GOVERNANCE THROUGH STOCK TRADING IN BRAZIL: EVIDENCE WITH INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS

• Autor(a) principal: VASCONCELOS,LUCAS N. C.
• Data de Publicação: 2020
• Outros Autores: MARTINS,ORLEANS S.
• Tipo de documento: Artigo
• Idioma: eng
• Título da fonte: RAM. Revista de Administração Mackenzie
• Texto Completo: http://old.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1678-69712020000600701
• topic: Corporate governance; Exit; Stock price Informativeness; Institutional investor; Bid-ask spread

ABSTRACT Purpose: This paper analyses the viability of stock trading as a mechanism to promote corporate governance, addressing its effects on abnormal returns, information, and firm performance. Originality/value: The study indicates that competition among institutional investors is important to raise stock price efficiency. Policies that allow capital inflow, increase in liquidity, and a link between managers’ salaries and stock performance are beneficial to reinforce the stock market efficiency. Design/methodology/approach: Hypotheses testing using panel data regressions of 233 stocks between December 2009 to December 2017 from Thomson Eikon, Economatica and ComDinheiro. Findings: The results indicate that the number of institutional investors is not related to abnormal returns. On the other hand, the number of institutional investors increases the amount of firm-specific information into stock prices, rising stock market price efficiency. This relationship is stronger among the preferred stocks (PN), but this mechanism is still not valid to increase firms’ operational performance. Despite the possible increase in stock price efficiency, the investors cannot adopt such a mechanism to exercise governance if there is no remuneration linked to performance.