Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor(a) principal: Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
Data de Publicação: 2012
Idioma: eng
Título da fonte: Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)
dARK ID: ark:/51990/0013000000m4s
Texto Completo: https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255
Resumo: The Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…)
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spelling Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in KenyaDo Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in KenyaThe Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…)1 p.2024-10-03T23:53:20Z2024-10-03T23:53:20Z2012One Pagerinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255ark:/51990/0013000000m4sInternational Policy Centre for Inclusive GrowthUnited Nations Development ProgrammeLicença total exclusivaO texto e dados desta publicação podem ser reproduzidos desde que as fontes sejam citadas. Reproduções com fins comerciais são proibidas.info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessTeam, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluationengreponame:Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)instname:Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)instacron:IPEA2024-10-04T06:16:04Zoai:repositorio.ipea.gov.br:11058/15255Repositório InstitucionalPUBhttp://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/oai/requestsuporte@ipea.gov.bropendoar:2024-10-04T06:16:04Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)false
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
spellingShingle Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title_short Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title_full Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title_fullStr Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title_full_unstemmed Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
title_sort Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
author Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
author_facet Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
author_role author
dc.contributor.author.fl_str_mv Team, Kenya CT-OVC Evaluation
dc.subject.por.fl_str_mv Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
topic Do Cash Transfers Change Household Consumption Preferences? – Evidence from an Unconditional Cash Transfer in Kenya
description The Kenya Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) is the government’s flagship social protection programme, reaching over 125,000 households and 250,000 OVC across the country as of mid-2011. The programme’s objective is to provide regular cash transfers to families living with OVC, to encourage fostering and retention of children and to promote development of their human capital. Eligible households, those who are ultra-poor and contain an OVC, receive a flat monthly transfer of US$21 (Ksh 1500). An OVC is defined as a household resident aged between 0 and 17 years old with at least one deceased parent, or who is chronically ill, or whose main caregiver is chronically ill. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment, although there are currently no punitive sanctions for non-compliance with this responsibility. (…)
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012
2024-10-03T23:53:20Z
2024-10-03T23:53:20Z
dc.type.driver.fl_str_mv One Pager
dc.type.status.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.uri.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255
dc.identifier.dark.fl_str_mv ark:/51990/0013000000m4s
url https://repositorio.ipea.gov.br/handle/11058/15255
identifier_str_mv ark:/51990/0013000000m4s
dc.language.iso.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.driver.fl_str_mv International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
United Nations Development Programme
Licença total exclusiva
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
United Nations Development Programme
Licença total exclusiva
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)
instname:Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)
instacron:IPEA
instname_str Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)
instacron_str IPEA
institution IPEA
reponame_str Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)
collection Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea)
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositório Institucional da IPEA (RCIpea) - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA)
repository.mail.fl_str_mv suporte@ipea.gov.br
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