ark:/51990/0013000000m4s |
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv |
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth United Nations Development Programme Licença total exclusiva info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth United Nations Development Programme Licença total exclusiva |
eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) instname:Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) instacron:IPEA |
instname_str |
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) |
instacron_str |
IPEA |
institution |
IPEA |
reponame_str |
Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) |
collection |
Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
suporte@ipea.gov.br |
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1815173044659814400 |